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On July 19,1996 the eyes of the world shifted to the historic city of the south,
Atlanta, Georgia, for the Centennial Olympic Games. The Games which closed on
August 2, 1996, were followed in August by the X Paralympic (Special Olympics)
Games. While many Americans looked at the 1996 Games as the Atlanta
Olympics, international visitors more than likely saw them as "America's Games,"
and any problems encountered were a reflection of the country as much as of the
city. The security and protection of citizens and property, without mentioning, are
integral parts of the success of such special events as this would necessitate that
law enforcement agencies predetermine a plan of action to prevent, contain and
investigate any form of threat. The Atlanta Police Department (APD), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and a number of different local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies, private security guards and Atlanta Committee for the
Olympic Games (ACOG) volunteers, shared the responsibility for providing Olympic
security services during the Games.
As the 1996 Summer Olympic Games was an event of international
importance, the United States was concerned not only with the right-wing extremist
groups, but with the threat of terrorism. It should be remembered that during the
1972 Olympic Games, the Black September Palestinian Group took eleven Israeli
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athletes hostage and in a subsequent rescue attempt by the West German Police,
seventeen people were killed.1 The international coverage of this event shocked
the world, and brought worldwide focus to the issue of terrorism and its use of the
media for making political and ideological statements, often at the expense of
innocent civilians. Since this incident, elaborate security measures have become
an integral part of the preparations for any scheduled special event. The United
States citizens and the international Olympic family and those who attended the
Games demanded a high level of security and made their displeasure known when
it was not apparent. These needs placed major responsibilities on the FBI, the
leading federal agency, and other auxiliary agencies.
During the Olympics, specific details concerning uniformed officers'
responsibilities as well as prosecutorial responsibilities must be clearly defined.
Contingency plans for emergency operations may place SWAT personnel,
helicopter service or other specialized units on standby. Substantive planning
requires a thorough comprehension of available resources and how they can best
be allocated to fulfill most (if not all) identified needs.
It is essential for containment and investigation of terrorism, since
interagency cooperation is important in the prevention of terrorist activity. There
must be prompt assessment of the actors and their intentions, if possible. This
requires immediate access to all possible sources of information, dedication of
necessary resources, and careful coordination and planning by public services,
medical facilities, highway departments, fire, rescue and emergency services.
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Security for the 1996 Games was a major concern, with as many as 400,000
to 500,000 visitors a day in the downtown area, with more than 11,000 athletes from
nearly 200 nations competing. Most of the activities were at the center of the
central Atlanta business district called the "Olympic Ring." Within the three-mile (5-
kilometer) Olympic Ring were eleven competition venues and a variety of other
Olympic-related activities including the Athletes' Villages, the International Olympic
Committee Hotel, the main Olympic Stadium and Centennial Olympic Park. Other
venues stretched from Miami to Washington, D.C. and from Birmingham to the
Atlantic Ocean. All competed for security resources.
Satisfying the exceptional security load posed a major challenge to the law
enforcement officials. Law enforcement leadership needed to share resources and
professional knowledge; focusing this cooperative force to shape events and
motivate the community to support public safety goals, since terrorist
assassinations, bombings and hostage-takings undermine public confidence in,a
target government's ability to provide basic security. Such terrorist depredations
erode national resolve and faith in a country's leadership. When a nation is a target
of such actions, terrorism must be measured not only in loss of life or destruction of
property, but in less tangible terms: loss of government credibility and a diminished
capacity to influence domestic and international events and to promote the national
interest. The dramatic July 27, 1996 Centennial Park bombing during the Games
was a forceful reminder that, despite notable successes, the war against
international or domestic terrorism has not yet been won.
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The provision of public safety services at the 1996 Olympic Games was a
task shared among over fifty local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and
ACOG security. The role and responsibilities carried out by these entities were
predicated on close coordination and cooperation in both planning and operations.
Although the relationship between the law enforcement agencies and ACOG was
an interdependent one, the role of each was distinct and it is clear that law
enforcement agencies were ultimately in charge in the case of any emergency.
Statement of the Research Problem
When the XXth Olympiad Games held in Munich, West Germany in 1972
were marred by terrorist tragedy, the law enforcement community began to weigh
the Olympic Games with greater care and caution directed at security
considerations and heightened countermeasures. The 1972 tragic incident,
demonstrated the unparalleled opportunity that a massive congregation of
world-renowned athletes offered to terrorists interested in commanding the attention
of the world with a single, violent terrorist attack.
Not until the Munich tragedy did Olympic officials come to the realization that
the Games were not immune from terrorism. In his statement on the Olympics,
Dave Maples holds that:
The United States is perceived as a more violent society than other
societies, therefore, law enforcement agencies must allay those fears
in their security planning, because Munich has forever changed the
way not only the host country thinks about security, but the way
people attending the Games think about it.2
Numerous threats of terrorism and searing memories of the massacre of
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Israeli athletes ensured that security was an overriding concern during the 1996
Atlanta Summer Games.
ACOG security and law enforcement officials were faced with a "daunting
task," that is, to be aware of dozens of domestic and international terrorist groups of
every political persuasion; while exploring ways to protect athletes, officials, and
over 1.5 million visitors during the greatest sporting event in history. Assurances by
officials of strong security measures did little to relieve public concern of possible
terrorist threats or attacks at the Atlanta Games. An Atlanta Journal-Constitution
poll of downtown Atlanta workers in early 1996 showed 71 percent were concerned
about terrorism while in a national poll, 61 percent of Americans expressed concern
about the Games being a target for terrorists.3
History shows that terrorism has been used effectively since ancient times to
achieve often-dramatic success in realizing political or religious goals. Although
terrorism is not a new phenomenon, modern society and advanced technology have
provided small group of terrorists with the ability to influence world events. The
provision and assurance of public safety and security at major international events
have become an increasingly major issue over the past twenty to twenty-five years.
From the United States' perspective, the major change in international terrorism in
the 1990s has been that terrorists can strike on its soil as compared to the 1980s,
where few international terrorist actions were aimed at foreigners in the United
States. Although US citizens were often victims of terrorism, that primarily was a
result of attacks abroad. The February, 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in
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New York City killed six people, injured over one thousand. Other examples of the
spread of international terrorism in the United States, (US) including the 1994
conviction of Abu Nidal supporters for a Saint Louis murder, and the 1993 arrests
for the plot to bomb several New York buildings, further demonstrated increased
terrorist capabilities.
The Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) security officials and
law enforcement agencies, in the wake of the devastating truck bomb in Oklahoma
City on April 19, 1995 killing at least 110 people, were forced to reassess the
groups that might pose threats to the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Games. It
should be noted that many security and terrorism experts had all but dismissed the
right-wing extremists within the United States as a physical threat to the Olympics.
The primary threats were considered to be religious fundamentalist groups,
particularly those based in the Middle East. With the April 19th blast, and the July
27, 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing, it became apparent that domestic
terrorism poses a serious threat to security agencies and law enforcement officials.
Although the ACOG security officials were reluctant to link the Oklahoma
City bombing with preparations to protect the Games, they conceded that the
incident especially in such a high-profile event as the Centennial Olympics Games,
warranted a thorough investigation and close monitoring in order to learn anything
that could affect their security plans. Other security officials agreed that the
bombing had an effect on the federal government's allocation of resources for the
Olympics, including full intelligence efforts of the FBI and the CIA and other
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agencies to ensure that the United States would not be embarrassed.
The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) in 1993, rated Atlanta as the per capita
violent crime capital of the country though the crime rate dropped by ten percent in
1994; with the number of homicides at the lowest level since 1986. The Atlanta
Police Chief Beverly Harvard's primary goal is to involve the community in helping
to reduce crime.4 In addition to curbing crime, Harvard was required to organize
strong security for the 1996 Olympic Games.
Law enforcement and security agencies were also concerned with the
epidemic increase in gang-related crimes in the city of Atlanta. Their concern
stemmed from the geographical locations of strategic planning boundaries for the
Games which had spread within and outside what was called, the "Olympic Ring."
For example, the Olympic Village site in Southwest Metropolitan Atlanta was at the
Techwood Housing Community, and the Centennial Park at the Downtown area,
were not far from Underground Atlanta where major gang activities had occurred.
With projected crime statistics for the years 1992 through 1996 linked with the
additional traffic and ancillary problems proposed by the influx of Olympic visitors
and dignitaries, policing problems were astronomical at best.
Although terrorists have not attacked the Olympics since Munich in 1972, the
unique challenges presented by the return of the Olympic Games to the United
States for the second time in just over a decade, reinforced law enforcement's
constant vigilance against those who conspired to execute a terrorist attack to
garner international attention. Therefore, the magnitude of the Olympics and the
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international participation that characterizes this event heightened such concerns.
Purpose of the Study
This study focuses on the planning and coordinating strategies by multiple
agencies, including the Atlanta Police Department (APD), the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Georgia Bureau
of Investigations (GBI), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of State
(DOS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and other auxiliary agencies in
providing security during specific scheduled major events that have taken place
within the last fifteen years.
The purpose is to examine the law enforcement and security planning data to
the extent available on three prior Olympic Games (the 1972 Munich Games, 1984
Los Angeles Games, 1992 Barcelona Games) to assess the factors leading to the
1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Park bombing. In dealing with terrorism, the
United States and security agencies must, constantly evaluate the nature of the
threat which changes markedly over time. As the law enforcement community takes
steps to reduce the country's vulnerability to terrorist attack, terrorists continue to
find new "weak links" in the security chain which they can exploit.
Finally, this study attempts to capture important Olympic knowledge gleaned
through security operations' management and preserve for the safeguarding and
protection of personnel and assets for future Olympic Games and special event
security planners.
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Significance of the Study
This study is significant in that the perception that the United States is
immune to terrorist attacks has been shattered. International terrorists have
demonstrated they can strike within, as was the case in the World Trade Center
bombing of 1993. And domestic terrorists have shown they can cause more
damage, as in the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma.
These deadly acts of terrorism punctuated the importance of security issues
connected to international special events such as the Olympic Games. The
gathering of sports heroes and other dignitaries under international scrutiny, in a
spirit of friendly competition, created extraordinary and unique security standards.
A "complete success" in Atlanta was achieved through a planned, coordinated and
cooperative response from the local, state and federal law enforcement community.
Reviewing the lessons learned by the law enforcement communities who had
already experienced similar challenges proved to be invaluable to the Atlanta Police
Department (APD) and others. The professional knowledge passed on by these
law enforcement communities significantly contributed to the development of both
interagency and individual agency Olympic security plans and provided a blueprint
for security operations during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta.
With the passing of time, it will not be remembered that twenty-two people
died at the XXth Olympiad in Munich. It will be historically remembered, however,
as the beginning of "Olympic Terrorist Activity"5 on major events. The major
disruptions and disasters that terrorists visited on the Great Metropolitan Atlanta
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Centennial Park has again, changed the course of history. Those same Olympic
Games, which had been held sacred by all participants, people of the world, and
governments, had been reduced to a visual media event, a "killing field," a
statement by terrorists and a tragedy in Olympic history which will never be
forgotten. Coping effectively with such acts of terrorism in future Olympics is a
pursuit of cardinal significance. This study seeks to make a contribution to that
pursuit.
What is Terrorism?
The term terrorism did not come into popular usage until the 1790s when it
was employed to describe Jacobin excesses in revolutionary France. Based on the
Latin verbs terrere, to tremble or cause to tremble, and deterrere, meaning to
frighten from, the word terrorism has come to mean acts of violence designed to
influence political behavior through a process of intimidation.6
Since the late 1960s, there has been a vast proliferation in the usage of the
term terrorism. This term often has been confused with other forms of low-intensity
conflict, which at times is also called sub-state violence.7 Usually, perpetrators of
violent deeds prefer to call themselves something other than terrorists. Hence, we
become familiarized with the current saying, "one man's terrorist is another man's
freedom fighter." Probably, the semantic confusion over the definition of "terrorism"
is the most fundamental obstacle in the efforts to establish a coherent theory of
terrorism.
Many writers, scholars, government agencies, etc. use the word "terrorism"
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loosely, or at least without defining it with any degree of precision. Formidable
problems are encountered in formulating a reasonably precise and objective
definition of the word.
As noted by Motley, "Terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe
than to define."8 Walter Laqueur, says that it is too readily used as a substitute for
rebellion, street battle, insurrection and guerrilla warfare which so often leads to
inflation of statistical data by the media.9
Alex Schmid defines "terrorism" by listing its common denominators. In over
100 definitions by well-known authors in the field, twenty-two elements emerged as
components of terrorism. Among those, violence, force, politics, fear and terror
were seen as the primary "attributes" of terrorism.10 Still, lengthy definitions,
attempted by the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
scholars, have met with little universal acceptance. Despite the lack of consensus,
terrorism today generally describes the destructive acts of disenfranchised people
which are designed to gain attention, or in some other way further political causes.
Despite these difficulties, core elements of a meaning seem clearly to include
the use or threat of violence: political motivation, and the creation of psychological
pressure for some specific or generalized purpose. The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) defines "terrorism" as:
The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or
groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established govern
mental authority when such actions are intended to shock/
intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims.11
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A broad legal definition is found in the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code, which defines "terrorist threat" as follows:
A person is guilty of a felony if he threatens to commit any crime of
violence with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of
a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or
otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless dis
regard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.12
Applied to the political arena, terrorism has been defined simply as
"motivated violence for political ends."13 The Task Force on Disorder and Terrorism
of the National Advisory Committee On Criminal Justice Standards defined
"terrorism" as "a tactic or technique by means of which a violent act or the threat
thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelming fear for coercive
purposes."14
For the purpose of this study, "terrorism" is defined as violent, criminal
behavior designed primarily to generate fear in the community, or in a substantial
segment of the community, for political purposes. When such behavior impinges on
the consciousness and concerns of the entire nation, then the nation becomes the
community in the definition. Domestic terrorism is such behavior carried out by
indigenous population elements. International terrorism is such behavior carried out
in the United States by foreign groups or abroad by the indigenous population. In
the context of this study, international terrorism is terrorism designed to affect
unfavorably the security interests of the United States. Criminal acts so
orchestrated as to threaten the stability of the 1996 Olympic Games and the safety
of allies of the United States, thereby affecting adversely the security interest of the
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United States, are classified as terrorism.
Definition of Concepts:
Included in the definition of terms are those general terms specifically related
to the study. These definitions are to prevent any confusion relating to the use or
meaning of the terms within the confines of the study, and to aid in the
comprehension of the structure and scope of the paper.
Civil Disorder- "A form of collective violence interfering with the peace, security and
normal functioning of the community."15
Coordinating- "The task of interrelating the numerous component units within the
organization to ensure goal accomplishment"16
Deterrence- "Protection and security efforts of the public and private sector to
discourage terrorist acts. It is especially target hardening."17
Hooligans- "Career criminals who come to soccer games primarily to conduct
criminal behavior such as assault, robbery and rape."18
International Radical Terrorist (IRT)- "Any extremist movement or group, which is
international in nature and conducts acts of crime or terrorism under the banner of
personal beliefs in furtherance of political, social, economic, or other objectives."19
Investigations- "Inquiries concerning suspected criminal behavior for the purpose of
identifying offenders or gathering further evidence to assist the prosecution of
apprehended offenders."20
Jurisdiction- "The lawful right to exercise official authority, whether executive,
judicial, or legislative; the territory within which such power may be exercised. For
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law enforcement officials; it refers to the geographical boundaries of power; for the
courts, it refers to the power to hear and decide cases."21
Law Enforcement- "Those groups of sworn local, state, or federal personnel who by
definition or charter are trusted with the keeping of the peace, and the protection of
life and property."22
Management- "The process administrators used to give an organization direction
and to influence people to work towards organizational objectives. It consists of
those activities which are designed to include cooperation and facilitate work."23
Military Assistance- "The authorization of federal military personnel to be utilized
under the Executive Branch's authority with the support of the Legislative Branch."24
Nonpolitical Terrorism- Terrorism that is not aimed at political purposes but exhibits
"conscious design to create and maintain a high degree of fear for coercive
purposes, but the end is individual or collective gain rather than the achievement of
a political objective."25
Planning- "Roughly, is deciding what the law enforcement agencies should be
doing. It is the linking of current activities to future conditions. It is decision-making
regarding operational activities based on anticipated contingencies."26
Physical Deterrent- "Those deterrents which are structural or physical in nature,
such as alarms, fences, lighting, etc., humans such as guards, animals such as K-9
dogs or procedural such as policies and procedures."27
Political Terrorism- "Violent criminal behavior designed primarily to generate fear in
the community, or a substantial segment of it, for political purposes."28
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Prevention- "International initiatives and diplomacy to discourage state support of
terrorism and to build a broad consensus that terrorist acts are inadmissible under
international law, irrespective of the cause in which they are used."29
Protection- "Shelter from danger or harassment."30
Quasi-terrorism- "Those activities incidental to the commission of crimes of violence
that are similar in form and method to true terrorism but which nevertheless lack its
essential ingredient." It is not the main purpose of the quasi-terrorists "to induce
terror in the instant victim," as in the case of true terrorism. Typically, the fleeing
felon who takes a hostage is a quasi-terrorist, whose methods are similar to those
of the true terrorist but whose purposes are quite different.31
Official or state terrorism- "Nations whose rule is based upon fear and oppression
that reach terrorist proportions."32
Riaht-Winq Terrorism- Generally, domestic terrorist groups categorized as
"right-wing" are defined as "being racist, anti-black, and anti-Semitic and are for the
advancement of the white race."33 These groups also have engaged in acts of
provocation and assault against federal and state law enforcement officials.
Security- "Privately employed persons whose purpose is the protection of property
and personnel of the company or employer."34
Securitv-ln-Depth- "A means of planning a series of controls so that each will delay
an intruder as much as possible, thus discouraging an attempted penetration or
assist in controlling it."35
Site (location) Survey- "Site or location survey, is a review of a specific location or
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site as to vulnerability as a target, its physical structure, as well as a review of
employees, visitors, and guests' backgrounds."36
Special Event- (varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction according to the
responsibilities and venue of agencies involved. Preparation and resource
allocation also vary according to need.) In the FB11989 publication, Terrorism in
the United States. John Fraser describes special events to be a) "of such national
or international significance that they are attractive targets for terrorists;" b)
"intelligence indicates that a credible terrorist threat exists;" c) "of such a nature that
the potential for collection of significant, classified intelligence by hostile
governments exists;" or d) "of such national or international importance that an FBI
presence would logically be warranted to fulfill its investigative responsibilities."37
Strategic Planning- "Is programmatic and deals with determining how agencies
should achieve policy goals and objectives. It involves the department's
administration, planning unit, and division commanders."38
Research Questions
This study attempts to find tentative answers to the following questions:
1. Would historic, political, long-standing ethnic rivalries (if existed) among the
fans, athletes, or officials of competing countries give way to any kind of
disruptive or terrorist acts of violence in 1996; i.e. can the Olympic Games
be kept free of nationalistic and political pressures?
2. Does anti-government rhetoric encourage domestic terrorists?
3. Is the loss of civil liberties too high a price to pay for stronger anti-terrorist
laws?



























Olympic Games in Barcelona, Spain. Utilizing these data, this study will assess the
breakdown of the safety and security planning of the respective government
agencies resulting in the bombing of the Centennial Park during the 1996
Centennial Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. This assessment will be
made in relation to the numerous bomb threats to the Olympic Security Committee
by terrorist groups at the international and domestic level.
This study combines an historical evaluation of agencies' security roles and
security precautions used in prior Olympic Games to reduce the terrorist threat to
property and life, and the success or failure of these precautions, as well as of
security precautions suggested as effective for the 1996 Centennial Olympic
Games in Atlanta. Since the historical data evaluated are not statistical in nature,
and the projective survey for future security is subjective, and does not lend itself to
formulae and statistical review, a means of measuring threat level or potential in
relation to terrorist groups had to be developed, and is theoretical in nature.
Sources of Information and Data on Terrorism
Data sources for this study included: books, journals, newspapers,
Congressional meeting reports and committee reports dealing with terrorism or
Olympics over the last 15 years. Additional information was procured from previous
research projects, state and federal documents including reports by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense (DOD, the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Transportation
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(DOT), television documentaries/news stories on terrorism and personal interviews
with selected officials dealing with terrorism, security planning and the Olympics.
The method used in this study was a survey, analysis, and synthesis of the
relevant literature. The literature, which is voluminous, can be categorized on the
basis of whether its source is governmental or non-governmental.
Governmental Sources:
Previously, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) published analyses of
various problems and events for the benefit of the general public. These analyses
represented attempts to delete all classified materials from official reports in order
to provide academicians, journalists, businessmen, and other interested citizens
with information that would be essentially correct without the wealth of supporting
detail from classified sources found in original reports. Several of these analyses
were used in this study.
The CIA has long discontinued the practice of preparing such analyses.
According to Dale Peterson, then CIA spokesman:
It took manpower to start with a classified report and try to produce
something meaningful in an unclassified fashion.... Our primary
responsibility is to provide US government policy-makers with the
best intelligence product we are capable of producing. We saw
that a lot of analysts' time was spent preparing these unclassified
analytical pieces.39
Scholars will, therefore, have to do without CIA materials in the immediate
future. It is worth noting that CIA analysts classify terrorist acts according to
whether they were carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors or by
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individuals and groups controlled by some sovereign state. This classification,
however, creates so many problems that the CIA's public analyses of terrorism have
been less useful than they would probably have been if a less subjective method of
classification had been adopted.
The State Department is one of the leading agencies in the fight against
terrorism. All of the information that the department wishes the public to have is
published in the Department of State Bulletin. This monthly publication includes
speeches and policy statements, and is available from the US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, on a subscription basis. This information source is
important for the study because it provided the definitive United States government
position with respect to major events and terrorism.
The primary "lead agency" for dealing with domestic terrorism is the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Materials dealing with terrorism are sometimes found
in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, available from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, US Department of Justice, Washington, D.C, 20535. This bulletin is
also available on microfiche from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service.
The National Criminal Justice Reference Service has available, also on
microfiche, a variety of materials from foreign police sources. The file of Police
Chief, the periodical of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, is also on
microfiche. Police Chief, published at Gaithersburg, Maryland, is an important
source of information on the views of state and local law enforcement authorities.
The National Criminal Justice Reference Service, and the National Institute of Law
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Enforcement and Criminal Justice also publish periodical supplements of annotated
bibliographies dealing with terrorism.
Among the most useful sources available for the study were the published
accounts of the many congressional hearings held on the subject of terrorism during
the past decade. The great advantage of a congressional hearing is that its
witnesses are not limited to reading a prepared statement. The witnesses must
also answer questions put to them by legislators from both ends of the political
spectrum. Such questioning elicits more detail that would be provided if the
witnesses were limited to prepared statements.
The Library of Congress issues Subject Catalogs four times a year, listing
new acquisitions that have been processed and are available for reading. Many of
these acquisitions have been prepared by organizations and writers outside the
United States. Journals published by branches of the American armed forces also
include articles and data on terrorism. One example of these is the Air University
Review.
One problem with almost all of the professional sources just enumerated is
that the views represented are almost exclusively those of the federal government.
An exception is the congressional hearings, where a variety of views is expressed.
In general, however, to obtain access to something other than the "party line," it is
necessary to consult other types of sources.
Non-Governmental Sources:
Virtually all significant terrorist acts are reported by those American news-
22
papers normally covering important world news. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
was the most often used for the study. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution coverage
was as complete as seemed possible, and was consulted primarily for its
interpretative coverage of the Atlanta scene. Many other newspapers could,
however, have been used extensively, and some were referred to occasionally.
After a terrorist incident has been reported in the daily press, many national
periodicals also cover it. Publications such as Time. Newsweek. Sports Illustrated.
U.S. News & World Report. USA Today, and others present usually condensed
versions of the incidents, with the benefit of somewhat more time in which to
research and write their accounts. The Economist of London also provides
reasonably complete coverage of world terrorism. Many other periodicals offer
in-depth analyses. One of the periodicals that appeared to have covered the
subject thoroughly was the New York Times Magazine, but many others - Harper's
National Review, and Security World -included articles of interest. For skyjacking
and countermeasures, Aviation Week and Space Technology is one of the best
sources, and has featured articles dealing with new technology as it impinges on
the terrorist threat.
Of the various specialized journals, Terrorism: An International Journal,
edited by Yonah Alexander, was the one most relevant to the study. It began
publication in 1978, and has devoted entire issues to a particular country or
problem. Much of the work it publishes is highly theoretical and deficient in factual
content. Security World frequently includes articles dealing with antiterrorism
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measures and equipment. Internet carries a great deal of information regarding
how lethal weapons can be constructed in one's home workshop; the information
gives individuals and groups coping with terrorism some idea of what they are
facing.
The Library of Congress collection is much larger, since it includes foreign
books and those now out of print. Scores of books dealing with terrorism are
published every year. However, relatively few of these concern Strategic Events
Planning by the listed agencies and departments to stop terrorist attacks.
Limitation of the Study
This study may be subjected to the following limitations: first, numerous
secondary documents-- books, articles, and official reports on terrorism may render
conflicting versions of certain facts (numbers of terrorists involved, casualties, and
the like). In such cases, the version by recognized source has been used for its
face value. Secondly, a large portion of the critical information is not available, not
only in the public domain, but is hard to access even to those inside the federal
government. Should this information be available, the study would have further
benefited. Thirdly, constraints placed on domestic intelligence activities by the FBI
and other law enforcement agencies have limited the amount of information
available to the bureau, other law enforcement agencies, and scholars. Similar
constraints placed on the CIA have limited the quality and quantity of information
available regarding international terrorist activities.
Finally, only selected scheduled major events, for example, the 1986 Statue
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of Liberty Centennial Celebration and the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship
were used for comparative study. These specific events are selected for direct
comparison with the Atlanta Summer Olympic Games planning because they were
staged in the United States, with the same restrictions and cooperation being
exhibited by the local, state and federal government's agencies. These same
restrictions and cooperation also influence the planning and coordination of law
enforcement, security and counte-terrorist personnel. In addition to inter-agency
cooperation, the basic technological abilities and the political environment is also of
a like type.
Scope and Organization of the Study
This study is organized in an eight-chapter format. The introductory first
chapter presented the background of the study, the problems, its purpose and the
significance of this study. The chapter explained the methodology used to evaluate
the information gained through research and its limitations. Also, the source and
methods for gathering the data and the scope and organization of the study were
outlined.
Chapter II examines pertinent literature on major special events
management, terrorism in general and terrorist groups, theories on causes of
terrorism and the terrorist personalities. It also reviews specific Olympics, their
findings and conclusions as applicable to this study.
Chapter III contains descriptions of countermeasures generally available to
policymakers facing the problem of terrorism. It describes the structure, functions,
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basic principles, and security roles of selected US departments and agencies
assigned with counterterrorism responsibilities. It includes a review of modern
terrorists; i.e., their involvement with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and
attempts to explain why biological agents are likely to appeal to terrorist groups.
Chapter IV includes two case studies and examines past contingency
planning and security coordination during: I. The 1986 Statue of Liberty Centennial
Celebration event, and II. The 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship events in
nine cities throughout the United States. The review first considers the events'
historical and regional perspective. This is followed by an evaluation of the security
process, while exploring the posed potential threats. The chapter concludes with
assessment of the overall planning strategy including the development and
coordination of an effective communications networking among agencies.
While chapter V is devoted to the actual application of the data within the
confines of the study, details on the historical perspective, regional study, and the
three phases model of 1996 Olympic security preparations and implementation by
the different departments and agencies providing security during the 1996
Centennial Games are discussed. This chapter will be evaluated in terms of the
interagency preparation and cooperation including, threat assessment and the
Olympic security safeguards throughout centers of the events. For example,
functions of the Joint Command Center (JCC) and the Olympic Security Support
Group (OSSG), in protecting the Olympic Torch, the Olympic Village, the event
venues, transportation system and others.
26
Chapter VI outlined the critical steps in preparing for and hosting the 1996
Olympic Games. It described the extraordinary measures undertaken by more than
fifty local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies responsible for the provision
of a safe and secure environment for the Centennial Games. This chapter
addresses each phase and levels of the security process. For example, the
Developmental Phase deals with the Strategic Planning process while the
Experimental Phase identified the different level of training requirements for a
smooth transition into the Operational Phase, which covers the implementation and
management process. These three phases show how effective cooperation and
coordination between law enforcement and ACOG security promotes better
understanding of each mission and led to a successful security operation during the
Games in Atlanta.
Chapter VII: Discussion/Assessment of Success, closely examines the
perceived emergency response structure incorporated in the planning, and
illustrates conditions under which such measures have failed or have been
successful. Here, Munich and Atlanta's terrorist Olympic incidents are compared.
Chapter VIII the final chapter, considers other analyses, evaluation and
conclusions drawn from the review of related Olympic Games and other scheduled
major events. In addition, recommendations will be made to the IOC security
personnel dealing with preventing acts of terrorism in future events.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This chapter focuses on the research and theoretical accounts on and about
terrorism that shed light on the guidelines for this Atlanta Summer Olympic study.
Special Event Management
The FBI publication, Terrorism in the United States 1994. shows how the
changing world conditions have affected terrorism not only at the global level, but at
the domestic level as well. During 1990 through 1994, for example, such events as
the ongoing Middle East peace process, the provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA) cease-fire agreement with the British government and the fall of the Soviet
Union have each had a profound effect on terrorism.1
Fraser 1991 accepted the FBI 1989 definition of special events. In his
special event management study 1991, he included the Olympic Games, the
World's Fair, the Statue of Liberty centennial celebration, the Economic Summit of
Industrialized Nations and the United States presidential inauguration. His study
focused on the organizational structure, analysis, strategic and operational
planning, training, logistical support, coordination centers, crisis management and
emergency response capabilities as key elements needed during special events.
He noted that law enforcement agencies have had some difficulty in the strategic
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planning area especially when asked to plan for a future event with significant
unknowns and "what ifs." He concluded that this is not a problem unique to law
enforcement, but that many corporations face similar challenges by police
departments.
Morrone 1994 assessed the definition of special events and concluded that
definitions vary according to the responsibilities and venue of the particular police
department in question. A special event in a rural setting according to his examples,
may be a "4-H show or country fair," while a special event for a large city may be
the "1996 Olympics," that preparations and resources allocation will vary according
to availability and needs. For instance, a department's available resources will
dictate the response level to a terrorist act; limitations on available special units do
not preclude the need thereof. Local police departments or state police agencies
with limited resources will have to contact other agencies for assistance and the
chief as first responder, must quickly assess and evaluate the situation in terms of
needs and his resources. Morrone's model of special events management is based
on a three-phase model: 1) initial planning, 2) substantive planning and 3)
post-event review.2
Morrone stated that the recent international political events, such as the
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, provided an
opportunity to expand law enforcement cooperation worldwide. The 1988 New
Jersey state trooper arrest of Yu Kikumura,3 and subsequent investigation of the
Japanese Red Army was a shining example of interagency cooperation among
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federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.4
Gallagher's 1994 description of special events is in agreement with both
Fraser and Morrone's definition. In his view, whether it is a major international
sporting event such as the Olympic Games or a local festivity, every law
enforcement agency has faced the challenge of setting up a security plan to
accommodate the activities surrounding a special event. These events may range
from hosting a local celebration to undertaking massive security arrangements.
Gallagher noted while evaluating the threat during the 1994 World Cup Soccer
Championship that, as with any special event, the primary jurisdiction for venue site
security rests with local law enforcement authorities. By the sheer scope of the
competition, that is, since fifty-two matches were scheduled across the United
States during a one-month period, security challenges faced not only the local
jurisdictions surrounding the venue sites, but adjacent jurisdictions and other sites
where national teams may be in residence for the matches.
Atlanta Olympic security officials stated prior to the Games that, "Atlanta will
be the safest place in the world during the Summer Games." These officials
believed if they said it often enough it would come true.5 Security Chief Rathburn,
Atlanta Mayor Campbell, Police Chief Harvard and virtually all law enforcement
officials assigned to the Olympic stated it as a "mantra," but experts cautioned that
"mantra" sounded, at times, like a challenge to every militant and terrorist group
seeking an international stage for murder and mayhem to advance a cause.6
Experts claimed, and the planners knew, that no city in America is immune from
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terrorism. A well-placed explosive, chemical bomb, or deadly virus at the Olympics
could be more devastating with more long-term repercussions than Oklahoma City,
the World Trade Center and the nerve gas incident on the Tokyo subway combined.
According to Brian Jenkins before the Games, "For someone with a cause, (the
Olympics) is a ready-made stage."7 Some security experts believed that terrorists
would stay away from the Olympics after the 1972 Munich Games terrorist attack,
because, instead of recognition, the slaying of Israeli athletes brought only
international condemnation for the Palestine Liberation Organization faction of
"Black September." Others, including Robert Heibel, argued to the contrary. He
believed increased security deterred Olympic terrorism, not a lack of trying on the
part of terrorists. Heibel stated:
I think when you put on a united front and you see people are well
organized and look trained and efficient and you put out inform
ation that indicates you are prepared, it acts as a deterrent for the
amateurs, but maybe not the professionals.8
Schwartz 1991 asserted that, "our law enforcement agencies are as good
as or better than any in the world, because United States law enforcement at the
local, state and federal levels is superbly staffed, equipped and trained." He
believed that these agencies, have met the difficult challenge of policing in a free
society, balancing their precious individual freedoms with the nation's need for
order and security. Although the demands of due process and a Constitution that,
by design, requires the state to honor and respect the rights of its citizens, they
have sometimes made law enforcement difficult. They have also made law
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enforcement highly professional. He also admitted that law enforcement agencies,
without doubt, have also been fortunate as well. He cautioned these agencies to
continue to view any threat seriously, resisting complacency and a false sense of
security. Preparing for the worst may be one of the only ways to avoid terrorism in
the future.
Terrorism In General
The lack of conceptual precision and clarity concerning the scholarly
analysis of terrorism as could be seen in Crenshaw, 1981; Wardlaw, 1982;
Wilkinson, 1987 is well recognized. Typically, the issue raises the following
questions: How broad or narrow should a definition of terrorism be? What elements
should be included, or excluded? And, given a particular definition of terrorism,
what is the appropriate or most effective strategy for developing a theory? Recently,
these problems have been addressed by Schmid and Jongman et al. in their
second edition of Political Terrorism 1988, a guide to research in the field, and by
Jack Gibbs in a paper titled "Conceptualization of Terrorism" 1989.
Terrorism is by no means a new form of warfare. Paul Wilkinson 1987 noted
that it has been witnessed in nearly every conflict of ideas, wills, and national
groups in history. The Old Testament contains many references to behavior that,
for all intents and purposes, can only be described as terrorism. In the first century
A.D., Jewish nationalists known as the Zealots conducted a fierce and unrelenting
terror campaign against the Roman occupiers of the eastern Mediterranean. The
radical Islamic sect known as the Assassins, which appeared nearly a millennium
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later, he added, was "perhaps the first organized group systematically employing
murder for a cause it believed to be righteous."9 Inspired by the teachings of
Hassan Sibai, the Assassins resisted, for nearly two centuries, efforts to suppress
their heretical religious beliefs through a combination of merciless terrorism and
fanatical faith in their own certitude and, in so doing, created a murder cult not
witnessed before or since. It is somewhat ironic that the word "terror" according to
Stohl 1988, originated in the aftermath of the French revolution and was associated
with the extreme violence of the Jacobin and Thermidorian regimes.
Herman 1982 and Chomsky 1986 described the term "terrorism" as having
wide disparate meanings depending on who is using it. The United States
government under both Reagan and Bush (in the 1980s) and Clinton and Gore
(through the 1990s to the present) routinely identified the violent actions of their
adversaries (e.g., Libya, Iran, Iraq) as terrorism while at the same time ignoring
similar activities of their client states. Similarly, during the Oklahoma crisis of the
1990s, according to York and Pindera 1991, a Liberal member of the Quebec
National Assembly referred to the Mohawk Warriors as "terrorists."10 Picard 1990,
stated that supporters of the Mohawks, on the other hand, complained that the
actions of the state (represented by the Surete du Quebec) amounted to terrorism.
Given the subjective quality of the term, how is it possible to engage in a coherent,
meaningful study of the phenomenon?
A common problem in conceptual analysis concerns the scope of the
definition. AsHospers 1965 asserts, the definition should be "neither too broad
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nor too narrow."11 For example, to define "terrorism" as "action intended to induce
sharp fear and through that agency to effect a desired outcome in a conflict
situation" would be far too broad as it would include a wide range of activities -
including domestic violence, and routine actions of police forces.12 Clearly, more
defining characteristics are required.
An example of a definition that is too narrow is provided by the United States
Department of Defense as:
.. .the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a
revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the
intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies,
often for political or ideological purposes.13
This definition is inadequate in that it ignores actions of the state that can
appropriately be labeled terrorism.
A number of authors including Franck 1978, Laquer 1979, and others,
argued that terrorism has extensive historical precedents for the use of violence to
coerce an enemy rather than to weaken or destroy his military capability. Walter
Laquer argues that terrorist tactics can be found in ancient Greek and Roman
history and in the Middle Ages. Terrorism has been waged by national and
religious groups, by the left and by the right, by nationalist as well as internationalist
movements. It has been state-sponsored terrorist movements that have frequently
consisted of members of the educated middle-class, but there has also been
agrarian terrorism, terror by the uprooted and the rejected, and trade union and
working-class terror. Terror has been directed against autocratic regimes as well
37
as democracies. National liberation movements and social revolutions (or
reactions) have turned to terrorism after political action has failed. Elsewhere, and
at other times, terrorism has not been the consequence of political failure, but has
been chosen by militant groups even before other options were tried.
Two factors may account for terrorism being misconceived as a new
phenomenon. The post-industrial societies of North America and Western Europe
are highly vulnerable to attack because of concentration and accessibility of
transportation, communications, and power resources. The easy movement of
people, goods, and information within and across national boundaries is an integral
part of the economies of these countries. These conditions facilitate terrorist
activities and provide abundant targets for them. The jet airplane has radically
altered travel, and as a result shrunk the late-twentieth century world. Terrorists
can travel more rapidly from a safe haven to staging area to point of attack and
back to a safe-haven. The same vehicles contribute substantially to the
susceptibility of attack and to the vulnerability of modern society to terrorism.14
Terrorism is now one of the paradoxes of our time. Its threat is as pervasive
as nuclear war, but its victims are relatively few in number. Nonetheless, its
consequences are publicized widely in excruciating detail. Terrorism affects
individuals, societies, governments, and interstate relations. Terrorism, moreover,
has been employed successfully to embarrass governments and to compel them to
grant concessions and pay ransoms used to underwrite new revolutionary activities.
It is both deadly and frightening.
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Reid 1994 described terrorist attacks as not new to this or other countries
although today they involve larger numbers of victims; but it was not until 1981 that
the U.S. government perceived the threat of terrorism "to be serious enough to
warrant classification as a major component of American foreign policy."15 That
after a year of study by a joint team from the Army and Air Force, a late 1986 report
indicated that the United States still did not have an effective plan for coping with
terroristic attacks. The team insisted that a comprehensive civil-military strategy to
defend our interests at home and abroad from terrorist attacks should be
developed. Kidnapping and hostage taking are other forms of terrorism that
characterized the 1980s. In mid-1985 William Buckley, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) station chief in Beirut, Lebanon, was forced from his car and
kidnapped by pro-Iranian gunmen. He died in December in a makeshift dungeon
where he was held in chains.16
According to Bakhash 1987, terrorist incidents at home and abroad as well
as an excessive amount of commentary by journalists, authors, academicians,
sociologists, politicians and psychologists, have left unclear terrorist trends. Probst
1989 agreed that terrorist attacks are also increasing in their sophistication and
casualties throughout the world. As the public becomes inured to particular
terrorists' operations, terrorists find the need to increase their operations and the
carnage and bloodshed associated with them in order to maintain public interest
and reaction.
Americans, among other Westerners, have become prime targets for terrorist
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activity. The United States' policy along with that of many other countries, is
committed to the maintenance of political stability and to orderly, legal, constructive
change. This policy seeks to diffuse tension by urging national governments to
institute reforms leading to stable governments that will obviate the need and
excuses for illegal terrorist activity. Terrorism is an ongoing threat and the West in
particular continues to oppose it vigorously because of the violence involved and
the threat of economic and political destabilization. Legitimate governments must
understand the nature of terrorism in order to check or prevent it.
American intelligence agencies are reportedly predicting that international
terrorism will gradually change its strategy, perpetrating terrorist acts within the
United States itself instead of virtually limiting itself to attacking American personnel
and facilities abroad. This expectation is based on the growing number of
individuals in the United States potentially or actually sympathetic to terrorist
groups. A handful of terrorists can inflict great damage on a society, provided that
they have a reasonable base of support in the community, supplying them with safe
houses, forged papers, weapons, and explosives. The money needed can be
obtained through ordinary criminal acts or from abroad. Terrorist groups in the
United States include the Puerto Rican and Croatian nationalists who have already
committed terrorist acts and Cubans, Iranians, Palestinians, and others with
sympathizers in the United States who have heretofore been relatively inactive until
recently. The expectation of intensified domestic terrorism is also based on the
improved capabilities of terrorists themselves.17
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The Department of State 1994, describes "terrorism" as:
Pre-meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
'noncombatant' targets by sub-national groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term
'noncombatant' is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians,
military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed
and/or not on duty.18
Examples listed as terrorist incidents were the murder of the following US military
personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April, 1989; Capt. William Nordeen,
United States defense attache killed in Athens in June, 1988; the two servicemen
killed in the La Belle disco bombing in West Berlin in April, 1986; and the four
off-duty United States Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in
June 1985. The department also considers as acts of terrorism, attacks on military
installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does
not exist at the site, such as bombings against United States bases in Europe, the
Philippines, or elsewhere. In reviewing the year, 1994, the State Department noted
that there were 321 international terrorist attacks during that period; a 25-percent
decrease from the 431 recorded the previous year and the lowest annual total in 23
years. Sixty-six were anti-US attacks, down from 88 in 1993.19
Merari 1978 reviewed terrorists' objectives, strategies, and tactics. He
described the primary objectives of terrorists are to instill fear, to terrorize, and to
create violence for the sake of effect. That is, the particular victims may not be
important to the cause other than to create the fear toward which the violence is
aimed. Instilling fear is not the only objective of terrorists. In addition, they seek to
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destroy the confidence people have in their government. He categorized terrorist
groups as "xenofighters," those who fight foreigners or "homofighters" those who
fight their own people. Often xenofighters are seeking removal of a foreign power
or the changing of political boundaries regarding a foreign power, with such goals
as 1) to attract international attention, 2) to harm the relations of the target country
with other nations, 3) to cause insecurity and to damage the economy and public
order in the target country, 4) to build feelings of distrust and hostility toward the
government among the target country's population, and 5) to cause actual damage
to civilians, security forces, and property in the target country.20 While homofighters
strategies are: 1) undermining internal security, public order, and the economy in
order to create distrust of the government's ability to maintain control, 2) acquiring
popular sympathy and support by positive action, 3) generating popular repulsion
from extreme counter-terrorist repressive measures, 4) damaging hated foreign
interests, 5) harming the international position of the existing regime and 6) causing
physical damage and harassing persons and institutions that represent the ruling
regime.21
Domestic Terrorism:
The features of this type of terrorism are that all offensive operations are
conducted by anti-government elements and carried out within the primary targeted
state (most often the country of origin of the group). Hence, the nationality of the
perpetrators is the same as that of their victims. The sphere of operations is limited
to a single state/country, their home territory. They are able to survive in that
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geographical location seemingly because they enjoy the support of their
sympathizers within their own country, except in the case of the Oklahoma bombing.
Successful domestic terrorism often gains momentum and grows in size until
it develops into a popular national movement. An example of which would be the
Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces (PACRF). This group is a violent
Puerto Rican separatist terrorist group dedicated to achieving total Puerto Rican
independence from the United States. Also, the "right-wing " groups such as the
Aryan Nations, the Order, the American Front Skinheads and Posse Comitatus fall
into this category. According to the FBI definition:
Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence,
committed by a group(s) or two or more individuals, against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives.22
In order to put the domestic threats in perspective, it may be helpful to briefly
reconstruct some of the major concerns and describe the most prominent form of
terrorism conducted in the United States. In 1970, the late Richard M. Nixon
expressed Presidential concern that he or members of his Cabinet would be victims
of terrorist attacks. When the Secret Service was asked by Nixon to develop
intelligence on terrorist groups, the agency refused, stating it would duplicate the
duties of other agencies.23 Two years later, as part of a national security hunt for
suspected terrorist bombers, the FBI—according to two former high level
officials—conducted illegal break-ins at private dwellings to investigate terrorism.
These specific actions were taken during black bag jobs, surreptitious entries, when
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the FBI was searching for fugitive members of the militant Weather Underground.24
Clarence M. Kelley, a former Director of the FBI, alerted the law enforcement
community that from 1973 to 1976 terrorist-related crimes within the United States
had increased three-fold. Past senior US officials who have conveyed a variety of
concerns regarding terrorism include: former President Carter who promised that
the United States will not give into terrorism, regardless of its form or wherever it
occurs and former Secretary of State Vance who described terrorism as one of the
most inhumane phenomena of our time. The former Director of the State
Department's Office for Combating Terrorism, Ambassador Quainton, predicted
higher levels of terrorist violence during the 1980s. Another former Director of the
FBI, Judge William H. Webster, has suggested that it is the nature of terrorist
groups to mount increasingly more spectacular attacks in order to capture attention
and to maintain credibility among their constituencies. Former Secretary of State
Haig has added that it is time for terrorism to be addressed with greater clarity and
effectiveness by all nations, including the United States.25
A handful of terrorist organizations account for most bombings and other
terrorist actions in the United States. The Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary
Forces (PACRF) is a domestic terrorist group which directs its terrorist activities at
the United States and receives no foreign direction or financial assistance. This is
the most active of the many Puerto Rican independence groups known as the
Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Independence, FALN. Since 1974, the
FALN has been responsible for causing five deaths, 84 injuries, and over $3.5
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million in property damages.26 The number of incidents committed by Puerto Rican
terrorist groups during the last five years, has steadily declined. In 1990, five
terrorist acts were committed by these groups in the US and Puerto Rico; in 1991,
the number of incidents decreased to four, and in 1992, the number of incidents
decreased yet again to one act of terrorism. During 1993 and 1994, no acts of
terrorism were committed by Puerto Rican terrorist groups.27 The apparent
decrease may be due, in part, to the November 1993, political plebiscite held in
Puerto Rico in which a plurality of Puerto Ricans voted to maintain their
commonwealth status. The results of this plebiscite appear to have deflated the
independence movement of Puerto Rican nationalists, of whom only a very small,
but militant faction, condone the use of terrorism as the primary method of
operation.
Jewish extremist organizations, such as the Jewish Defense League, also
have accounted for a large share of domestic terrorist incidents. This organization
bombed the residences of three United Nations employees and an Egyptian Tourist
Office. The Jewish Committee of Concern and the Jewish Armed Resistance have
also been active in firebombing incidents.28 In 1980, the FBI regarded "Omega 7,"
anti-Castro Cubans, as the most dangerous terrorist group in the United States. To
a certain extent, there has been a changing of the guard of terror groups operating
in the United States. In addition, the New World Liberation Front which had been
active, claimed responsibility for only one bombing during 1978. Since that time,
little has been heard from this organization.29
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Special interest terrorist groups also remain a potential threat to US
interests. Special interest groups are characterized by their focus on a specific
cause or issue. Examples include groups who espouse the use of terrorism in order
to advocate environmental issues or animal rights. In recent years, many criminal
acts have been perpetrated against providers of abortion services. These include
arson, extortion, bombing, stalking, and harassment. The Attorney General
Guidelines (AGG) states that a domestic security/terrorism investigation may be
initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons
are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals
wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States.30
In Reid's 1994 account, there are other types of domestic terrorism that have
caused greater concern in the United States and for which no adequate explanation
has been articulated. For example, tampering with domestic products, and deaths
resulting from consumption of cyanide-tainted aspirin and cyanide-laced soup in
1986. He also reminded Americans that although earlier deaths from cyanide-laced
Tylenol capsules, resulted in new legislation for tamper-proof containers, this did
not eliminate the possibility of becoming a victim of any kind of terrorist attack. In
the fall of 1992, while driving on I-295 near Jacksonville, in North Florida, a woman
was randomly shot in the head, receiving severe injuries that left her disabled.
Other violent acts led to the American Automobile Association (AAA) to recommend
to tourists that they avoid traveling through that area. These terrorist acts, had a
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significant negative impact on the tourist trade in the state of Florida.31
According to the FBI publication. Terrorism in the United States 1995. there
were 83 attacks by domestic terrorists in the United States from 1985-95, including
fire bombings of fur stores and abortion clinics by the Animal Liberation Front and
Anti-Abortion Groups, the February 26th World Trade Center and the April 19th
Federal Building bombing. There were no terrorist acts on US soil in 1994 as shown
in table 1 below. The FBI says tightened security measures rather than a downward




























Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Terrorism in the United States-1995," (Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1997), 16.
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These show that many violent acts are random in nature, placing society under the
threat of terroristic attacks, and illustrate the fact that terrorism victims are not
limited to specific individuals.
The literature supporting domestic causes notably, Bassiouni 1975, and Gurr
(1970), emphasizes governmental oppression and poor living conditions. Structural
conditions incite terrorism. The key difference between international terrorism and
domestic terrorism is the inclusion of a second international party as the scene, the
target, or the origin. This key difference would mean that the second international
party involved had something to do with the domestic structural determinants
causing terrorism. This link is particularly difficult to make. Even if this link could be
made, however, the relative deprivation hypothesis is a tricky one to measure and
test.
Deterrence theory for domestic terrorism is mainly directed to physical
security, as was seen during the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games here in Atlanta.
In the future, greater efforts must be expended towards analyzing relationships
between terrorist, terrorist groups, and terrorist operations, terrorist motives and
intentions; why terrorists select particular targets. The terrorist problem is a real
one. However, the voluminous literature on terrorist activity has largely focused on
what terrorism is, and why democratic societies should be concerned about this
particular form of violence. It is time to seriously deal with how the United States
and the Olympic Committee can better develop its capabilities to avoid and, if
required, manage domestic/international terrorist-induced crises.
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International Terrorism
International terrorism consists of violent attacks by groups against more
than one primary country, target or nationality. The attacks are directed against
foreign targets as well, within or outside their own national borders.33 The victims of
international terrorist attacks many times bear no relation to the prime target of the
perpetrators. In these incidents the target may be of symbolic value to the
assailants. Even though the terrorists may have large groups of sympathizers
among the population in whose name they act, they choose to operate on foreign
soil. The choice of operating abroad could be attributed to stiff security measures,
to the inability to find safe bases in their home territory, the government's control of
the media, harsh punishments, travel restrictions and a variety of other reasons.
The aspects of international terrorism that are theorized about the most are
the causes of terrorism (for example: Decter 1987; Crenshaw 1981, 1989, 1990;
Kegley 1990; Moorhead 1986; Lacquer 1978, 1987, 1990; Rapaport 1990; Stohl
1988; Thornton 1964; Wardlaw 1989; Wilkinson1990; Pierre 1976; Mickolus 1983;
Levitt 1988; Netanyahu 1986). Some claim terrorism stems mostly from internal
(domestic) causes. Others believe almost exclusively in external (primarily foreign
sponsorship) causes.
The apparent agreement on the issue of international terrorism at the United
Nations (UN) began to disintegrate in 1972, when the United States introduced a
Draft Convention for the Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism
following the massacre at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. The
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devastating reality created an atmosphere of awareness of the threat posed by
political terrorism in the international arena. The former UN Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim raised the issue of terrorism in the General Assembly, prior to the
introduction of the United States Draft Convention for the Punishment of Certain
Acts of International Terrorism in 1972. The failure of the efforts made by the
Secretary General and the US delegation revealed a deep split in the United
Nations opinion, centering around the distinction between "national wars of
liberation" and "terrorism." The split is visible in the title of the first major
investigation into terrorism by the UN resolution which led to:
measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or
takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms,
and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism
and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance,
and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human
lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical change.34
This resolution led to the creation of three committees to: 1) define terrorism, 2)
examine the causes of terrorism, and 3) propose measures to prevent terrorism.
The disagreement on the definition of terrorism split the UN into two groups - the
US and the Arab and African states. The General Assembly saw no further progress
on this issue until 1979, when the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, was
occupied in November and American personnel were held hostage. The General
Assembly passed two resolutions on 1) the Convention against the taking of
Hostages and 2) the following year it adopted a Resolution on Measures to
Enhance the Protection, Security, and Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Missions
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and Representatives. Both resolutions require the extradition or prosecution of
persons alleged to have hostages, and no "political offense exception" is allowed.
Ratification of these measures has been spotty, indicating that although the
General Assembly appreciates the importance of diplomatic inviolability, it cannot
agree on how to compel states to provide adequate protection to diplomats.
Because of the symbolic value attached to diplomatic missions and personnel, and
the inability of the United Nations to enforce the host state's obligation to protect
them, individual states have assumed the responsibility of protecting their diplomats
and facilities overseas. The US government, for example, appropriated over $1
billion in 1984 to improve the physical security of its embassies and train staff to
avoid terrorist attacks abroad.35
International terrorism as defined by the US Department of Justice is:
the unlawful use of force or violence, committed by a group(s) or
individual(s), who is foreign based and/or directed by countries or
groups outside the United States or whose activities transcend
national boundaries, against persons or property to intimidate
or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
The department maintained that, several international terrorist groups continue to
maintain or increase their presence in the United States. These groups continue to
infiltrate its members into the country by both legal and illegal means despite their
pronounced hatred for the United States and its policies, because they perceived it
as a rich environment for fundraising, recruitment, and proselytizing. A prime
example of such a group which has been active in the United States is an Iranian
terrorist group known as the "Mujahedin-E-Khalq" (MEK). This group is
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foreign-based and its activities transcend national boundaries.37
Laqueur 1977 viewed terrorism in terms of bombing, assassination, hijacking,
and kidnapping. From these acts terrorism has become, he states, the most
publicized form of political violence of our time. He documented this by examining
political terrorism through the beginning of the anarchists of the 1880s, the left-wing
clashes of the 1900s, the actions of Carlos, Black September, the Baader-Meinhof
Gang, as well as the Molly Maguires. He then went on to discuss the sociology of
terrorism: intelligence gathering, funding, weapons, tactics, counterterrorism
methods, and the role of the media. Also included in the discussion were the
actions/behaviors of terrorists. Laqueur, concluded that the democracies need to
wait for public opinion to change before they can act decisively against terrorism.
William M. Landes 1978 analyzed the impact that metal detectors and sky
marshals had on the level of international skyjackings. His basic findings were that
aircraft hijackings dropped significantly after the implementation of the two
intervention strategies named. Landes looked at skyjackings from 1961 to 1976 and
found through the use of ordinary least squares regression that while skyjackings
Were the typical form of terrorism throughout the 1960s, their numbers dropped off
significantly after 1973.38 In essence, aircraft hijackings are thought to have been
virtually eliminated by metal detectors in airports and sky marshals on airplanes.
Landes1 work stood alone for nearly ten years as the only systematic,
statistical impact analysis on the impact of metal detectors, and expanding this type
of work to include two other interventions aimed at thwarting terrorism. They also
52
added an analysis of terrorist substitution effects which had been initiated by
research efforts by Sandier, Tschirtart and Cauley 1983, and Sandier and Scott
1987. The inclusion of substitution effects was important, for it sought to explain
the inability of intervention measures to reduce the overall level of international
terrorism.
Cauley and Im 1988, used Autoregressive and Moving Average (ARIMA)
model and intervention analysis as described by McCleary and Hay 1980, to
evaluate three specific anti-terrorist policies and the substitution phenomenon
associated with these policies: (1) increased airport security screening, (2)
increased security at US embassies and other diplomatic missions, (3) the
institution of the UN convention on preventing crimes against diplomatic personnel,
and (4) the substitution phenomenon that indicates that terrorists will substitute out
of one mode of attack into another when government authorities crackdown on a
particular mode.
Their findings can be summarized as follows. First, the metal detector
intervention led to a permanent reduction in the number of hijackings, as found
earlier by Landes. However, this reduction in hijackings was countered by an
increase in other types of terrorist events. Therefore, the overall effectiveness of
the imposition of hijackings is less clear, for it is not certain whetherwe are better or
worse off with more non-hijacking attacks and fewer (but still some) hijackings.
The technological intervention of metal detectors, however effective, was the
most effective of any of the measures tested. The imposition of tighter security
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around US installations led to an immediate reduction in attacks which was not
substituted for, but this reduction was merely temporary, that is, it had no long term
effect. As for the 1977 UN convention, no significant effects were found on the
level of terrorist attacks. Overall, anti-terrorist policies were not found to have much
of a significant direct impact on the level of terrorism, nor did they have much of a
deterrent effect on future levels of terrorism.
Enders, Sandier and Cauley 1990, entered the fray again to test for the
effects of some of the same and some additional anti-terrorist interventions. Enders,
Sandier and Cauley again used ARIMA modeling by McCleary and Hay 1980, to
assess the immediate and long-run impact of (1) metal detectors, (2) a host of
United Nations conventions and resolutions involving terrorist events (that is,
crimes against protected persons including diplomatic agents, hostage taking and
aerial hijackings), and (3) the United States bombing raid against Libya in 1986, on
the level of international terrorism by specific category and for substitution effects.
Overall, their findings are similar to the earlier two works on intervention
policies. Their results regarding the first two interventions are the same. The
installation of metal detectors reduced all types of aerial hijackings. This impact was
immediate and permanent, and terrorists appear to have substituted other kinds of
hostage taking events for skyjackings in response to the metal detectors. They
could also find no significant immediate or long-term impact derived from the seven
UN conventions and resolutions regarding international terrorism that were tested.
However, the unique contribution of the paper lies in its test of the US raid on
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Libya-a test that had not been done before, and one that might shed an interesting,
new set of lights on the debate between those who argue for military retaliation
against terrorists and those who do not.
The findings on the raid on Libya are as follows. The retaliatory attack
against Libya increased terrorist acts against the US and the UK in the short run.
No long-term impact was found. Here the findings are both similar and contradictory
to the findings on other policy interventions. They are similar in that the impact of
the intervention was temporary, as was the case with the imposition of increased
security measures around US missions. They are also similar in that there was no
long-term impact as was the case with the US security measures and all of the UN
resolutions. Yet the finding that the intervention policy led to an increase in
international terrorism flies in the face of any and all intentions the policymakers
had for the retaliation.39 This article then took the analysis of policy intervention to
a new level by including offensive rather than just defensive measures, and showed
that not only can policy be ineffective, but it can also be counterproductive.
This idea is tied to the fact that terrorism is a persistent local problem that
needs attention, and that terrorist events tend to bring out strong emotional
responses in people. These responses emanate not only from immediate victims,
but targeted third party victims and beyond. In fact, a number of analysts represent
this highly charged, emotional, negative reaction to terrorism. Wilkinson 1990,
provides a colorful example:
Let us strip away the masks of terrorist illusions and expose the
death-head of murder beneath. Terrorists are fond of using
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romantic euphemisms for their murderous crimes. They claim to
be revolutionary heroes yet that commit cowardly acts and lack
the heroic qualities of humanity and magnanimity.40
These analysts forward the notion that terrorism cannot be explained
because explanation equals justification, and terrorism certainly could never be
justified.41 This points out the fact that terrorism is often only viewed from one
perspective, a perspective which allows for no explanation. If we are not to try to
explain terrorism, but only to eradicate it, then there is little need for in-depth
analysis.
Schreiber's 1978, views below are in agreement with the above statement.
He maintained that terrorism is a politically motivated violence against the innocent,
and is used as a weapon against the state. He worked to delineate between the
political terrorist, the professional criminal and the fanatically insane. His examples
of terrorism do not glamorize the cause, however, but show how it is inhuman,
political and military in nature. He explored government fears and reactions to
violence, the psychology of the terrorism and how the innocent victims react. He
also discussed how they can become converted by their captors and grow to trust
them and believe in them. Finally, Schreiber discussed issues that have hindered
international control of terrorism: tighter security measures, failure to negotiate,
media publicity, and the appropriate means to deal with the convicted terrorists. He
concluded with the need to keep negotiations open with the terrorist as a means of
dealing with the situation and to be hard on capture and punishment of the terrorist.
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Clark 1980 analyzed the growth of terrorism and viewed the fact that
American society is unable to defend itself in the event of terrorism. He explained
this by evaluating what he called our extreme vulnerability in modern technology in
the areas of nuclear power plants, water systems, liquefied natural gas, and
computers. This was accomplished by evaluating terrorist attacks against these
systems both in the United States and the world. Clark feels that these previous
attacks were "trial runs" for greater and more devastating attacks in the future. This
view is contrary to the opinion of many other authorities on terrorism, who believe
the terrorist groups do not have the weapons or expertise to use them. Clark has
shown how, through theft of weapons from facilities that are poorly guarded, these
members can launch sophisticated terrorist attacks. Clark concluded with
precedents of actions that our government has used in the past, and how these
same actions can be employed with no danger to our fundamental rights.
In the State Department publication, Patterns of Global Terrorism -1993. it
considered the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New
York City as an act of international terrorism because of the political motivations
that spurred the attack and because most of the suspects who have been arrested
are foreign nationals, even though the FBI has no evidence that a foreign
government was responsible for the bombing.42
The data on international terrorism show no clear trend up or down from
1988 through 1993, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is now known to
have provided more aid for terrorists than was hitherto recognized. Statistics for
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1994 indicate a decline in the number of international terrorism, the lowest point in
two decades. Most of the 321 documented terrorist incidents reported in six
regions, were in the Middle East and Western Europe. Specific breakdown by
region is as shown in table 2. The highest (115 incidents) were recorded in the
Middle East, while the least (12 incidents) occurred in Eurasia indicating less
tension in that region.
Table 2















Source: U.S. Department of State, Pattern of Global Terrorism -1994 (Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, April 1995).
In evaluating the types of incidents reported, it is noted that bombings and
armed attacks were the most prevalent methods utilized. Not every incident
reported was documented as to which group was involved.
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State-Sponsored Terrorism
One of the most dangerous forms of terrorism is state-supported terrorism. In
1986, as indicated by Bremer 1989, the US State Department stated that Libya,
Syria, and Iran were the most active practitioners of state-supported terrorism.
Libya led the list by being involved in at least nineteen international terrorist
attacks. The 1986 air strike on Libya's terrorist camps (which was Qadhafi's home)
was the watershed event in the world's fight against terrorist-supported states.
Qadhafi learned that his support for international terrorism would not be cost free,
and he changed his behavior, which after all, was the objective of the US attack.
Libya's involvement in terrorism, according to statistics, declined from nineteen
incidents in 1986 to six in 1987 and another six in 1988.43
International terrorism would not have flourished as it has during the past few
decades without the funding, training, safe-haven, weapons, and logistic support
provided to terrorists by sovereign states. For this reason, the primary aim of the
US counterterrorism policy has been to apply pressure to such states to cease and
desist in that support and make them pay the cost if they persist. This is done
publicly by identifying state sponsors and by imposing economic, diplomatic, and
sometimes military sanctions. An important tool in this effort is the list of state
sponsors of terrorism that developed from the counterterrorism provisions of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as revised by the Anti-terrorism and Arms Export
Control Act of 1989. Here, seven nations are designated as states that sponsor
international terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.44
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The Department of Defense publication, Strategic Assessment 1995.
summarized that cases of state sponsorship can be demonstrated, the US and the
international community tend to respond vigorously against the offending
government. It cited an example following a determination that the Iraqi government
was responsible for an April 1993 plot to kill former President Bush during his visit
to Kuwait, the US launched cruise missiles against the headquarters of the Iraqi
intelligence service. In November 1993, in response to Tripoli's refusal to extradite
suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772, the UN Security
Council toughened the sanctions imposed on Libya in March 1992. The publication
concluded that, terrorists who lack state sponsorship increasingly use criminal
activities to finance their movements. For example, documents captured and
defectors suggest that "Peru's Shining Path" collected tens of millions of dollars
from the cocaine traffickers.45
According to Pope 1993, in the Department's Efforts to Combat International
Terrorism publication, the basis of the US policy is to reduce and eventually
eliminate the support which states provide to terrorist groups. Of the current state
sponsors, Iran is seen as the major problem that faces the US because Iran's
support for terrorism includes the threat to murder British author Salman Rushdie,
its continued campaign to assassinate Iranian dissidents overseas, and its support
for groups which seek to use violence against the Middle East peace process. He
concluded with international collaborations in which governments have increasingly
been willing to join in steps against state sponsors and the groups they support.
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Some of his examples were 1). Operation Desert Storm when many countries joined
in expelling or keeping under close security suspected Iraqi agents and imposing
other security measures to thwart Iraqi's terrorist efforts, and 2). Most recently, the
Italian extradition of Khalid Mohammed El-Jassem, a Palestinian terrorist, to the US
to stand trial for offenses committed 20 years ago while a member of the notorious
Black September Organization and his attempt to kill then Israeli Prime Minister
Golda Meir and for planting an explosive at New York's JFK Airport.46
A review by Trager 1986 indicates that President Reagan signed a new
policy directive authorizing a government-wide effort to combat international
terrorism. The new policy was set forth in a document officially designated National
Security Decision Directive 138. Designed to give the government an offensive
instead of a purely defensive stance, the policy would enable the United States to
launch preventive and retaliatory strides against terrorists abroad. Special
emphasis was to be placed on improvement of intelligence operations and
international cooperation to stop terrorists before they act. Legislation was being
drafted by the Administration to implement the new policy.
Secretary of State George Schultz warned in a speech to the Trilateral
Commission in Washington, D.C. April 3 that a "purely passive strategy" was no
longer adequate in coping with the problem of international terrorism. It was time,
he said, "that the nations of the West face up to the need for active defense against
terrorism."47
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The United States claims to repudiate international terrorism. This policy has
been graphically demonstrated by the retaliatory 1986 air strike on Libya and the
1993 missiles launching on Iraq. The United States has also led in the support of
political, economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on states, that according to
them, support terrorism. On the other hand, some argue that if the events of the US
Iran-Contra scandal had happened in any other country, it would have been
regarded as terrorism, and that the Gulf War was nothing but international terrorism
on Iraq. In an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council in 1993 to
expose what President Clinton called "Iraq's crime," he stressed that 1. "a firm and
commensurate response was essential to protect the US sovereignty; to send a
message to those engaged in state-sponsored terrorism." 2. to deter further
violence against the US citizens and 3. "to affirm the expectation of civilized
behavior among nations."48
In one of the arguments, Draper 1987, stated that the Iran-Contra affairs was
a plot worked out by practiced conspirators who set up a shadow government within
the Executive Branch of the US government; that is, to covertly and illegally
exercise a governmental policy which negated the legitimate powers of Congress
and violated the US Constitution. Many legal scholars agreed with him and define
US-Junta operations as illegal-state terrorism. The Boland Amendment in October
1984 outlawed the CIA or any other agency or entity of the United States from
providing any type of military support to the Nicaraguan contras (called "freedom
fighters" by President Reagan).
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Draper's article, "Rewriting the Iran-Contra Storv." claims that top officials of
the Executive branch of the US government conspired to overthrow an established
constitutional rule of law with the help of former President Ronald Reagan. This
intervention, according to him, was not only illegal but constituted terrorism.49
Typology on Causes of Terrorism
The classification of terrorist groups is an ominous task, tantamount in many
respects to the elusive undertaking of defining terrorism. In the field of terrorism
research, the most common typologies according to Schmid and Jongman et al.,
1988, focus on the characteristics of either the actors or perpetrators. Some
common theories regarding the cause of terrorism as examined by terrorist experts
are on ideology of violence, some pursue mainly psychological motives, and others,
political, and sociological motives.
The importance of Max Weber 1949, notion of "ideal-type" construct cannot
be overstated. As a method of inquiry, developing ideal-types (organized into
typologies) makes objective and replicable analysis possible. Although social
reality involves a complex interaction of forces, and thus defies easy categorization,
a coherent typology can form the basis for model and theory development.
Ideology of Violence and Historical Terrorism
An ideology to justify political violence (terrorism) emerged when Marx and
Lenin saw revolutions as an inevitable consequence of social unrest. Marxist
theory considered terrorism as suicidal, but regarded terrorist acts as acceptable
parts of the final mass attack on the old structure. Lenin combated the influence of
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anarchists and terrorists before the Russian Revolution. However, some ideas
about anarchists and terrorism have reemerged since the 1960s. The National
Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice holds that revolutionary theory is based
upon dissatisfaction with social and political life and a passionate belief that change
can and should be effected.
Revolution, in a political sense, implies a forcible transfer of power from one
social group to another. It is based on the premise that no class surrenders power
to another without violence. Terrorism per se has no ideology for reference or
rationalization. Where and when destructive and barbaric acts of terrorism are
perpetuated with little prospect of military gain and with the likelihood of negative
political results, it is proper to suspect psychopathology.
The "ideological" category is widely used in the field of terrorism research.
The objective of groups that employ this form of terrorism is to radically transform
the established institutions of a given society or country. To date, most of the
terrorist typologies that emphasize political motivations of terrorist groups tend to
focus on secular ideologies. Typically, many of them include categories of "left"
oriented ideology. Many others, in addition to distinguishing among left-oriented
groups, include categories of "right-wing" terrorism.50 Unfortunately, very few
theorists have developed typologies that recognize the importance of religious
motivation and ethnic-nationalist motivation as an explicit category of ideological
terrorism. It is important to emphasize religious, secular and ethnic-nationalist
ideologies as powerful motivators.
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Non-state terrorism inspired by secular ideologies, particularly those that can
be categorized as left-oriented (e.g., Marxist-Leninism and anarchism), has
diminished significantly since the 1970s. In the United States, for example, there
has been a decline from 129 incidents in 1975 to 17 in 1986.51 Similar trends can
be found in many other parts of the world. This form of ideological terrorism is often
associated with the student rebellions that occurred in the US and Western Europe
during the 1960s and 1970s. The political objectives of these groups as stated by
Burton 1976, were strongly influenced by radical theorists such as Marx and
Bakunin, as well as more contemporary theorists such as Franz Fanon, Mao Tse
Tung, Che Guevara, Marighella, Fidel Castro, and Herbert Marcuse.
Religious terrorism occurs when religious scripture or doctrine can be
identified as the fundamental motivating and unifying factor. In Said's 1988,
analysis of the preceding twelve years, religious violence in the Middle East has
gained an enormous amount of media attention. Unfortunately, much of the
commentary reflects a Western ideological bias.52 More sophisticated analysis
focusing on the social and cultural norms and traditions is rare - even among
researchers of terrorism. In this respect, Martin 1987 highlights the importance of
ritual, symbol, and myth as pretexts for religious violence. Martin argues that the
Muslim doctrine of Jihad is central to any explanation of Islamic terrorism. He
pointed out that the concept ofjihad invokes a broad semantic field that can provide
a rationale for "holy war." As an Arabic verb, the term (specifically, jihad) denotes
"striving in the path of God"; however, as a verbal noun it has two generally
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accepted meanings: the lesser jihad (striving through warfare), and the greaterjihad
(striving through peaceful means). It is the notion of the lesser jihad that is used to
justify armed struggle and terrorist violence.
When this doctrine is viewed within the context of structural and historical
antecedents the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism becomes more comprehensible.
Many Islamic fundamentalists consider the influence of Western culture to be a
serious threat to the survival of their religious traditions and values. More
specifically, European colonialism and its legacy of cultural and ideological
hegemony have led to widespread bitterness and resentment among Muslims. For
many fundamentalists the only alternative is to invoke a holy war. Although these
elements alone are usually not sufficient conditions to precipitate a violent jihad. A
thorough understanding of Salmon Rushdie's controversial novel Satanic Verses
published in 1988 will show that historically specific events, as well as political
manipulation, can be a decisive factor. Rushdie's satirical depiction of the Koranic
text infuriated many Muslims as it was perceived as outrageously blasphemous.53
A type of terrorism often associated with ethnic-based secessionist
movements is defined as ethnic nationalist terrorism.54 Discriminatory practices
directed at an identifiable ethnic group can produce the bitterness and frustration
that leads to political violence. These practices can involve religious freedom,
educational policy, resources allocations, and political opportunities. First, as
explained by Crenshaw 1981, there is a perception within the minority group that
specific social, political or economic injustices exist. This is followed by a sense of
66
frustration over the inability to resolve those grievances through conventional
non-violent means. Samuel P. Huntington views the process of modernization as a
means of ending the isolation of various ethnic groups. While the breakdown of the
polarization of a society along ethnic lines may be beneficial to social stability, the
breakdown of the ethnic borders may also lead to some serious negative effects.55
As noted by Kirk 1983, all of these approaches concentrate on the terrorist
as a purely ideological creature: fighting repression, fighting the West, fighting
(however subjectively perceived) injustice. The idea that terrorism is a political tool
that can be used in a rational context is simply avoided.
Political Objectives
At the heart of terrorism is the notion of political violence. Terrorism falls
within a gray area - an area within which political violence is in some cases
justified, and in other cases not justified. Mention the word "terrorism" or "terrorist"
to almost any individual, and a set of images or concepts fills that person's
thoughts. Terrorism strikes not only the immediate victim of the act, and not only the
potential third party involved (that is, the party the terrorist is trying to influence);
terrorism touches almost everyone's life in the sense that the notions of terrorism
and the imagery of terrorists can easily be brought to the fore in people's minds.
This fact stands out in typical knowledge about politics in the general public. A
variety of surveys show how little factual knowledge Americans have about their
political system, yet they can easily conjure up ideas and pictures of terrorists.
The baseline premises of political violence theories of terrorism's cause are
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viewed as rational actors who use terrorist means in response to objective political
economic and/or social conditions existing at the level of the nation, state or the
global power structure. This, of course, is the orientation toward the topic that
terrorists themselves clearly favor, terrorists almost invariably citing "objective"
political conditions as their reason for engaging in terrorist acts.56 This rationalist
viewpoint depicts terrorism "as politics pursued by other means,"57 rather than
conventional and/or legitimate struggle or social protest.
Frantz Fanon's 1963 work, The Wretched of the Earth is considered by
some as the most powerful and influential piece of literature written in the past
years supporting the use of violence for political purposes. As stated by Earnest
Evans: "Clearly Fanon has had a major impact on contemporary revolutionary
ideology. His writing has increased the acceptability of the strategy of terrorism."58
Fanon's work provided the most explicit rationale for terrorist violence,
arguing that violence against the colonizer binds colonized peoples together as a
group and has a cleansing effect on the individual - "it frees the native from his
inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and
restores his self-respect."59 Fanon believed violence has these beneficial effects
even if it is only symbolic; that is, even if it is not required in the political and military
conflict for de-colonization. Jean-Paul Satre 1963 endorsed this view in his preface
to Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth:
.. .the rebel's weapon is the proof of his humanity. For in the
days of the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to
kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the
man he oppresses at the same time.60
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Terrorists tend to generalize this attitude to all political contexts, claiming
that they are justified in resorting to terroristic violence because states are guilty of
using these tactics. Like Satre, terrorists do not distinguish between security forces
and the citizenry as targets for violence. There are no innocents. The writing of
individuals like Fanon has acted as a guide and source of inspiration for those
seeking to change their position through the use of violence.
Eddie 1986 explained that political scientists have great concern over
political violence which they define as terrorism. The basic models utilized in
studying terrorist groups support the theory that violence has been resorted to by
both men and women of various social backgrounds and motivations. Political
goals of terrorist groups may range from independence from certain geographical
areas to worldwide revolution. Many groups seek to overthrow governments and
replace them. Terrorists seek to overthrow these governments by terrorizing the
populace through repeated acts of violence to demonstrate their governments'
inability to protect citizens.
The terrorists' political scenario contends that the citizens will pressure the
government to restore order; and the government, fearing for its continued
existence, will overreact, suspending many basic rights and freedoms and
oppressing the people. The people will then begin to adopt the terrorists' view that
the government is corrupt, repressive and impotent.
The resort to terrorism is a calculated choice by the terrorists who find other
forms of political activity to be either unavailable or ineffective.61
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Psychological Theories
The research concentrating on psychology notably Crenshaw 1988 and
Wilkinson 1990, stems from the notion that terrorism is completely abnormal
behavior and must, therefore, be the result of disturbed minds. Terrorists cannot
perceive reality and they cannot understand that their acts achieve little. They act
because they delude themselves into thinking that their violence is justified.
Meaning that, we would not be confronted with terrorism if these kinds of people did
not exist. Within the relevant body of literature there is a discovery of a likely
candidate in the work of other psychologists and psychiatrists who place their
analytical focus upon the individual motivations of terrorists whom they characterize
as a set of persons suffering from one or more psychological disorders.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the widely-respected criminologist,
Cesare Lombroso, developed theories that saw all forms of criminal behavior
including terrorism, as the natural consequence of psychological factors.
Lombroso's initial work concentrated upon the influence of genetic inheritances and
to the assertion that some individuals are born criminals.62 In her review of the
literature in 1983, Dr. Anne Romano pointed out that "the concepts of the
Lombrosian School were later disapproved by Goring. However the conviction that
criminals have biological defects has continued on."63
Introducing his readers to psychological theories of the causes of terrorism,
Schmid contends:
If it is assumed that nonviolent behavior in society is normal,
those who engage in violence, criminal or other, are necessarily
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'abnormal' deviating from the rules of society. An outflow of this
assumption are the many theories which regard the terrorist as
a peculiar personality with clear identifiable character traits.e64
This assumption frequently takes the form of a contention that many, if not all,
terrorists are subject to psychopathologies of various kinds, that they are in
colloquial terms, "crazy." Directly countering Sterling's view, psychoanalyst
Abraham Kaplan has opined, "an international network of terror is less an
organizational reality than the pervasiveness of a psychopathology."65 Referring to
elaborate initiation rites common to Western-based terrorist groups and their
satanic symbolism, Kaplan continues along these lines to assert that "the
Baader-Meinhof group is not very different in the causes and consequences of their
actions whether their reasons, from the Manson family."66
On the contrary, Hacker 1980, and other writers point out that some terrorists
believe that society is sick and does not recognize the gravity or nature of its
illness. The terrorists, accordingly, are also convinced that they can affect the cure.
Psychological theories that perceive terrorist groups as motivated by psychological
influences include: rebelling against authority (adult frustration), guilt feelings
(conscious formation), the heartfelt need to change existing systems (frustration),
that the behavior patterns of these reformers include aggression and violence. The
research on the media and liberal, democratic societies as causes of terrorism
builds on the psychological causes according to Alali and Eke 1991, Martin 1990,
and Schaffert 1992. This research sees terrorists as purely publicity seekers. The
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media plays into terrorists' wants by covering terrorist events. Liberal, democratic
societies further play into terrorists' desires by being easily accessible along with
having a basically uncontrolled media. Media cause terrorism because they
indirectly give terrorists what they want, and democracies cause terrorism because
they do not have enough control over the various segments of society.
Sociological Theories
Many of the same causes covered under the heading of political violence
have similar sociological and psychological explanations of why terrorism occurs.
Sociological approaches to the causes of terrorism can be roughly distinguished
from those of other social sciences in that they focus upon the perceptions of
groups or collectives of persons prone to violent behavior when viewing the
objective conditions of the world they inhabit. The sociological approaches also
provide a bridge for the interactions that take place within these groups and
between them, on the one hand, and their perceived external environment, on the
other. In this sense sociological approaches draw from a political conflict model and
psychological interpretations while adding key bridging concepts such as group
perceptions and interactions, as well as such concepts as culture, institutions and
social structure.
When Irving Horowitz says that, "terrorism is primarily a sociological
phenomenon,"67 one cannot help but think that his experience as a sociologist has
predisposed Horowitz toward this conclusion. Demographically, according to
Russell and Miller 1977, the typical urban terrorist is young, normally falling in the
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age group of twenty-two and twenty-four years old. Terrorism is in their words, a
predominantly male phenomenon since almost all significant terrorist operations
(well over 80 percent) were directed, led and executed by males.68 Although,
women are prominent in certain West German and Japanese groups; on the whole
the typical terrorist organization is led by males, females accounting for less than
twenty percent of its body and being largely limited to support/ancillary roles such
as maintenance of safe houses. This pattern is far more pronounced in right-wing
terrorist organizations and Latin American-based groups than in left-wing, West
European outfits. For both men and women alike, marital status is single. As
Russell and Miller explain:
The unmarried terrorist is still the rule rather than the exception.
Requirements for mobility, flexibility, initiative, security and total
dedication to a revolutionary cause all preclude encumbering
family responsibilities and normally dictate single status for
virtually all operational terrorist cadres. Statistics regarding
arrested or identified terrorists in Latin America, Europe, the
Middle East and Asia reflect over 75-80 percent of the individuals
involved were single.69
In terms of their vital statistics then, terrorists are generally young adult, unmarried
males. In conjunction with their finding that the vast majority of urban terrorists
come from metropolitan areas and normally operate within the cities of which they
are long-term residents, Russell and Miller summarized that many terrorist cadres
and leaders are of "middle-class or even upper-class background."70
The Terrorist Personality
Parry 1976 cites what Dr. Lawrence Freeman called the likely characteristics
of the typical terrorist personality:
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(a) First, many cases of abnormality can be traced to unhappy
child-hoods, the effects of illegitimacy or broken homes. Other
instances of what appears to be comfortable and placid child
hood and adolescence, upon close examination reveal the
protest against real or perceived domination or inadequacy of
the parents.
(b) Second, the terrorist has a desire to submerge his individuality
into a group. The group is a refuge for the individual's impotence
and irresponsibility.
(c) Third, the terrorist seeks an ambivalent closeness to his victim,
he terrorist is recognized and even the most powerful figures
must reason with him.
(d) Finally, there is a kind of terroristic sacrament. The terrorist
obliterates an image of himself when he strikes out at his victim.71
Parry stated that terrorists are motivated by their desire to reaffirm their masculinity
and self-image. In most cases, terrorists are a result of an unhappy or broken
home. Emma Goldman described terrorists as psychopaths who derived from a
society that has been cruel, relentless, and inhuman.
But Walter Laquer is extremely skeptical about any one comprehensive
explanation of the cause of terrorism; or that a scientific socio-political theory is
even in reach; or that it is possible for scholars to agree on a definition of
"terrorism."
Terrorist ideology and psychology suggest that certain characteristics
emerge in the typical terrorist. Without a surprise, these characteristics are often
attributed to adolescence. According to Kidder 1987, the typical terrorist displays
the following characteristics: /. Frustration: Pent up concerns about an individual's
ability to change society. Terrorists have no patience and are totally absorbed in
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their cause. //. Oversimplification of Issues: Terrorists often reduce complex issues
to "black and white." The terrorist live out a "fantasy war," convinced that he has
broad support from numerous like-minded followers; ///. Utopianism: Many terrorists
seem to believe that a near perfect future lies ahead, once the present order is
destroyed; IV. Social Isolation: Terrorists are often lonely and the terrorist group is
often the first family they have ever known; V. Willingness to Kill: (The
cold-bloodedness of some terrorists is startling). The last characteristic is indicative
of a harsh oversimplification that allows killers to see victims simply as objects - a
state of mind observed from Nazi killers during the massacre of Jews in World War
II. Researchers have noticed, however, that captors who hold hostages for
protracted periods tend to develop a kind of bond with them that makes
cold-blooded murder less likely.72
In light of all this, it is apparent that attempts to pinpoint the causes of
terrorism and to develop a theory of terrorism from them have not yet yielded
conclusive results.
Olympic Games Historical Overview
The Olympic Games were established in the spring of 1896, mostly through
the efforts of a French sportsman - Baron Pierre de Coubertin. They have
continued every four years from that time, but not without political contentions. In
the 1936 Games held in Berlin, Germany, Adolph Hitler refused to recognize Black
American Jesse Owens, who won four gold medals. The 1972 Games held in
Munich, West Germany were marred by the murder of the eleven Israeli athletes
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and West German policemen who were killed by members of an Arab guerilla
organization. In 1976, the Games were held in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The
host Canadian government refused to allow the Taiwanese team to carry its flag or
have its national anthems played, whereupon, the Taiwanese promptly withdrew. In
1980, the United States refused to participate in the Games held in Moscow, Russia
to protest the invasion of Afghanistan and in 1984, the Russians refused to
participate in the Los Angeles, California Games, allegedly for lack of security.
The security measures in operation during the past three Summer Olympic
events (Munich, West Germany; Los Angeles, California and Barcelona, Spain
Games) serve as a backdrop to the 1996 Atlanta, Georgia Centennial Summer
Olympic Games.
Munich, West Germany
The Germans had a basic event management plan prior to the Munich
Summer Games, but no detailed counterterrorism measures in place. Furthermore,
they lacked special trained hostage negotiation teams. Additionally, security
personnel had been employed without proper screening measures.
Explaining the events resulting in the death of the Israeli hostages at the
Munich Airport, Binder 1972, in his article, reported that the athletes were killed in a
shoot out between the Arab gunmen, policemen and soldiers. The article explained
how, in the final moments, an Arab terrorist threw a grenade into a helicopter in
which the athletes were bound hand and foot, making escape impossible for any of
the hostages. Binder's account went on to explain that at least one of the guerrillas
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was an employee of the Olympic village, possibly more, therefore allowing the
terrorists access to and knowledge of the compound.73 In his second article titled:
"German Term Action Necessary," Binder discussed how the German police
defended their action to open fire on the Arab terrorists, thus leading to the eventual
death of the Israeli athletes. The police, according to the article, claimed that there
were only five terrorists, and that they believed they could control the situation by
attempting to kill the terrorists and free the hostages. They had already decided
against storming the Olympic Village, and attempting to isolate the guerrillas was
too risky. The article concluded with a brief description of the events leading up to
the tragedy.74
Other articles for example, "Guerrillas in Cairo" claimed that the Black
September Organization took responsibility for the attack on the Israeli athletes and
that they were prepared to kill themselves rather than be taken captive if their
demands were not met.75 "Horror and Death," another article, discussed the deaths
of the Olympic athletes in Munich. It explained how a feeling of euphoria had
spread during the early part of the Olympics because everything was going so well.
The only problem was from the media that complained about the absence of press
security at the Olympic Village. Due to those complaints, the security around the
village was reduced to accommodate the press, thus opening the way for the
terrorists. The ironic note was that the Israelis had requested and been assured
that special security from the West Germans was going to be in force. The article
also discussed how the terrorists took the hostages, the negotiations and the
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subsequent deaths of the hostages. It concluded by explaining how the German
plan to rescue the hostages from the terrorists failed.76
In yet another article, Schrieber 1972, in detailing the activities in the Israeli
compound at the Olympic Games, explained that the security measures of the 1936
Games were relaxed in order to provide a friendlier atmosphere for the guests and
dignitaries since the previous hosting of the Games had been in 1936, during
severe political times. The report stated that higher security and increased security
personnel should have been provided for the Israeli athletes. The report concluded
with the confused negotiations with the terrorists involved at the airport which
failed. Why the attempted rescue failed was not explained.77
In an attempt to completely describe how the Black September members got
past the compound guards at the Olympic Village and burst into the rooms of the
Israelis, taking nine hostages and killing two, the "Terror at the Olympics" article78
described the negotiations with the terrorists; their move to the airport, and the
subsequent shoot-out.
It was initially reported to Israel that the hostages were safe when, in fact,
they had already been killed. The German rescue plan, approved by Israel, was
inept and doomed from the start because of the inadequate manpower, but no
suggestions were made on how the plan could have been improved.
In the "Terrorist International" article, it shows that evidence of growing
terrorist activity prior to the Munich raid was presented. Links between groups such
as the PFLP, the United Red Army, and others had been noted in increasing
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numbers in months prior to the Games. The article discussed how the mobility of
the terrorists was possible through foreign embassies, underground, and
sympathetics to the cause.79
O'Ballance 1979 in a report on terrorism in the Middle East, explained how
the terrorists who captured and killed the Israeli athletes were able to escape
detection; how they obtained false documents such as passports and identification;
how they managed to go through security scanners with grenades hidden on their
bodies; and where they got their equipment and money.80
The Munich Olympics, according to Edgar Best, left some legacies. Edgar
Best, the director of security for the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
(LAOOC) and former special agent who ran the FBI's Los Angeles office, concluded
that one legacy is that security planning will never be the same for the Olympic
Games. He noted that the police in Munich did not have the ability to deal with that
kind of a confrontation. Another legacy he added, is that since that time, Western
countries have developed crack anti-terrorist forces to address such problems.
Los Angeles, California Olympics
Before 1984 the Olympics were last held in Los Angeles back in the Great
Depression Summer of 1932, and nowhere in the final report on those Games was
the word "security" mentioned. But months before the 1984 Summer Games, the
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) headquarters focused a
greater part of their planning on security. Johnston (1984) described the serious
attitude taken towards security. The reason for such an approach is traceable to
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the 1972 Olympic tragedy in Munich, West Germany.
Ostler 1981 claims the 1984 Olympics faced not only terrorism, but racial and
possible "other" problems because: (1) the United States supported the South
African apartheid policy by letting its teams participate in sports; (2) the black
business community in Los Angeles was not included in the Olympics1 "business
area"; (3) South Central Los Angeles, where the Coliseum is located, was weaker in
socioeconomic conditions than it was during the 1965 Watts Riots; and (4) many
foreign governments, including Russia, called for a location change for the 1984
Olympics because South Africa was allowed to play there. The article concluded
that more than 50 Third World countries were concerned with the foregoing
issues.81
Reich 1981, in his article "Politics Again to Dominate Olympics," revealed
that during the 11th Olympic Congress, the Soviets did not appear to have "forgiven
and forgotten" the United States' boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. They
had lodged protests as to the housing arrangements at the University of California
at Los Angeles, and they requested changes in site due to the South African rugby
team's appearance in the United States. In his article, "African Threat to Olympics,"
Reich reiterated the concerns of the 11th Olympic Committee that Russia would
cause disruptions in the planning of the 1984 Los Angeles Games. However, some
Committee members, he reported, warned that further problems could develop later,
depending on how the Reagan Administration handled the South Africans in the
future.82
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Another study in "Protesters Greet Springboks in New York" 1981, found that
50 protestors chanted as the South African rugby team arrived in the United States.
Several cities cancelled scheduled games and New York Mayor Erastus Doming, II,
was asked to cancel a match for fear it would spark a boycott by black nations of
the 1984 Games.83
Barcelona, Spain Olympics
By way of background factors pertaining to security measures taken at the
Barcelona Olympic Games, the writer will begin with a brief summary of political
events precluding the games. Shively 1993 discussed the changes in Spain's
government from a fascist to a democratic state. In 1976, King Juan Carlos and his
conservative Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez put a democratic constitution before the
people of Spain in a referendum. The referendum was important because it added
the legitimacy of popular approval to the democracy. She noted that the new
democracy was plagued by disorganized party conflict in the parliament, together
with a rising campaign of terrorism by Basque nationalists. The terrorists' targets
were primarily the officers of the police and the army, which added to the tension
because those institutions were potentially dangerous if they became disenchanted
with the new system. In 1982, a moderate socialist, Felipe Gonzalez, became
Prime Minister. His long, not very radical rule, helped to calm fears of the "Reds"
and laid the civil war to rest. Considerable power of self-government was
developed by the regions. Spain became a member of the European Community in
1986, integrating it into a democratic organization of democratic states. Spain now
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appears to have successfully established a stable base for democracy.84
Revell 1992, in his article "Security Planning for the 1992 Olympics"
reviewed security measures taken to protect the 1992 Summer Olympic Games. He
discussed the threat of terrorism during the Barcelona Games as emanating from
two distinct levels with the most likely scenario involving existing terrorist
organizations that had been active within the Iberian Peninsula over the past
decade. Such domestic threats which caused Spanish authorities greatest concern
were from the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and a somewhat smaller group,
the October First Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), and two other terrorist
organizations - Catalonia Separatist Group known as Terra, Lliure and the Guerrilla
Army of the Free Galician People.85 In his outline of the planning and
organizational structure of the Games, the operational organization, Olympic facts
and figures, security arrangements and the general coordination of the security
program as a whole, Revell concluded that the urgency and the importance of the
security planning process was made abundantly clear to the IACP delegation, that
is, when two terrorist incidents were carried out during the Olympic delegation's visit
- the first was a car bomb detonated by the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
group, killing two Barcelonian police officers, a tow truck driver and wounding a
number of bystanders.
The second incident was the bombing of public buildings by the October First
Anti-Fascists Resistance Group (GRAPO). Although there were no injuries, property
damage was substantial. These two incidents caused the Spanish police to go an
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extraordinary length to ensure that the Barcelona Olympics were safe and secure
because the authorities were very anxious for all guests at the Olympics to feel
safe, secure and confident to move about without fear.86
According to Martz 1996, "The traditional answer to the question of Olympic
Security has been low-tech," concluding that, the 1972 Olympics in Munich,
Germany, the 1988 Seoul Games, Barcelona in 1992, demonstrated that security
measures planning should not place too much emphasis on uniform security, but
rather on electronic security measures. He proposed such actions to the Atlanta
Olympic Security Planning Committee. Finally, he pointed out that too much
security in the form of uniform personnel during previous Games would detract from
the freedom, spirit and enjoyment of the athletics events.87
Summary
The literature review demonstrated that violence has always been common
place in politics and international relations. Terrorism is a pejorative term. As so
often occurs with terms that become routinized with overuse, the concept of
terrorism, while widely understood, seems to evade a universally accepted
definition. If one side in a dispute succeeds in attaching the terrorist label to its
adversary, it gains an important psychological, political and material advantage.
Certain states have utilized the definition and nature of terrorism as part of
their own political and psychological campaigns against political opposition. Some
countries label those who engage in violent acts against the regime as terrorists.
For instance, Britain applies the term to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Israel
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regard all Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) acts as terroristic. The Jews in
Palestin during and after World War II utilized terroristic attacks against the Arabs
and the English in establishing the state of Israel. Every sovereign state reserves
to itself the political and legal authority to determine what is and what is not
terrorism in the context of its domestic and foreign affairs.
For the purpose of this study, "terrorism" is defined as violent, criminal
behavior designed primarily to generate fear in the community, or in a substantial
segment of the community, for political purposes. When such behavior impinges on
the consciousness and concerns of the entire nation, then the nation becomes the
community in the definition. Domestic terrorism is such behavior carried out by
indigenous population elements. International terrorism is such behavior carried out
in the United States by foreign groups or abroad by indigenous population
elements. In the context of this study, international terrorism is terrorism designed
to affect unfavorably the security interests of the United States. Criminal acts so
orchestrated as to threaten the stability of the 1996 Olympic Games and the safety
of allies of the United States, thereby affecting adversely the security interest of the
United States, are classified as terrorism.
In this chapter, the selected review of the pertinent literature analyzes and
compares other studies as they are related to the roles of the various agencies in
the management of major scheduled events such as the Olympic Games. Also,
literature concerning terrorism and the Olympic Games at Munich, in 1972, Los
Angeles in 1984, and Barcelona in 1992, were noted. Little information was found
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concerning the security precautions and actions taken in case of terrorism against
members of the athletic teams and the diplomats at the Games. Christopher
Caldwell, summarized the 1996 Olympic Games as annoying because the entire
presentation has been to turn an event that is nationalistic, competitive and cruel
into an event that is egalitarian, sweet and easygoing. That commercialism, "has
fostered the most extreme anti-competitive squeamishness at the Olympic
Games."88
In general, the current literature reflects wide disagreement among scholars
on the proper definition of "terrorism." Various interpretations and governments'
perspectives have generated numerous definitions reflecting their perceptions and
political stances. Clearly, the lack of consensus among governments, as well as
different non-governmental entities, indicates that the heart of the problem in
defining "terrorism" is not value free. The confusion in interpreting the phenomenon
is increased by numerous variables incorporated with violence. Physical violence is
only one of the modes creating terrorism.
The destructive effects of all forms of terrorist actions such as threat,
bombing, kidnapping, assassination, coercion and repression are damaging to
social stability. Variables like political aims, strategy, motivation, criminal acts,
intent and victimization also contribute to disrupt civil order. Psychological
destabilization caused by fear, anxiety, mental distress and psychological
manipulation bring social, economic and political pressures.
Moreover, some analysts of terrorism do not believe in a "causal" theory of
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terrorism; terrorism is an unstoppable, random blight on both domestic and
international society that simply must be dealt with. Again, these theories tend to
be very general in nature, and also very vague. They are not derived in any formal
manner and do not get to the level of being able to describe the variance of group
behavior within any given system. The literature, generally, is quite diverse and
contradictory. Overall, one can see how these various theoretical approaches hold
a kernel of truth. Yet none of these approaches lead to the kind of overreaching
theory that can tie various acts of terrorism as caused by A, B, and C, but we
cannot tell you when and where or how often terrorists will strike; we only know
terrorism appears to exist for these reasons.
In brief, any non-governmental entity (individual or group) who applies
violent means such as physical or psychological, directed beyond the immediate
target, is considered a terrorist and will be addressed as such in this study.
This literature review serves as a guide in the analysis of the Atlanta Olympic
Games as an example of major scheduled event planning; that is, the strength and
weaknesses of this Games' planning. Chapter III will include the structure and
functions of selected United States government agencies, security protection units
and antiterrorism programs; examples are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of State (DOS)
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CHAPTER III
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
A number of plane crashes and terrorist acts a few months prior to the 1996
Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta (during an election year) paraded
counterterrorism legislation: example, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and
the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building in spring 1995. Any such
legislation would require citizens to yield some of their constitutional rights of
privacy and freedom of movement, especially at the airport.
A Congressional conference report on the House and Senate antiterrorism
measures bill (S735 - H Rept 104-518) which resulted, is designed to give federal
law enforcement agencies significant new tools to battle domestic and international
terrorism, including expanded jurisdiction over crimes linked to terrorism and an
increased power to keep foreign terrorists from entering, or raising funds in the
United States. The designed new tools are to prevent, prosecute and punish
domestic and international terrorism, as well as restrict death row appeals.1 House
and Senate negotiators settled on the final terms of the bill on April 15,1996. The
Senate adopted the conference report, 91-8 and the House followed suit on April
18,1996, 293-133 clearing the bill for signing by the President.2
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The United States has over thirty agencies, departments and offices involved
in executing some form of security program, related to terrorism. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to outline the structure, functions and duties of all of these
institutions. Organizations having major impact on United States' security policy, as
utilized during the 1996 Centennial Olympics in Atlanta in preventing terrorist acts
are discussed.
For the past two decades, antiterrorism efforts of the United States
government have focused primarily on international terrorism. Even though this
study deals with security during the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, a brief
description of how the United States manages international and domestic terrorist
threats in general is necessary to provide a perspective of the United States
antiterrorist programs.
This chapter deals with essential background information pertinent to two key
presidential decisions that gave impetus to the United States antiterrorist program;
describes the existing program and its organizational structure; discusses
jurisdictional responsibilities; and outlines the role of supporting agencies.
Historical Developments
In the early 1970s, the tragedies at the Munich Olympic, the epidemic of
kidnappings in Latin America, and the murder of two US diplomats in the Sudan,
underscored the harsh reality of modern-day terrorist violence for the United States.
The above incidents radically altered the United States' attitude and response
toward terrorist acts. Thus, in September 25,1972, late President Richard M. Nixon
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acting on the recommendations of the two study committees headed by Assistant
Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and Deputy Secretary of State William Macomber,
signed a Presidential Memorandum establishing a Cabinet Committee and Working
Group to Combat Terrorism. According to Nixon, this was to consider "the most
effective means to prevent terrorism here and abroad."3
The established Cabinet Committee was chaired by the Secretary of State
William Rogers, whose full membership included Secretaries of the Departments of
Defense, Treasury, and Transportation, the Attorney General, the US Ambassador
to the United Nations, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Assistant to the President for National
Security and Domestic Affairs Advisors. During the Cabinet Committee's first and
only meeting on October 2,1972, it was decided that the Committee would perform
the following functions:- 1. "coordinate among government agencies, ongoing
activity for the prevention of terrorism," 2. "evaluate all such programs and activities
and where necessary, recommend methods for their effective implementation," 3.
"devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that
occur," 4. "make recommendations to the director of the office of Management and
Budget concerning proposed funding for antiterrorist programs." Lastly, the
Committee was to "report to the President, from time to time, on the status of
American effort to combat terrorism."4 A Working Group, composed of senior
members of the Cabinet Committee, was subsequently established. In the words of
the first chairman of the Working Group, Lewis Hoffacker, the United States'
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approach to counterterrorism "is based on the principle derived from our liberal
heritage, as well as from the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms that
every human being has a right to life, liberty, and security of person. Yet the
violence of international terrorism violates that principle."5
Initially, the Working Group was made up of the same departments and
agencies as the Cabinet Committee. However, by 1974, eleven more agencies and
departments were added to the Cabinet Committee and the working group. They
were - the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Energy Research and
Development Administration, the Federal Protective Service, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Law Enforcement Administration, the Washington D.C.
Metropolitan Police Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National
Security Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, the United States
Information Agency, and the Secret Service.6 These new agencies and
departments increased the antiterrorist bureaucracy to twenty-one actors. Towards
the latter part of 1977, marking five years of the existence of the Cabinet Committee
to Combat Terrorism, the actual work of this committee was done by its Working
Group, chaired by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Combating
Terrorism. Issues arising within the Working Group were handled on an ad hoc
basis. There were three outstanding factors that affected the quality of the Working
Group's endeavors: firstly, the lack of exchange of needed information among
agencies and departments members within the Working Group. Secondly, the
sheer huge size of the working group itself hindered coordination within the group,
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and thirdly, the loss of interest among members within the group itself.7 These
problems prompted the establishment of an executive committee in 1974 consisting
of those agencies and departments with jurisdictional functions in dealing with
terrorism to respond to these problems.
Findings from the study of the American Society of International Law (ASIL)
during their research project on international terrorism for the Department of State
concluded that the cabinet committee and its Working Group, were a first step
toward coordinating the United States policy response. The project's final draft
report in the early part of 1977 recommended that "somebody must be clearly
assigned authority to respond to a crisis situation and that a centralized data base
on terrorist activities be created."8 In Brian M. Jenkins1 testimony before the
Senate's Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on September 14,1977, he stated
that the individuals in the Working Group were dedicated and capable but lacked
formal authority and sufficient rank to impose their will on officials in other
departments. Jenkins concluded that the "Working Group was primarily a
bureaucratic coordinating body, not a command organization because so many
bureaucratic jurisdictions will make governmental coordination difficult."9
Restructuring of the Antiterrorist Bureaucracy in 1977
Following the election and shortly after former President Carter's
inauguration, a major review and restructuring of the antiterrorist bureaucracy was
triggered resulting in a comprehensive review of the entire antiterrorist organization
entitled Presidential Review Memorandum on Terrorism No. 30.10The memorandum
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ordered the National Security Council to initiate a detailed study to assess the
United States' abilities to both develop consistent policies for dealing with terrorism
and for handling specific terrorist incidents, to study the structural problems of the
Cabinet Committee system, and to make recommendations on a possible course of
action. On June 2, 1977, after concluding its foreign policy review process, the
administration addressed the issue of international terrorism and the structural
weaknesses of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, and approved
Presidential Review Memorandum on Terrorism No. 30.11 According to the former
Deputy Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, the "study confirmed the need for an
extremely flexible, antiterrorism program at the federal level that would take into
account the changeable nature of the contemporary terrorist threat and the wide
range of resources that would have to be marshaled to meet all likely
contingencies."12
The Establishment of the Special Coordination Committee
By the authority of a Presidential Directive (PD) in September 1977, the
Cabinet Committee was dismantled and transferred to the Special Coordination
Committee of the National Security Council with its role as the central coordinating
body for the United States' antiterrorist program.13 The Special Coordination
Committee's membership consisted of the National Security Advisor as chairman,
the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.14
Three primary functions in the area of terrorism were invested on the Special
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Coordination Committee (SCC):
1. - to supervise the senior-level interagency group to ensure
coordination among the agencies dealing with terrorism.
2. - to resolve any jurisdictional problems that might have arisen
during a terrorist situation. During a crisis situation, the SCC
was to convene immediately and
3. - to ensure that all necessary decisions concerning terrorism
were made at the highest levels of government.15
Two newly created organizations assumed the dismantled Cabinet
Committee's responsibilities and were directly responsible to the SCC. The
Organization for the Response to Terrorist Incidents took over the management of
terrorist crisis situations and the Organization for Antiterrorism Planning,
Coordination and Policy Formulation assumed the task of planning, coordinating
and formulating governmental policy towards domestic and international terrorism.16
The United States' policy of prevention, deterrence, reaction and prediction
towards terrorism was reaffirmed by the Carter administration and was known as
the four basic program components at the operational level.17 The prevention
component focuses on international initiatives and diplomacy to discourage foreign
states' support of terrorism. This program further attempts to build a broad
consensus that terrorist acts are inadmissible under international law, irrespective
of the motivating cause. The second component, deterrence, emphasizes protection
and security efforts, essentially target hardening in both the public and private
sector, in order to discourage terrorist acts. The third basic program component,
reaction, consists of operations in response to specific major acts of terrorism.
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Finally, prediction includes intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in continuous
support of the three previously mentioned program components. The administration
also embraced the concept of lead agency management of terrorist incidents.
The Lead Agency Concept
The "Lead Agency" concept was supported in order to minimize the impact of
bureaucratic politics. This concept operates on the principle that if an incident falls
within one agency's jurisdiction, that agency coordinates the United States'
response towards the incident. The Organization for Response to Terrorist
Incidents deals with terrorist incidents by use of the lead agency concept.18 There
are only three agencies within the United States government that have jurisdiction
over terrorist incidents: the Department of State, the Justice Department/Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Transportation Department/Federal Aviation
Administration.19 Their exact structures and functions will be outlined in this paper.
The Antiterrorism Planning, Coordination, and Policy Formulation
Organization
This body is made up of two interagency groups and constitutes the upper
two levels-the Executive Committee on Terrorism and the Working Group on
Terrorism-coordinating the various components of the program and providing
overall guidance for planning, coordination, and policy development.
The senior level interagency Executive Committee on Terrorism (ECT),
responsive to the SCC, is especially concerned with the response to major terrorist
incidents and related issues, including periodic testing and evaluation of response
102
capabilities. A June 1979 report by the Executive Committee done for the SCC,
also outlined the committee's duties as including "long-range antiterrorism program
planning and analysis."20
The Working Group on Terrorism (WGT) assigned responsibilities including
information exchange, resolution of jurisdiction issues, and the coordination of the
general antiterrorism activities of the various agencies chaired by the representative
from the Department of State. The Department of Justice representative serves as
the deputy chairman. The full committee membership periodically meets in plenary
session; the participants also belong to committees that deal with specific problems
and issues, international initiatives, security policy, contingency planning and crisis
management committees address and, as required, the prevention, deterrence, and
reaction components of the United States government's antiterrorism program. The
intelligence component (prediction) is continuously addressed by a special
intelligence community that coordinates with both the Working Group and the
Executive Committee.21
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
To facilitate the management of terrorist incidents, delineate operational
jurisdiction and provide for the exchange of information between agencies, federal
departments concluded a number of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), which
includes agreements between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on domestic aircraft hijackings, the FAAand
the Department of Defense (DOD) on aircraft hijackings on US military bases, the
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FBI and the Department of Energy (DOE) on nuclear threat incidents, the DOE and
DOD on accidents or incidents involving radioactive material or nuclear weapons,
and the Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury on bombing
incidents.22
The Carter administration suffered the adverse consequences of
international terrorism largely because of the economy and the Iranian issue, like
any other program. The administration's antiterrorism program was criticized by
many as lacking a real command structure. That is, individual departments and
agencies failed to coordinate their decision-making.
The United States' response to terrorism from the early 1970s to the early
1980s was an approach based on a passive-reactive defense. However, the signing
of the National Security Decision Directives 138 by President Reagan on April 3,
1984, represented a change in the American approach towards terrorism and this
is confirmed in the words of Noel C. Koch (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense)
"from the reactive approach to recognition that pro-active steps are needed."23
Although the process appeared to be a constantly swinging pendulum where
extremes dominate, Presidents are not always able to adopt a course of action they
consider ideal because public opinion has swung to one extreme or another as a
result of previous mistakes or disasters.
The push for antiterrorism legislation in President Clinton's era had an air of
familiarity. The terrorism bill passed in April 1996 grew out of similar circumstances
- public outcry after the Oklahoma City federal building disaster. In February,
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Clinton submitted his Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, which stemmed from
recommendations growing out of the World Trade Center bombing and focused on
the threat of international terrorism.24 After the Oklahoma attack, President Clinton
and congressional leaders quickly pledged swift and bipartisan cooperation on a set
of initiatives aimed at both international and domestic terrorism. Clinton began the
week with a lengthy list of new provisions he was seeking to help prevent acts of
terrorism and to identify perpetrators. At the top of his list were the following : 1.
Giving federal agents expanded wiretap authority and 2. Requiring the use of
chemical identifiers known as "taggants" in black powder and smokeless powder,
the two principal categories of gun-powder.25
At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing April 27, 1995, administration
officials and lawmakers generally agreed on the need to clarify and broaden federal
jurisdiction and powers regarding crimes related to terrorism. During the hearing,
FBI Director Louis J. Freeh told the committee his agency could and did investigate
extremist groups that posed a threat of violence, but said he needed additional
funds and legal powers to keep pace with the threat. The administration, for
example, wanted increased access to telephone and other consumer records in
terrorism probes. Freeh said, "gathering information about potential terrorism was
the best hope of preventing it," and assured senators the government would stay
within constitutional bounds.26
Some lawmakers including then Senate majority Leader Bob Dole,
R-Kansas, Senator Arlen Specter, R-Pennsylvania, Joseph I. Lieberman,
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D-Connecticut, the Deputy Director for the Center for National Security Studies
James X. Dempsey, and civil liberties advocates were already concerned about
broadening government powers. They protested the administration's initial
antiterrorism bill, such as plans allowing military involvement in law enforcement
efforts regarding biological and chemical weapons, the idea of broadening federal
wiretap authority to eavesdrop from one phone to another without obtaining a new
warrant, and the issue of special deportation procedures for suspected alien
terrorists and prohibitions on fundraising for terrorist groups respectively.27 Senator
Lieberman stated that the United States would have to re-think its traditional
balance of government power versus individual freedom in light of the Oklahoma
bombing, "without order in our society," he added, "there is no liberty."28
In sum, the Carter administration brought about the restructuring of the
antiterrorist bureaucracy. His successors - Reagan, Bush and Clinton have
attempted to alter the structural complexion of the organization for antiterrorism
planning, coordination, and policy formulation. While none of the administrations
has radically altered either the government's antiterrorist policy or bureaucracy, the
focus of the American response to international and domestic terrorism has been
redirected.
U.S. Government Departments and Agencies with
Antiterrorism Programs
The mission of antiterrorism programs is to detect, prevent, and/or react to
unlawful, violent activities of individuals or groups whose intent is to 1. overthrow
the government; 2. interfere with the activities of foreign governments in the United
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States; 3. impair the functioning of the federal government, a state government, or
interstate commerce; or 4. deprive Americans of their civil rights as guaranteed by
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.29
There are over thirty departments and agencies responsible for the
implementation of the United States antiterrorism programs. These institutions and
personnel responsible for the management of terrorist incidents are so divided
among local governments, state and federal governments that it is frequently
difficult to know who is in charge. This section will briefly outline institutions
invested with the United States antiterrorist bureaucracy, such as: the Department
of State; the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department
of the Treasury/ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Department of
Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Transportation.
Department of State (DOS) Structure and Organization
The Department of State is the designated lead agency for the United States
policy on international terrorism, and the most important organizational actor in the
United States' response to both domestic and international terrorism. It advances
the United States' objectives and interests in shaping a more free, more secure, and
more prosperous world through formulating, representing, and implementing the
President's foreign policies. In addition to representing the United States' policy
and interests, the department is the primary provider of foreign affairs information
used by the United States government in policy formulation.
The Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line
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of presidential succession, is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and
the person chiefly responsible for the United States representation abroad.30
This department has jurisdictional authority over international terrorist
incidents involving American citizens and property overseas and does so through
an interagency coordination mechanism. The chief organizational actors within the
State Department tackling the issue of international terrorism are the Office for
Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, the Office of Security and the
Operational Center. The Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning
formally created on February 9, 1984,31 represents the heart of the department's
antiterrorism efforts. This office has been reconstituted and re-designated from the
office for Combating Terrorism. The Office for Combating Terrorism was formally
established during 1976.32 Its primary function, which has been retained by the
office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, was to "develop and refine the
policy and operational guidelines for dealing with terrorist threats to American
citizens and interests abroad."33 Another group, the Policy Coordinating Committee
on Terrorism (PCCT) chaired by the Department of State, is responsible for the
development of overall US policy regarding international terrorism.
Goals of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program
In November 1983, in response to the alarming increase in international
terrorist activity, the United States Congress authorized that an Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) Program be established within the Department of State. The
program is designed "to help friendly governments counterterrorism by training
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foreign delegations at United States facilities in antiterrorist policy, crisis
management, hostage negotiations, airport security measures, explosive detection
and disposal methods."34 For the past decade, approximately seventy-five
countries and over fourteen thousand international government officials have
participated in the ATA program.35
The program is specifically directed toward enhancing the antiterrorist
operating skills of participating countries and increasing respect for human rights by
sharing modern, humane and effective antiterrorism techniques with international
civil authorities. While promoting these major objectives, the ATA program also
enhances the protection provided overseas to American personnel and facilities,
and increases cooperation between the United States government and international
security and law enforcement communities."36 This program has become a major
element in the United States government's continuing effort to combat international
terrorism.
The Antiterrorism Assistance Program idea gained acceptance by the United
States Congress, but Democrats from the House of Representatives expressed
concern that such a program could result in the United States helping authoritarian
regimes clamp down on political dissidents rather than real terrorists.37 The
Director of the Office of Combating Terrorism was assigned responsibility for
administering the Antiterrorism Assistance Program on February 4, 1984. Five
days later, the Under Secretary for Management increased the office's
responsibilities by assigning it emergency planning functions. These new
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responsibilities, in addition to those outlined above, expanded the number of duties
of the Office for Combating Terrorism beyond its capacities. In response, the Office
for Combating Terrorism was reconstituted and re-designated the Office of
Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning.38
One year after the World Trade Center bombing, Washington was embroiled
in a fierce bureaucratic battle over control of United States counterterrorism policy.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher called for the folding of the counterterrorism
department's office into a larger bureau for narcotics, terrorism and crime. But
opponents in Congress worried that downgrading the office could lessen the United
States' clout in dealing with terrorists abroad. The House passed legislation
blocking the reorganization and was followed suit by the Senate. White House
officials drafted a secret presidential directive aimed at returning control of
counterterrorism operations to the National Security Council; after the Iran-contra
scandal (when counterterrorism policy was ousted from the NSC by Oliver North),
the Reagan administration gave the Department of State the job of coordinating
Washington's response to terrorism abroad. The Department of State, Pentagon
and FBI officials, fought the White House plan, fearing it could breed the kind of
off-the-books operations that embarrassed Reagan.39
Counterterrorism experts in and out of government worried that the
bureaucratic wrangling was already hampering the United States response to
terrorist threats. Critics charged the administration had been slow to respond to the
kidnapping of two United States missionaries by Colombian terrorists. But aides to
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the Secretary of State insisted the infighting has had no impact on the department's
ability to combat terrorism.40
Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning
The Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning is divided into
three sections. The first is the Counterterrorism Policy Section, which is headed by
a Senior Deputy Director. The next two sections are headed by Deputy Directors.
One section deals with emergency planning and the other with the administration of
Counterterrorism Programs, such as the Antiterrorism Assistance Program.41
The Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning has responsibility
for the execution of the Department of State's jurisdictional authority over
international terrorist incidents involving American citizens and property. Through
the Operational Center, personnel from the office handle the American response to
a terrorist incident by formulating a task force physically located in the center and
which is headed by a representative of the counterterrorism office. The task force
will remain on duty 24 hours a day until the crisis has been resolved.42 It must be
pointed out, however, that during major incidents, such as the Pan-Am airline and
the World Trade Center bombings, the President and other senior members of the
National Security Council will oversee all important policy issues and even some
tactical moves.
The Director of the office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning is
the United States chief antiterrorist official. The position of Director carries the rank
of ambassador with the administrative authority of an assistant secretary.43 The
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Director of the office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning is the chairman
of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and through this position oversees
both the United States response to domestic and international terrorism.44
Within the State Department the Director heads up the department's policy
group on security policies and programs and contingency planning.45 Finally, the
Director reviews all intelligence material on terrorism. He sees that all relevant
information is distributed, coordinated and incorporated into the United States
antiterrorist program.46
In the summer of 1984, former Secretary of State George Shultz named a
special panel to sort out what could be done to fight terrorism. He wanted ideas for
reducing the risk of terrorist attacks against overseas missions. The Advisory Panel
on Overseas Security, headed by retired Admiral Bobby Inman, suggested a
monumental buildup of security with a new organizational entity to manage it. On
November 4, 1985, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (BDS) was created as an
independent bureau.47 As an organization, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's
responsibilities are diverse and encompass many areas. Its primary function "is to
provide protective security for the personnel and facilities of the agency and the
Foreign Services in the United States and abroad, and for the protection of certain
high level foreign dignitaries."48 Because security matters such as terrorism and
espionage are State Department concerns, Diplomatic Security agents are trained
to handle high-level assignments, especially during the past Olympic Games.
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Foreign Operation Division
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security fulfills its overseas duties through special
agents who work as Assistant Regional Security Officers or Regional Security
Officers. Responsible for protecting American personnel, property, and information
abroad, Assistant and Regional Security Officer serve as principal security advisors
to the U.S. on security concerns as overseas ambassadors. They manage
programs at each post for dealing with threats posed by criminals, terrorists, and
hostile intelligence services. The Regional Security Officer is also the American
liaison with host country law enforcement agencies, sponsoring activities such as
an antiterrorism training assistance program for foreign civilian security personnel.49
These officers are also responsible for commanding, under the authority of
the Ambassador, those Marine Security Detachments assigned to embassy duty.50
The Marine Security Detachments are the office of Security's chief operational unit.
The Marines, working with Technical Services Division, provide protection of
personnel, property and classified material. The Technical Services Division
provides the Marines with the means of protecting the embassy from electronic
penetration, surreptitious entry and terrorist attacks.51
Both the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning and the Office
of Security report to the Under Secretary for Management. The Office of the Under
Secretary for Management is responsible for seeing "that planning and policy, as
reflected in the counterterrorism office, and the resources for the response to
threats represented in the security office will both be under single jurisdiction."52
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The Deputy Secretary of State is the department's senior most official concerned
with the issue of international terrorism and represents the department and chairs
the Senior Interdepartmental Group on terrorism.53
State Department Operational Center
The United States' mission to the United Nations is concerned with the
coordination of the United Nations' efforts in dealing with international terrorism.
The United States strongly believes that the only long-term means of preventing
and deterring international terrorism is through international cooperation. The State
Department's Operational Center, outside the White House's Situation Room, is the
United States' chief crisis management institution. Once an international terrorist
incident involving American citizen and/or property begins, the Operational Center
takes over operational control of the American response. This official's main task is
to remind the foreign government(s) handling the incidents of the different
international conventions and agreements it is party to, and its obligations in
enforcing them. The American policy goal is to have the terrorist(s) punished either
by the United States through the extradition of the terrorist(s) to the US or by the
foreign government using its domestic laws dealing with criminal behavior.54
Besides physically strengthening walls and installing antiterrorist equipment,
the United States has developed a policy of non-concessions. The policy of
non-concessions basically states that the United States will not accede to terrorist
demands. No ransom will be paid, no convicted terrorist will be pardoned, and no
country will be pressured to give in to terrorist demands. In other words, the US will
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make no deals. This policy has been a constant feature of the United States'
antiterrorist policy since the late 1960s. However, there were members of the
Reagan administration who believed that the Carter administration gave into Iranian
demands for the release of the hostages.55 In reaction, the Reagan administration
strongly restated U.S. support for the non-concession policy, so as to make it clear
to terrorists that his administration would not bend to their demands. The
non-concession element of the US policy was damaged by Iran-Contra affairs.
Since then, the US has made crystal-clear the government's steadfast commitment
to the "no deals" principle.
Antiterrorist Controversy
One of the most controversial aspects of any nation's antiterrorist program is
the use of self-help measures. Self-help measures can be divided into two
categories. The first involves the use of force such as the execution of hostage-
rescue operations, counterintelligence operations and covert actions. The second
category of self-help measures consists of economic sanctions, international claims,
diplomatic protests and quiet diplomacy.56 Three of four of these measures are the
direct responsibility of the State Department: international claims, diplomatic
protests and quiet diplomacy.
International claims are designed to use the law of state responsibility in
incidents where there is evidence that a state failed "to prevent injuries caused by
terrorism or {failed} to apprehend, punish or extradite terrorists."57 Unfortunately,
the ambiguous nature of the law of state responsibility and the likelihood that a
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state would not accept responsibility for a terrorist act undermines the effectiveness
of this measure. John Murphy, however, states:
the bringing of international claims might serve a useful
function in that they would focus attention on the illegal acts
of the respondent state and raise the consciousness of the
world community as though the legal principles involved and
the respondent state's violation of them.58
The second self-help measure is diplomatic protest. Diplomatic protests,
whether in response to a nation's failure to protect Americans or other nationals or
in response to a nation's aiding and/or abetting international terrorism, represent a
worthy avenue of recourse. Diplomatic protests, first, state publicly the United
States' belief that international terrorism and state behavior associated with it is
illegitimate. Secondly, in John Murphy's words, "the possible benefits of diplomatic
protests outweigh the possible costs."59
Because of the nature of international politics, the United States may choose
not to use an international claim or diplomatic protest. As an alternative, the United
States can engage in quiet diplomacy. Through the use of quiet diplomacy the
United States can still express its displeasure with a nation's behavior without the
risks of both diplomatic protests and international claims. Quiet diplomacy also
makes possible the formulation of agreements, such as the United States-Cuban
memorandum of understanding concerning aircraft hijackings, which would not have
been possible through more public forms of diplomacy.
One of the most debatable self-help measures is economic sanctions and
export controls. The aim of the use of economic sanctions and export controls is to
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cut off military and economic support to those nations determined to have aided
and/or abetted international terrorists by the granting of safe havens and other
assistance. The State Department views the use of economic sanctions and export
controls against governments aiding and/or abetting international terrorism as vital
in the prevention and deterrence of terrorist behavior.60 However, economic
sanctions and export controls are not viewed by all sections of the US government
as vital weapons in combating terrorism. The Treasury Department, as pointed out
by William Regis Farrell, "does not view terrorism from an economic perspective."61
The Treasury and State Departments have traditionally disagreed over the
use of sanctions. It is the view of this author that the damage to the US economy
and the international economic order caused by economic sanctions exceed any
benefit gained by the imposition, because other allies and non-allies will eventually
ignore such sanctions and continue trading with the targeted nations either overtly
or covertly. The nation imposing sanctions in the long run is injured more than the
target nation, witness the Carter administration's grain embargo of the Soviet Union
following the latter's invasion of Afghanistan.
The State Department does not have exclusive power to impose either
economic sanctions or export controls. This department must work with the
Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Defense and Transportation in imposing
sanctions. There are an estimated twelve or more legislative acts granting the
President the authority to impose economic sanctions on nations determined to
have aided and/or abetted international terrorism.62
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With recent domestic terrorist activities, the Congress in 1996 passed a broad
counterterrorism bill concerning fundraising, and exclusion/deportation which
allowed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and
Treasury Secretary, to designate certain foreign groups as terrorist and block these
groups from fundraising in the United States. The Treasury Secretary would be
authorized to freeze the US assets of such groups and allow the federal government
to deny visas to foreigners who belong to groups designated as terrorists. The
legislation would also establish a special deportation court for aliens suspected of
terrorism where the government would be able to shield sensitive evidence from
suspects.
The Department of State is the United States' chief antiterrorist organization.
The department employs a vast array of tools in its fight against international
terrorism. A major problem the State Department and other agencies and
departments are faced with in implementing the United States antiterrorism program
is the attitude of those officials implementing policy. A problem closely associated
with the lack of awareness on the part of some government officials is the argument
that the problem of international terrorism is an issue best handled by specialists
and not generalists.64
A major difficulty in the State Department's handling of the problem of
terrorism - and that of other departments and agencies - is that key officials learn
mainly on the job, but often before they can use the knowledge they have gained,
they are transferred to another post.
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The Department of State represents the United States' commitment to
combat international terrorism. No matter how effective other agencies and
departments are in fulfilling their antiterrorist responsibilities, without an effective
response from the Department of State, the American response to terrorism will be
lacking.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
The Department of Justice (DOJ), was established by the act of June 22,
1870 (28 U.S.C. 501, 503) with the Attorney General as its head.65 The Attorney
General directs the affairs and activities of the department, and is responsible for
managing the federal response to acts of terrorism conducted in the United States.
This function, in turn, is delegated to the Associate Attorney General who makes
major policy and legal decisions during any terrorism crisis.
Guidelines and Statutory Authority On Counterterrorism Investigation
Counterterrorism investigations are based on the fundamental duty of
government to protect the public against terrorism and criminal violence intended to
destroy or manipulate our constitutional system. It is the responsibility of the
Attorney General to ensure that every effort is made to protect US citizens and
property, also, to protect their individual rights. To accomplish this with the
department's thousands of lawyers, investigators and agents who play significant
roles in protecting citizens through effective law enforcement, crime prevention, and
prosecution, the Attorney General issues the following investigative guidelines:
1) the domestic terrorism investigations which are conducted
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in accordance with the "Attorney General Guidelines for
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises, and Domestic
Security/Terrorism Investigation" and
2) the international terrorism investigations are conducted
in accordance with the "Attorney General Guidelines for
FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counter-
intelligence Investigations."66
These guidelines, which are subject to continual review and revision, establish a
consistent policy concerning when an investigation may be initiated and what
techniques may be employed while conducting the investigation.
The Office of the Associate Attorney General supervises the overall
coordination of all agencies within the Justice Department dealing with terrorism.
Under the Associate Attorney General's authority, are the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and the Criminal Division.67 The Associate Attorney General
is the deputy chairman of the Inter-departmental Group on Terrorism.68
Title 28, of the US Code, Section 533, authorizes the Attorney General to
"appoint officials to detect crimes against the United States," and other federal
statutes.69 The Attorney General has designated the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, (FBI), to be the lead federal law enforcement agency in the United
States government fight against terrorism. The FBI is responsible for investigating
the activities of terrorist groups within the United States and for the investigation of
terrorist acts against US citizens abroad. At present, the FBI has investigative
jurisdiction for more than two hundred fifty statutes that categorize violation of
federal laws. Information obtained through an FBI investigator is presented to the
120
appropriate US Attorneys or DOJ officials who decide if prosecution or other actions
are warranted.70
FBI Mission and Organizational Structure
The FBI mission is two-fold: first, to prevent terrorist acts before they occur,
and second, to launch an immediate and effective investigative response, should an
act of terrorism occur. In the course of conducting investigations, the FBI collects
information regarding group membership, associations, movements, support
structures, and funding. This information serves not only as a basis for prosecution,
but builds an intelligence database, making possible the prevention of terrorist acts.
The reactive phase, on the other hand, consists of an effective and timely response
to a terrorist incident through crisis management and conventional investigative
techniques.71 Efforts to coordinate investigations into terrorist incidents were put to
the test following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York
City.
The FBI assumed responsibility for the crime scene and assigned three
hundred agents to carry out forensic examinations. Joined by personnel from the
New York City Police Department (NYPD), the Secret Service, INS, Customs, ATF,
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and other law enforcement
agencies, were able to complete their investigation within a month after the




The FBI is headed by a Director, who is supported by a Deputy Director. An
Assistant Director heads each of the nine Headquarters divisions. The
Counterterrorism Section (CTS) at FBI headquarters provides program direction
and management to all FBI counterterrorism investigations. Overall program policy
and investigative procedures are set and monitored by program managers in the
CTS. Because most terrorist activities involve broad geographic areas in the United
States, which transcend FBI field division boundaries, it is necessary for
headquarters to coordinate investigative activity. The CTS is a component of the
Criminal Investigative Division, which coordinates all criminal investigative
programs. The CTS is further organized into several units that manage investigative
matters, planning matters, research/analysis projects, training, staffing, and
program funding responsibilities.73
The FBI is a field-oriented organization. Its field offices are located in
fifty-six major cities. Of those, fifty-five are in the United States, and one is in
Puerto Rico. The locations have been selected in accordance with crime trends,
the need for regional geographic centralization, and the need to efficiently manage
resources. Within each FBI field office, there exist units that conduct
counterterrorism investigation, provide program direction and support services to
these field offices, from approximately 400 satellite offices known as resident
agencies.74
Each FBI field office is overseen by a Special-Agent-in-Charge (SAC). The
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New York City and Washington, D.C. offices are each managed by an Assistant
Director in Charge (ADIC) due to their large size. The ADICs are assisted by
Deputy Assistant Directors (DADs), and by Special-Agent-ln-Charge (SACs)
responsible for various programs. The SACs in all field offices, including those in
New York City and Washington, D.C, are aided by one or more managers called
Assistant-Special-Agents-ln-Charge (ASACs).75 The initial, tactical response to a
terrorist incident is made by the FBI Special-Agent-ln-Charge (SAC) at the scene.
He is under the supervision of the Director of FBI who retains the responsibility for
containing and resolving the crisis.76
Specific Capabilities
The FBI has a number of specific responsibilities in combating terrorism.
Each office and headquarters has a contingency plan that go into effect when a
terrorist incident occurs. They include, for example, the chain of command,
communications both within and outside the FBI, and the availability of specialized
equipment and personnel. The knowledge and experience gained by such teams
are shared with local law enforcement agencies through training sessions at the FBI
Academy, Quantico, Virginia and throughout the nation.77
Another asset that allows the FBI to respond to terrorist acts is the Special
Operations and Research Unit (SOAR). The function of SOAR is to accumulate and
analyze facts about terrorist incidents and through papers, articles, seminars, and
training sessions to present ways of dealing with terrorism. Members of SOAR are
also available for on-site consultations and are well-versed in the practical
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operations of criminal apprehension.78
SWAT and HTR Program
Two additional FBI units are Special Weapons and Tactics Squads (SWAT)
team and Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). It is believed that confronting a criminal or
terrorist element with a clearly superior force, such as a Special Weapons and
Tactics Squads (SWAT) team will serve to diminish any willful inclination toward
violent resistance. SWAT was designed to equip the FBI with a flexible and
effective response to unconventional and high-risk law enforcement situations
arising from jurisdictional responsibilities. Each of the fifty-six FBI field divisions
maintains a SWAT capability that is utilized to respond to, contain, and terminate
terrorist activity in progress. It is intended that the SWAT concept should be
employed in any situation involving what is, in the judgment of the SAC, a
higher-than-normal risk or requiring the special skills unique to SWAT operational
capacity. Examples of these situations are:- snipping; barricaded subjects; terrorist
activities; high-risk raids and arrests; skyjackings; rescues coincidental to FBI
jurisdiction; operations requiring airborne insertion or extraction capability; security
and protective functions.79
If one or more teams are combined to form a larger organization, the senior
team leader on the scene exercises direct tactical command. This in no way alters
the overall command responsibility and authority of the SAC within his field office
because all authority for employment of SWAT teams is derived from SAC.80
The desirable relationship between the team leader and the SAC in any
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given operation is seen in the following chain-of-command; i.e., at the top is SAC
(or his delegated representative), followed by the SWAT Leader and the SWAT
Team. Specifically, the team leader is responsible for: 1. ensuring that he and his
team obtain necessary training; 2. scheduling team activities; and 3. conducting
contingency planning relative to potential problems within his field office. At the
scene of an incident, the controlling team's personnel, formulates a tactical plan,
makes recommendations to the SAC, briefs the team on mission procedures, and
equipment concerning execution of the tactical plan; and directs the execution of
the tactical plan.81
This delineation of responsibilities relieves the SAC of much of the detail
involved in SWAT planning, giving him time to devote overall problem perspective;
while at the same time it fully exploits the tactical expertise of the SWAT team.
Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) Program
In response to "the growing threat of terrorism" and the perception that there
was a "void in US ability to handle large scale terrorist situations,"82 the FBI
originally in 1983 formatted a fifty-agent Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) to provide
the President and the Attorney General with a civilian law enforcement alternative
to the use of military force. Today the team is part of the Critical Incident Response
Group (CIRG) stationed at the FBI Academy and its authorized 91 Special Agents,
which includes an ASAC, eight SSA's, twelve agent staff positions, and seventy
agent operators. The operators are assigned either to an Assault/Entry Section or a
Sniper/Observer Section. The HRT is structured to deploy with part or all of its
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personnel and resources, depending upon the magnitude of a crisis and can do so
within four hours of the request.83
The HRT is prepared to provide FBI field offices a variety of assistance for
resolving high-risk crises involving hostage/barricade, raid, arrest, or other tactical
situations. Further, the team is specifically trained to do so in stronghold, aircraft,
vehicle, rural, or maritime environments. The Team conducts a great deal of
research and development with respect to explosive breaching, weapons, tactics,
and equipment that might enhance tactical capabilities. It also maintains liaison
with other domestic and foreign counterterrorist teams, whenever possible
exchanging ideas, policy, training methods, and operational experiences.84
In addition the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 addressed the
FBI's role in responding to hostage taking. A group of highly experienced and
expertly trained hostage negotiators formed the core of the FBI's Critical Incident
Negotiation Team (CINT).85 Since it was created in 1985, CINT members regularly
intervene in various hostage-taking incidents as they occur nationwide. Trained in
all aspects of crisis negotiation including preparation for overseas negotiations, and
international assistance functions, the team has been called on to perform over
86
twenty-two overseas operations since its inception.
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
Increased counterterrorism cooperative efforts between the FBI and various
law enforcement agencies have resulted in the formation of the Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, composed of Federal, state and local law enforcement officers. These
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units are staffed and supervised by police officers, detectives, state troopers, and
FBI agents. The purpose of these task forces is to maximize interagency
coordination and cooperation in the formulation and implementation of
investigations strategies while taking advantage of a wide range of law enforcement
resources.87 The pooling of personnel and resources among United States
agencies alone is not enough to successfully counter the global nature of the
terrorist threats. International cooperation and information sharing were necessary
to enhance the United States counterterrorism effort and promote continued
success in the future.
Extraterritorial Investigative Jurisdiction
The FBI's extraterritorial jurisdiction in international terrorism is obtained from
numerous US statutes. While previous statutes enabled the FBI to investigate acts
of terrorism inside the United States, Congress, in response to the threat posed by
terrorists against United States citizens and their interests abroad, passed two laws,
in 1984 and 1986 expanding FBI jurisdiction to include investigation of terrorist acts
abroad. Of particular importance, however, is the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, which created a new section in the United States criminal code for Hostage
Taking and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which
established a new statute and expanded the FBI's jurisdiction pertaining to terrorist
acts directed against United States nationals and/or interest oversees.88
The FBI, with the permission of the host foreign government, and close
procedural coordination with the United States Department of State, can conduct
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extraterritorial investigations by interviewing victims, collecting forensic evidence
and apprehending terrorist fugitives for eventual prosecution in a U.S. court. The
ability to conduct an on-site crime scene investigation greatly enhances the
likelihood of a successful conclusion to the investigation.89 This development
greatly benefits the fight against terrorism, including enhanced coordination and
cooperation, as well as increased intelligence and information sharing among those
agencies and departments tasked with counterterrorism responsibilities. One
example of a successful effort by the FBI in providing extensive investigative
assistance to many foreign countries, is the FBI's assistance to the government of
Kuwait following the arrest and conviction of sixteen subjects by the government of
Kuwait for their plot to assassinate former President George Bush in 1993. The
above cited example and other past successes in the United States government's
fight against terrorists are attributable in large part to this coordinated
counterterrorism effort.
The chief tools available to the FBI in combating terrorism are counter-
intelligence operations. In July 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision
Directives 39,90 entitled US Policy on Counterterrorism. These directives further
articulated and defined the roles of members of the United States Counterterrorism
Community, including the FBI. The counterterrorism funds in 1996 were increased
to $1 billion over four years to help federal law enforcement officials fight terrorism.
Because of the major concern of terrorism, the FBI would receive the largest share,
$468 million.91
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The FBI has jurisdiction over domestic counterintelligence operations
designed to be preventive and reactive in nature in dealing with terrorism.92 During
the past years, the FBI has expanded its Counterterrorism Branches at FBI
Headquarters. Counterterrorism officers and analysts from several U.S.
Government agencies were also invited to work at the FBI. The goal is to improve
the U.S.' ability to combat terrorism and maintain a robust infrastructure protection
and countermeasure capability for the United States. All FBI counterintelligence
operations must follow "the Attorney General's foreign counterintelligence
guidelines against the foreign inspired terrorists or foreign-based terrorists."93
Finally, the FBI participates in numerous interagency working groups that deal with
terrorism issues. One example is the Protective Security Working Group (PSWG)
chaired by the FBI. PSWG ensures that federal agencies tasked with protective
responsibilities for facilities and individuals are kept abreast of all aspects of the
terrorist threat. Its International Terrorist Unit examines trends in international
terrorism which have a possible impact on US domestic terrorist activity.
Immigration And Naturalization Service (INS)
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Inspection Division is
another important agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ), assigned an
antiterrorist role. The INS headed by a commissioner was moved from the
Department of Labor to the Department of Justice through the President's
Reorganization Plan Number V 1940.94 The INS established the Restructuring
Office within the Commissioner's Office to direct the second phase of planning for
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the agency's restructuring effort. The agency has moved with the administrator's
decision to separate enforcement and immigration function within one agency.95
The agency's primary responsibility is to administer immigration and
nationality laws, with respect to the inspection in determining the admissibility of all
persons attempting entry into the fifty states, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands and
Guam.96 Since maintaining the intensity of all US borders is this country's first line
of defense against terrorist incursions, the INS inspectors, in conjunction with
officers of the US Customs Service, implement at all ports of entry, special
screening procedures to ensure that known terrorists and illegal weapons,
explosives, and equipment are not admitted to the United States.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182)97 specified various
classes of aliens who are excludable from the United States. That is "a person
seeking to enter the US with a criminal act for a political purpose" thereby
endangering the security of the United States.98 Through the normal course of their
duties, INS officers encounter millions of foreign-born persons every year
throughout the 250 ports of entry in the United States. These include land, air, and
sea locations along the Canadian borders, as well as the Gulf Coast; thereby giving
the agency a prominent role in the national counterterrorism effort.
Although no specific organizational component within INS is dedicated
exclusively to terrorist activities, the Intelligence Program, a unit within the
Enforcement Division, is the focal point for the collection of information relating to
terrorism. The INS primary role in the antiterrorist structure revolves around its
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involvement in the "Lookout System."99 Both the Manual Service Lookout Books
(MSLB) and the National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS)
containing thousands of records grouped by phonetic coding, enabling
similar-sounding names to be grouped together for references despite
dissimilarities in spelling. The systems are constantly upgraded with the list of lost
or stolen documents that could be used by terrorists or other criminals attempting
entry into the United States. Findings by the Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL)
confirm strong ties between terrorism and the use of fraudulent identity
documents.100
It is estimated that over twenty major ports of entry are now connected to the
FDL through Photophone, a tele-imagery system that provides a real-time capability
to transmit and receive visual images. This equipment is capable of transmitting a
"high-resolution image by phone throughout the globe in approximately twenty
seconds."101 INS also uses a hand scanner for frequent travelers at Kennedy and
Newark Airports. Known as INS Passenger Accelerated Service System"
(INSPASS), the hand scanners allowed frequent travelers to be processed quickly
through long lines as Immigration into Customs. According to James Achterberg,
INSPASS project director, INS was able to use the scanner for over 36,000 times
before deciding whether to employ the system as another part of entry.
One of the best means to fight terrorism is through an effective liaison effort.
INS works closely with other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies,
including the Department of State, FBI, CIA, and others, through information
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sharing about known or suspected terrorists. A number of interagency committees
and working groups have been established to ensure that information can be
processed quickly among people and agencies with key roles in the national
counterterrorism effort.
All INS officers are subjected to the following type of training - "basic
intelligence training for trainee officers; more advanced intelligence training for
intelligence officers; specialized training for Terrorism, Drug and Fraud (TDF) task
force members at ports of entry; and fraudulent document detection training."102
Finally, INS, by virtue of its character to enforce and administer US laws relating to
the immigration of aliens, is in a unique position to gather a variety of intelligence
information on a first-hand basis. Any efficient campaign against terrorism has to
start with information on the many international and domestic groups that have
conducted or threatened to carry out terrorist acts in the past. A key source of this
information is generated through "TECSII data base,"103 managed jointly by the
Custom Service and the INS, to identify individuals who have raised the suspicions
of agents at ports of entry into the US because of their involvement with contraband
as well as suspicious travel patterns revealed on their passports.
These Intelligence Collection Requirements mandate field-level officers to
communicate immediately any information developed on terrorism to the INS
headquarters for appropriate dissemination. It should be noted that only a small
fraction of the hundreds of millions of aliens to whom INS comes in contact have
terrorist ties. The INS, in recognition of the seriousness of a single terrorist attack
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on US soil, has implemented a number of pro-active and effective counterterrorism
measures through its mandated role in coordinating a federal response to terrorism.
Department of the Treasury (DOTT) and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
The Department of the Treasury is headed by a Secretary and deals with
terrorism mainly from a law enforcement perspective. The department has both a
law enforcement function and the authority to utilize economic levers in combating
terrorism. The Treasury offices are composed of divisions headed by Assistant
Secretaries and are primarily responsible for policy formulation and overall
management of the Treasury Department. The Assistant Secretary for Enforcement
and Operation coordinates all of the Department of Treasury's antiterrorism law
enforcement activities.
President Clinton's Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 required making
plastic explosives for easier detection by law enforcement. The bill also mandates
a study and recommendations by the Department of Treasury as to whether tracing
agents should be added to explosive material - excluding black and smokeless
powder, "If warranted by the study findings, the Treasury Secretary could require
such taggants."104 The departments under the Assistant Secretary jurisdiction are
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), the Custom Service and the
Secret Service. Only the functions of the ATF antiterrorism under the Department of
the Treasury will be discussed.
ATF Organizational Structure and Functions
In July 1, 1972, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was
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established by the US Department of the Treasury Order No. 120-1 (originally No.
221 ),105 as a law enforcement organization within the Department of the Treasury.
The order transferred the functions, powers and duties arising under laws relating
to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives, from the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to the ATF. Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act in 1970, formalized
the ATF Division as having explosive expertise.106 In the Anti-Arson Act of 1982,
Congress amended the Title XI definition of explosive to include arson as a federal
crime thus, expanding ATF's responsibility for investigating commercial arson
nationwide.107
The Director who is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, is the head
of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and reports to the Assistant
Secretary (Enforcement). ATF represents the Department of the Treasury in
terrorist incidents involving the use of firearms and explosives. With its
headquarters in Washington D.C. Most of the Bureau's personnel and operations
are decentralized throughout the United States, with a few stations overseas. ATF
agents, inspectors and support staff enforce the federal laws and regulations
relating to alcohol, tobacco products, firearms, explosives and arson by working
directly and in cooperation with other local, state, federal and international law
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enforcement agencies.
The Department of the Treasury formulated a memorandum of understanding
with the FBI addressing issues involving the use of explosives. During an
investigation of an incident involving explosives, the ATF handles technical matters
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while the FBI acts in the role of supervisor.109 To investigate explosives incidents
and arson, ATF uses National Response Teams (NRTs) and International
Response Teams (IRT) and Arson Task Forces consisting of ATF special agents,
auditors, technicians, laboratory personnel, and canines.110 The Bureau's four
NRTs can respond within twenty-four hours to suspected bombing and arson
scenes in the US. At arson scenes, ATF also deploys cause and origin specialists,
specially trained canines and auditors, while the IRTs formed as a result of an
agreement with the State Department, are deployed outside the US.111 ATF had
initiated steps to ensure law enforcement's continued effective investigation of a
crime scene. This cooperation, training and intelligence sharing continue to be a
vital element in counterterrorism. A good example is the ATF joining forces with the
FBI, the New York Police Department and Port Authority Police Department to
investigate the bombing of the World Trade Center to bring those responsible to
justice. As stated by Steven H. Harris:
. . .terrorists certainly, do not confine their activities to one
country or region, therefore international cooperation, training
and intelligence sharing has been illustrated in numerous
international terrorism investigations in recent years, such as
the successful investigation into the 1988 bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.112
Two major incidents in the 1990s have drawn criticism from the Executive
Branch, Congress, the media and the general public over the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms' law enforcement functions. 1. The ATF role following the
"Ruby Ridge Shootout" in August 1992, which resulted in the deaths of a federal
marshal and two civilians and 2. the Waco, Texas raid of the Branch Davidian
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compound on February 1993 that left over eighty dead including four ATF agents.113
Both incidents prompted a number of investigations and hearings such as
President Clinton's mandate to the Department of the Treasury and the Department
of Justice, which are responsible for the ATF and FBI, to conduct "vigorous and
thorough" investigations of the events leading to the loss of law enforcement and
civilian lives, and hearings by the members of the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information and the Government
Reforms and Oversight Subcommittee on Criminal Justice.114
Robert M. Wells described both incidents as "examples of excessive force
and abuse of power by law enforcement officials."115
Department of Transportation (DOT) and
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The Department of Transportation (DOT) is headed by a Secretary. The
office of Inspector General under the DOT Director remains committed to aviation
security. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs
carries a broad portfolio of responsibilities covering domestic and international
aviation, international trade, and a range of other international cooperation and
facilitation issues.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is one of the DOTs administrative
organizations concerned with the issue of terrorism. Other DOT functions in
combating terrorism are the representation at meetings of International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), and to monitor nations' compliance in maintaining
airport security standards required by the ICAO. The ICAO is the acknowledged
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body responsible for setting standards in the field of civil aviation.116
By virtue of the Anti-hijacking Act of 1974, the DOT Secretary has the
authority to suspend American Civil aviation traffic with any nation that aids and/or
abets international terrorism.117 The Secretary can also, by virtue of Section
1115(b) of the Anti-hijacking Act, suspend American Civil Aviation traffic with any
nation that does not maintain the minimum airport security measures mandated by
the Hague Convention of 1970118 and the Ominbus Counter terrorism Act of 1995.119
Such actions could be implemented by the DOT Secretary with the approval of the
Secretary of State. One of the Department of Transportation's strategic goals in
counter terrorism relates to transportation security, as will be discussed below.
Federal Aviation Administration fFAA^
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) aviation security mission is to
protect the users of commercial air transportation against terrorism and other
criminal acts. The FAA's mission also includes the prevention of passengers or
cargo shippers transporting hazardous materials or other dangerous goods in a
manner that could jeopardize flight safety.120 In brief, the "FAA is to prevent or deter
the introduction of weapons and explosives aboard commercial passenger-carrying
aircraft." To achieve this goal, the FAA has established a number of focus areas,
one of which is to maximize the performance capability of people working in security
for air carriers, for airport operators and at FAA facilities; including but not limited to
"training of inspectors, rule making and intelligence analyses, among others."121
The Office of the Director of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
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responsible for the handling of hijacking and the oversight of civil aviation security
programs. The FAA's Office for Aviation Security is responsible for the
supervising of the security and safety regulations dealing with all aspects of civil
aviation mandated by the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974.123
The 1970s and the 1980s brought about a rise in group-sponsored or
organizational terrorism against aviation. Crimes against international civil aviation
involving US Aviation interest along with the capabilities of the criminals during the
1980s were at its peak. For example, FAA security in 1985 witnessed the "hijacking
of TWA Flight 847, the attacks on the Rome and Vienna Airport and the bombing of
TWA Flight 840 on departure from Athens.1'124 The aforementioned incidents
resulted in tightened security and inspection procedures, the Foreign Airport
Security Act of 1985, and the swift action of the ICAO. In 1986, the ICAO adopted
improvements to its Security Standards and Recommended Practices; as a result,
there was a significant drop in the number of hijackings, a total of three worldwide
between 1986 and 1987.125 The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 which killed all 259
people on board and eleven on the ground over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988126
emphasized the continuous need for prompt action to strengthen further aviation
security measures. The above action prompted the Presidential Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism and the passage of the Aviation Security
Improvement Act of 1990.127 Both demonstrated the President's, Congress and the
determination of the United States citizens to have the FAA adopt - and the aviation
industry to implement more reliable methods to prevent an act of terrorism against
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civil aviation.
Another tragedy, the crash of TWA Flight 800 in July 1996, proved to be the
catalyst for taking important steps in aviation security. Although the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) ruled
out terrorist involvement as a potential cause of the crash, the crash prompted the
creation of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
(WHCASS) in August 1996, known as the Core Commission. The WHCASS reports
in "September 1996 and February 1997 addressed safety, security, and air traffic
control modernization."128 The Core Commission made recommendations to 1.
"implement a comprehensive plan to prevent inclusions of explosives and other
threats objects in cargo, 2. conduct airport vulnerability assessments 3. deploy new
explosives detection equipment, and 4. implement automated passenger
profiling."129
Development of Explosive Detection Equipment
Much of the FAA's effort to develop effective countermeasures focuses on
research and development for explosive detection equipment, concourse security
and system development and integration. In the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 1997,130 Congress allotted $198 million for aviation security
initiatives, including $144.2 million for the deployment of advanced security
technologies, $18 million to hire 300 additional FAA personnel, $8.9 million for
additional canine teams, $5.5 million for airport vulnerability assessments, and $21
million for aviation security research and operational testing.131 The FAA has
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awarded contracts to purchase up to 100 FAA - certified132 explosive detection
machines and 489 trace detection devices.133
The FAA's security program consists of the use of random hundred percent
baggage searches, the use of X-ray equipment and the use of sky marshals on
airline routes likely to be hijacked. The new technology weapons detection
equipment "(infrared, ultrasound and millimeter wave),"134 automated weapon
recognition by X-ray and explosive vapor detection of persons and carry-on luggage
have been purchased and installed by the Security Equipment Integrated Product
Team (SEIPT).135 SEIPT was formed by the FAA and is composed of FAA, airline,
and airport representatives. The Security Equipment Integrated Product Team
(SEIPT), is responsible for (1) developing acquisition plans, (2) determining the
type and number of explosive detection equipment to purchase, (3) selecting the
airlines and airport sites to receive the equipment, and (4) overseeing the
installation and integration of equipment into airports' existing security system.
Working with the aviation industry, FAA has completed and implemented the
automated passenger profiling, and has deployed explosives detection equipment
to airports nationwide. Presently, FAA has installed new security technologies,
including seventy-two FAA-certified explosives detection machines, and 345 trace
detection devices, at US airports.136 The CTX 5000 SP's (and its upgraded version,
the 5000DS), at a cost of about $1 million per machine, is currently the only
FAA-certified bulk explosive detection system deployed.137 In addition, FAA has
developed a new computer-based operator training system called the "Screener
140
Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System" (SPEARS),138 a computerized
training and testing system to help train airline screeners and maintain their skills.
FAA's Cooperation with Other Federal Departments
Adopting new and effective measures to counter the threat against civil
aviation requires a cooperative team effort. As earlier mentioned in this chapter,
the FAA's main responsibility outside of its supervision of civilian airlines security
program, is the handling of crisis situations involving US civilian aircrafts.139 Its
mandated authority covers the "hijacking of aircraft in flight or on the ground with its
doors closed."140 Because hijacking incidents invade the jurisdictional realms of
other federal departments, the FAA has formulated memoranda of understanding
with the FBI and with the State and Defense Departments. The memoranda of
understanding with the FBI deal with domestic hijackings. The memoranda of
understanding with the DOD deal with hijackings occurring or involving US military
bases, while the memoranda of understanding with the DOS cover overseas
hijacking incidents involving American airlines.141
The Antiterrorist Assistance Program (ATA) is another vital element in the
US response to the threat posed by international terrorism. ATA since its inception
in 1984, has helped train over 650 students from twenty- eight nations in advanced
civil aviation security or airport police management at the FAA's Transportation
Safety Institute in Oklahoma City. The ATA program also works with the FAA's
assessment of airports as provided under the Foreign Airport Security Act.142
The Department of State and the FAA cooperate closely in this FAA airport
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assessment program and in areas such as research and development, to identify
and develop new technology to apply to the process of examining baggage so that
materials such as plastic explosives can be more consistently detected. For
example, the "thermal neutron analyzer"143 developed as a means of ensuring that
plastic explosives cannot evade detection, has offered real promise for the FAAand
its aviation industry.144 As part of a comprehensive effort to detect plastic
explosives, ATA trained bomb-detector dogs already hold a critical role in aviation
security.145
FAA faces significant challenges in providing effective security oversight
over the US aviation industry. The US air transport system is the most complex
aviation system in the world with approximately six hundred million passenger
implements and more than twenty-six billion cargo ton miles per year.146
Domestically, over 450 airports are required to have FAA-approved security
programs.147 The responsibility for aviation security is shared between FAA, the
airlines, and airport. The FAA sets guidelines, establishes procedures, and relies
on the intelligence community for information on threats to aviation and makes
judgment on how to meet these threats.
To meet current and future threats to aviation security, FAA needs an
integrated strategic plan to guide its efforts and prioritize funding needs. The
planning efforts of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and
Research and Acquisitions, including the Technical center, must be integrated
towards common goals, objectives, and milestones.
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Although the FAA is not an intelligence-gathering organization, the agency's
direct ties and counterterrorism effort to those agencies that are, has increased the
FAA's effectiveness in deterring any terrorist or criminal act. Because aviation is an
attractive target for terrorists, the FAA and the U.S. aviation community remained
alert and continued to improve and enhance the safety and security of the traveling
public.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
Intelligence Community
The most important aspect of any nation's fight against domestic and
international terrorism is current and accurate intelligence. As stated by Robert H.
Kupperman, "Intelligence is the first line of defense."148 The Intelligence Community
refers in aggregate to these: "Executive Branch agencies and organizations that
conduct the variety of intelligence activities which comprise the total United States
national intelligence efforts."149
The community is divided into three categories known as 'elements.' 1. The
Department of Defense Element; 2. The Department of Intelligence Element (other
than DOD); and 3. The Independent Agency Element.150 These three elements
formed over twelve organizational units of the Intelligence Community are
authorized to conduct intelligence functions outside and within the United States.
The community includes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the National
Security Agency (NSA); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the office within the
Department of Defense (DOD) for collection of specialized national foreign
intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and
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Research of the Department of State (DOS); Army, Navy, and Air Force
intelligence; the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI); the Department of the
Treasury (DOT); and the Department of Energy.151 Currently, all counterintelligence
activities occurring outside the US are conducted by the CIA. All counterintelligence
activities occurring within the U.S. are conducted by the FBI and are executed
according to the Attorney General's Guidelines (AGG) for Domestic Security
Investigation as was discussed under DOT/FBI.
Members of the Intelligence Community advise the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) who heads both the Intelligence Community and the CIA, through
their representation on a number of specialized committees, namely, the National
Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), and the Intelligence Community Executive
Committee (ICEC), both are chaired by the Director Of Central Intelligence (DCI).
The DCI also served as the President's principal adviser on foreign intelligence
matters.152 Both the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.153
The CIA was established under the National Security Council (NSC) by the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.).154 It now
functions under that statute, Executive Order 12333 signed by President Reagan on
December 4, 1981, which revoked Executive Order 12036 of President Carter's
Administration thus, altering the functions of the Intelligence Community.155
Executive Order 12333 states the intelligence community's antiterroristtaskasthe:
Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to
protect against international terrorism and other hostile activities
i
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directed against the United States by foreign powers, organ-
organizations, persons and their agents.156
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the only independent agency.
Through the office of the Deputy Director for Operations' Counter- terrorist Center,
the CIA plays a key role within the United States' antiterrorist intelligence
component.157 However, the CIA is purely a foreign intelligence organization and
has little or no domestic security law enforcement duties. The nature of intelligence
operations performed by the CIA requires them to maintain secrecy, therefore, the
details surrounding their involvement in counterterrorism remain classified and
excludes the possibility of any type of academic in-depth examination in their utility
in combating terrorism.
The CIA's work is classified into three general categories: intelligence
gathering and analysis; counterintelligence and political intervention in other
countries. In combating international terrorism, the CIA supports the overall US
Government effort by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on
foreign terrorist groups and individuals. It conducts liaisons with the intelligence
and security services of friendly governments, shares counterterrorism intelligence
information with and, on request, provides advice and training to these services.158
Intelligence gathering is a critical process, which can serve as an essential
tool for combating terrorism and provide an invaluable contribution to U.S.
policymakers and law enforcement authorities. Intelligence is designed to guide
and shape law enforcement policy and strategy through continuous questioning,
probing, assessing, reassessing, and evaluating raw data.159 Intelligence data
145
provide the basis for systematic management by identifying potential terrorist
groups, their membership, plans and capabilities.
Political terrorists do not generally possess the strength to launch a direct
attack on their adversary. They thus rely on anonymity, surprise, and guerrilla
tactics to obtain their specific goals. Because terrorist organizations operate
covertly, similar methods of investigation and intelligence gathering are necessary
to combat and obstruct their plan. Such methods, according to Siljander, may
include "the use of electronics surveillance techniques, physical surveillance
techniques, physical surveillance of suspects, infiltration of suspect groups by
undercover agents, development of a network of paid informants, and establishment
of computerized dossier systems of suspect and known terrorists."160
No matter what intelligence strategy is utilized in combating terrorism, the
collection, analysis and dissemination of covert and overt information and
intelligence are vital to the success of the United States' antiterrorist efforts. A
possible alternative to the public and bureaucratic constraint placed on the use of
overt operations is the use of secret operatives to carry out actions against
terrorists. Only the President through the recommendation of the National Security
Council (NSC) can authorize the CIA to execute covert operations. Covert actions
are considered when the United States foreign policy objectives may not be fully
realized by normal diplomatic means and when military actions are deemed too
extreme an operation.161 These "covert operations" according to Celmer, were not
formulated until the National Security Council (NSC) established the Office of
i
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Special Projects (OSP) in June 18, 1948. The OSP was directed "to plan and
conduct covert operations."162 The Office of Special Projects (OSP) which
represents the intelligence community's chief operational asset in combating
international terrorism, has evolved into the present "Directorate of Operations."163
Covert actions or operations entail such activities as collecting intelligence
information, and protecting against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers,
organization, persons, or international terrorists activities.164 Since terrorists learn
from varied and shared experience and take great precautions to prevent detection
or penetration, the CIA's counter terrorism specialists participate actively in
developing strategies aimed at combating terrorism through covert operations.
There are several advantages associated with using covert resources to
implement foreign policy objectives.
First, it gives the administration wide leverage in dealing with foreign persons
and governments without the fear of reprisals from world opinion.
Second, it serves to shield the intelligence establishment from congressional,
media and public inquiries.165 CIA covert collection of information must use all legal
means available, including human resource penetration and physical surveillance,
and emphasize linkages between regular criminal investigation and terrorist
operations.
Covert military operations launched during the Reagan administration known
as Iran-Contra, were a violation of United States law and helped point out flaws in
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the system of check and balances. In the Iran-Contra affairs, the agency was
implicated in the illegal diversion of money from arms sales to Iran to fund the
Reagan Administration's covert work against Nicaragua.166 What was most troubling
to policymakers and many CIA officials was that the former Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), William J. Casey and his covert operators, violated the law and
avoided congressional oversight.167 These revelations and other exposures have
caused public outrage and a change of attitude towards the agency's covert
operations. A former CIA member acknowledged that the agency has "lost its
credibility." Other critics concluded that the CIA's directorate of operations which
runs covert actions, is becoming less relevant.
Analyzing the CIA's role during the Cold War and other intelligence
inadequacies gave critics more reasons to question the agency's effectiveness.
First, the CIA has been faulted for failing to "foresee the demise of communism"
despite years of devotion to assess the military capabilities of the former Soviet
Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations.168 Second, the agency failed to give
sufficient warning to trapped American civilians in Kuwait City of the imminent
invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's troop.169
Third, Griffin stated:
The ongoing revelations about Iran-Contra and the CIA's dealing
with the Luxembourg - based Bank of Credit and Commerce
International, which has been linked to drug traffickers and Arab
terrorists, have put the agency on the defensive.170
He concluded that, "the agency's overall analysis in recent years has been"
according to Allan Goodman "[between abysmal and mediocre]"171 with the
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permeated state of the world, Goodman argued, "[Covert action should be used as
an instrument of absolute last resort, rather than one of the early options
considered.]"172
The intelligence challenges further raised questions as to if the intelligence
community is relying too heavily on satellite and electronics surveillance at the
expense of human intelligence collected in the field. The former director for CIA
planning and coordination Gary Foster noted: "though the agency possesses
extraordinarily sophisticated machines, -the data-collecting ability of this spy
technology, far outstrips the capacity of humans to analyze it intelligently." In the
Gulf War, Foster emphasized: "the real issue was not if we had the intelligence, but
whether we had the capability to use it all."173
The CIA's cold war infrastructure, combined with challenges of the new world
order, raises other new questions. At issue is the fundamental question of what a
post -Cold War intelligence community should resemble, and what the present role
of the nation's spies and analysts should be. Under the CIA's restructuring plan,
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., while serving as vice-chairman for the Senate
Intelligence Committee, advocated abolishing of the CIA.174 In support of the idea,
the former head of the CIA's counterterrorism operations Vincent Cannistraro,
stated:
Academia and think tanks have at least an equal record
in forecasting significant trends and development in the
Soviet Union. Some have done better, despite the lack of
access to sensitive intelligence data.175
He further suggested the control of political and economic data collection by the
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Department of State while the military intelligence and counterterrorism
176responsibilities be assigned to the Pentagon.1
One of the major legislative initiatives to restructure the intelligence
community, introduced by some lawmakers was that of Senator David L. Boren,
D-Oklahoma, chairman of the Senate Selected Committee on Intelligence and
House Rep. Dave McCurdy, D- Oklahoma. The measures suggested to Congress
such changes as:
- A new director of national intelligence to oversee all intelligence
operations. With broad statutory powers, and a voice on the
National Security Council and authority over spending.
-A new National Intelligence center to take over the CIA's
Directorate of Intelligence as well as manage the intelligence
analysts now working at the Pentagon, the State Department and
other government departments.
-A smaller CIA to restrict the agency to clandestine operations.
-Consolidation of satellite intelligence-collection efforts by the
rest of the intelligence community under a deputy director with
authority over military and civilian agencies. The deputy's
responsibility to include control over the new National Imagery
Agency, responsible for all satellite and airborne photographs and
the National Security Agency, which intercepts communications
around the world.177
Boren argued that ["the DC I has become a captive of the CIA, as opposed to being
a coordinator of intelligence from all the community."]178
While others agreed that some intelligence-gathering capability is necessary,
critics suggest that the CIA is "ill-equipped for the tasks of the 1990s"179 and
beyond. Angelo Cordevilla, and other officials in the intelligence field agreed for
openness within the intelligence community. The CIA should "operate openly in a
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democratic society," and no longer "hide behind the veil of secrecy," and autonomy.
The agency "must function more like a private company and be accountable for its
mistakes," experts charged.180
There is a consensus even within the CIA that the intelligence community
must cut back on certain intelligence operations. Former President Bush National
Security Directive No. 29, in 1991, ordered for a total reevaluation of the mission,
role and priorities of the intelligence community, and over twenty departments and
agencies projection of their intelligence requirements until the year 2005.181 To
meet this order, Robert M. Gates former DCI, implemented the following changes:-
1) Reduce staff in foreign affair and weapons-analysis by over
30-40 percent.
2) Improve coordination between bureaucracies, to reduce
duplication of effort, and enhance independence of analysis
and to strengthen accountability and
3) Declassify a large number of CIA files, make CIA officials
available to Congress, the media and publish more of the
agency's assessments.182
Similarly, in an effort to revamp the nation's intelligence community, the
House National Security Committee (HNSC), approved the intelligence
reorganization bill (HR 3237), on July 17, 1997 after adopting a substitute
amendment that eliminated nearly all provisions to increase the authority of the
director of the CIA over military-related intelligence.183
The CIA's past challenges were far different than those it must encounter
now: for example focusing on small states armed with weapons of mass destruction,
virulent local conflicts over ethnic and nationalistic rivalries, drug trafficking and
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terrorism, even economic competition from longstanding allies. Goodman, agreed
that the agency "should focus on areas where it has a comparative intelligence
advantage such as terrorism, nuclear-arms control and narcotics trafficking."184 For
all the fault its critics cite, most experts believe the CIA still serves a valuable
function.
Intelligence when used properly, can facilitate a more thorough
understanding of the complex phenomena of terrorism and increase the likelihood
that appropriate policies and strategies can develop to combat and deter acts of
political terror. Without such understanding, insight, and capabilities, however,
policymakers and law enforcement authorities must operate in a vacuum,
responding to crisis situations in an ad hoc, and unorganized manner. While
satellite photographs and other technical data can reveal military movements before
attacks, they cannot provide early warning of an enemy's intentions. Therefore, the
new intelligence community's top priority should place emphasis on human-source
intelligence.
The Department of Defense (DOD)
A number of terrorist incidents have influenced the development of the
United States' policy toward domestic and international terrorism. With few
exceptions, the US policy to counterterrorism has involved nonviolent pressure
tactics designed to persuade countries to desist from supporting terrorist groups. It
was not until early 1978 that the Department of Defense (DOD) responded with a
determined and coordinated antiterrorist program.1185
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The department deals with international terrorism within the context of its
approach toward special operations. The two chief civilian offices concerned with
special operations in general and international terrorism in particular are the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (OASIS) and the Office
of the Under Secretary for Policy. The OASIS, through the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary (PDAS), "is the office of the Secretary of Defense's focal point
for special operations matters"186 in general and is charged with planning,
coordinating and overseeing the Pentagon's antiterrorist program.187
In 1978, the Secretary of Defense established a Counterterrorism Steering
Committee (CTSC) consisting of the Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs as chairman and representatives from the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) and
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).188 The committee was designed "to better focus
on the problem of international terrorism and to make recommendations to the
secretary on policies and procedures to counter the terrorist threat."189 The
committee was also charged with the task of identifying and addressing problems of
the overall United States antiterrorist program and, as stated by William Farrell,
ensuring that the Department's "interests were adequately represented in the
inter-agency arena."190
It should be noted that all US military operations are designed for dealing
with terrorists outside the United States. All paramilitary operations inside the US
fall under the FBI jurisdiction. The Armed Services are prohibited by law from
engaging in domestic paramilitary operations. However, should situations occur
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requiring the use of armed service personnel, the President in consultation with
Congress has the authority to waive statutory restrictions on such operations.191
The DOD military response to international terrorism is under the direction of
the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA). The main components of the Armed
Services' antiterrorist program consist of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint
Special Operations Agency (JSOA), the Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC), the Service1 Intelligence Units (SIU) and the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA).192 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have overall jurisdiction for all aspects of
the military's response to international terrorism. The JSOC represents the United
States' chief antiterrorist operational component and is made up of "thirty special
operations units maintained by the military services."193 The central component of
this vast array of units is the Delta Force, supported by the 160th Aviation Battalion
('Night Stalkers') and the Navy SEAL units.194 The JSOC's primary function is that
of a coordinating body, designed to unify and coordinate the training of the different
services' antiterrorist units.195
The onslaught of terrorist attacks, paralyzing world attention with fear of
uncontrolled violence, has caused a public outcry for use of force or military
retaliation against terrorists. One of the most important tools a nation can employ in
dealing with terrorism is an effective antiterrorist military capability. Military forces
can be applied within an overall counterterrorist strategy in the form of retaliation or
intervention. The United States can use retaliation to "punish" the perpetrators of
terrorist acts, after an incident. The purpose of this action is intended to send a
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message to terrorists that there are consequences for their action.
There are two uses of military forces according to Richard H. Shultz, Jr., first,
"to rescue US citizens caught up in another nation's civil strife."196 The second is in
"antiterrorist operations to rescue hostages, preempt the destruction of important
facilities or resources or retake them from the terrorist."197
Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in his presentation at the
DOD -sponsored 1987 International Terrorism Conference (ITC), articulated the
criteria for consideration of military action against states that engage in terrorism.
He stated:
Political and economic actions are all the more effective when
the terrorist state understands clearly that behind these other
measures stands effective military power capable of an
appropriate and timely response - before we commit to military
action, there are several key questions we must answer.
Primary among them are:
- What are the objectives of such action?
- What are the likely short - and long-term
consequences of retaliation not only with
regard to the immediate terrorist problem
but to larger US interest?
- What are the consequences of failure?
- Are there alternative actions that have
not been tried or considered?
- What are the likely consequences of
failing to act?198
Developing a strategy that includes offensive action requires planning which
is selective and procedures which are flexible. Warlaw believes that a policy is
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necessary and should allow for finite discrimination between terrorists and
responses. He contends, that while terrorists are a menace to an ordered society, a
greater danger lies in allowing the fear of terrorist activity to force policy changes by
states. Warlaw concluded," states must be committed to the policy which is the real
target of a terrorist attack if they are to provide any true deterrents to future
international terrorism."199
Unfortunately, the United States' record in executing commando style raids
similar to Israel's Entebbe raid in Uganda has been disappointing. Two early
examples could explain the American disappointments. First, the tragic ending of
the Iranian hostage rescue mission of April 16-24, 1980 by the Operation Eagle
Claw during President Carter's administration. Second, the October 23, 1983
terrorist bombing of the US Marines Barracks in Beirut killing 241 Marines during
President Reagan's administration. These incidents and others raised doubts about
the US Armed Forces' preparedness to deal with terrorism and the Department of
Defense's general understanding of international terrorism.
Congress in 1986 passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act. It requires the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCOS) "to
periodically recommend such changes in the assignment of functions or roles as the
chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed
forces.200 After a year of study by a joint team from the Army and Air Force, a late
1986 report indicated that the United States still did not have an effective plan for
coping with terrorist attacks.201 The team insisted that a comprehensive
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civil-military strategy to defend U.S. interests at home and abroad from terrorist
attacks be developed.
Besides rescue operations and military interventions, the military also
performed a number of other important antiterrorist functions. Among them are the
execution of counterintelligence operations; issues related to nuclear terrorism and
psychological operations.
Execution of Counterintelliaence Operations
The importance of accurate and current intelligence to units engaging in
antiterrorist operations cannot be over emphasized. Counterintelligence (Cl) is
perhaps the least understood component of intelligence. Yet, counterintelligence is
a prerequisite for an effective intelligence capability. Cl is both information
gathered and activities conducted to protect against terrorist activities. Following
the conclusion of the Iranian hostage operation, the need for current and accurate
intelligence became clear if the military were to deal effectively with international
terrorism. In response, the DOD mainly the Army, reviewed and constructed a
counterintelligence and counterterrorism program.202
The success of accurate and cooperative intelligence was well demonstrated
by the retaliatory action of the 1986 Libyan raid, and the August 1993 military action
on Baghdad, after the Kuwaiti court finding of Iraqi involvement in the assassination
attempt on former President Bush. Finally, the Persian Gulf war, also illustrated an
unprecedented cooperation among allied intelligence and security services which
disrupted much of the international terrorist support structures.203
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Despite steps taken to implement lessons learned during operation Desert
Storm and centralized management functions, the existing intelligence structure still
largely reflects its Cold War origins. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
continues to assess resources with a few toward providing joint task force
commanders with fully operational intelligence support organizations. The agency is
also examining the consolidation of some service-level intelligence production
responsibilities.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and or Bio-Terrorism
Another vital function of the Armed Services in dealing with terrorism is related to
chemical and biological weapons threat by terrorists. Yonah Alexander noted that
today's terrorists are "better organized, more professional and better-equipped than
those in the 1970's."204 He concluded that, "a few sophisticated terrorist groups
could use higher leverage tactics to achieve mass disruption or political turmoil."205
Studies by experts in the field also show that terrorists evidently have
considered resorting to biological terrorism and are likely to take greater operational
risks in the next millennium.206 As stated by Michael L. Moodie, "the Odds are
Increasing," although how much is hard to quantify.207 Joan Stephenson noted,
"there are groups today that are willing to use weapons of mass destruction,
including biological agents."208 Examples cited, are the June 1994 attack by the
Aum Shinrikyo in Matsumoto, Japan that killed seven and injured 500. And also
the Tokyo Subway killing of twelve with over 5,500 injuries.209 Although, these were
the first instances of large-scale terrorist use of chemical agents, a variety of
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incidents and reports for the past two years indicated a growing terrorist interest in
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).210
Terrorist interests in chemical and biological weapons (CBW), as further
stated by Yonah Alexander, is not surprising given the relative ease with which
some of these weapons can be produced in simple laboratories, than nuclear
explosives. He argued that open sources literature and formulas to produce
chemical and biological agents can be found at libraries, including access to the
internet which provides instructions on how to produce some chemical agents.
Once in possession of such information, "a terrorist with some technical know-how,
could synthesize toxic chemical agents from raw materials or intermediates."211
In support of Alexander's findings, Oehler stated, "although popular fictions
and national attention have focused on terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical
and biological weapons are a more likely choice for terrorist groups."212 Oehler
explained terrorist choices in three ways:
1. In contrast to the fabrication of nuclear weapons, the production
of biological weapons requires only a small quantity of equipment.
2. Even very small amounts of biological and chemical weapons can
cause massive casualties. The fact that only twelve Japanese
died in the Tokyo Subway attack de-emphasizes the significance
of the 5,500 people who required treatment in hospital emergency
rooms. Such a massive influx of injured - many critically - has
the potential to overwhelm emergency medical facilities even
in large metropolitan areas.
3. Terrorist use of these weapons also makes them "weapons of
mass disruption" because, of the necessity to decontaminate
affected areas before the public will be able to begin feeling
safe.213
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Both Alexander's and Oehler's findings demonstrated two advantages that
biological and chemical weapons have for terrorists. First, is the low cost, ease and
speed of production and the fact that they can be developed by individuals with
limited education, and second, the reliability and availability of such weapons,
which are easier to "disguise and transport than conventional arms.214
The DOD through the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Policy, is responsible for protecting the United States' nuclear weapons from
terrorist attack.215 The Armed Services represents the DOD's operational arm in
this area. However, the services' role is a supportive one in relation to those of
other agencies dealing with nuclear terrorism.216
The main national security worry associated with international crime has
been that "plutonium or highly-enriched uranium" could be stolen from the former
Soviet Union and sold internationally in the black market. Several seizures in
Germany in 1994 raised concern that such diversions may have already taken
place.217 These concerns and others have resulted in fundamental changes within
the organization of the US nuclear forces. Following the presidential nuclear
initiatives developed under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the
Secretary of Defense, the Army and Marine Corps no longer have nuclear weapons,
a function for which both have had during the Cold War era.218
Finally, organizing an aggressive response against unconventional
adversaries like terrorists will require further restructuring of the military power to
address the threat. However, to achieve this required strategic planning which
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includes possible retaliatory strikes and the political will to execute them. It should
be noted that many experts disagreed on the application of military force when
countering terrorism. Richard Shultz suggested that while the United States
recognizes the need to use military force in defense of national interest, there also
exists a moral desire to find alternative means to settle differences. Shultz called
this the "peaceful application of military force" and, as such, sees great potential in
a deterrence strategy.219
Summary
The United States Counterterrorism programs revolved around cooperative
efforts between local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and deploy a
massive array of tools in attempting to deal with domestic and international
terrorism. All the departments and agencies outlined in this chapter represent the
core of the US institutional response to terrorism. For example, the Department of
State's (DOS) antiterrorist program has the lead role in dealing with international
terrorism abroad and does so through an interagency coordination mechanism,
while the Department of Justice (DOJ) with its agencies, has a similar lead role in
terrorism issues occurring within the United States.220 Depending on the source of
an attack, as many as twenty-five or more U.S. agencies may be involved in
investigating and prosecuting suspected terrorists, as was the case in the
investigation of the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma
City federal building in 1995.
Targeting, collecting, analyzing and disseminating form the four distinct
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phases of intelligence production for both domestic and international terrorism. The
civilian US intelligence community has had some setbacks, including public
interagency disputes that many experts worry could affect cooperation between the
CIA, which has lead responsibility abroad but is not allowed to collect intelligence
domestically, and the FBI, which has lead responsibility domestically and is
expanding its efforts abroad. This bureaucratic division of responsibility of
counterintelligence between the CIA for foreign matters, and FBI for domestic
matters was once a convenient and flexible division of labor. However, no
counterintelligence case is wholly foreign or domestic. Presently, no agency in the
United States government has total responsibility for most counterintelligence
cases. In addition to jurisdictional problems, the intelligence community also has a
problem in deciding which counterintelligence organizational structure, staff or
centralized line unit, is the most effective. This problem was well documented in the
House National Security Committee Intelligence reorganization bill (HR 3237) on
July 17, 1996,221 to expand the power of the director of the CIA at the expense of
the Secretary of Defense. The Spencer-Dellums amendment of the bill stripped
from the bill the provision to shift the Department of Defense's human
intelligence-gathering to the CIA. It reinforced the Secretary of Defense's control
over the budget and personnel of military-related spy agencies.222 The amendment
also authorized the "creation of a new agency in the DOD to oversee the
government's high-tech imagery and mapping activities, which are now carried out
by several agencies, including the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) and the
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Pentagon's Central Imagery Office (PCIO).223
The US intelligence community, however, suffers a number of impediments
in responding to terrorism. For example, the surveillance of individuals is seen as
infringing upon their basic rights and freedom as was argued by the civil liberties
advocates in protest of the antiterrorist bill (S 735) by the Senate and (HR 729) by
the House224 following the World Trade Center bombing. Joseph I. Lieberman,
D-Connecticut, stated; "the United States would have to rethink its traditional
balance of government power versus individual freedom in light of the Oklahoma
bombing," that "without order in our society, there is no liberty."225 To date, the
need for domestic intelligence to curb terrorist activities versus the question of
invasion of the constitutional protected rights of American citizens continues to
receive cursory examination.
Nuclear weapons are generally deemed the most frightening of the three
types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within the United States, there are
three organizations assigned to deal with the technical aspects involved in this
threat. The Department of Defense (DOD) has jurisdiction over technical matters
involving nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has
authority over technical problems involved with a terrorist incident in which nuclear
material is used for civilian purposes. The Department of Energy (DOE), is
responsible for incidents involving material used for military purposes, but not in the
form of a weapon. Finally, the FBI has responsibility for overseeing all domestic
terrorist incidents involving nuclear weapons and materials. Criminal diversion of
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these nuclear materials into terrorists hands, might well be the single most
worrisome proliferation problem. A primary purpose of the Clinton administration's
agreement to help Russia dismantle and dispose of the former USSR's nuclear
arsenal was to prevent these weapons from reaching terrorists and governments
that support them. Unless the United States learns about the diversion of nuclear
material, Washington would have more difficulty detecting such a nuclear weapon
program since it will not require the large facilities and expense involved in
producing missile material.226
There are many obstacles faced by the United States in the formulation of an
effective counterterrorism program. With so many law enforcement agencies
assigned counterterrorism responsibilities, it is not surprising that agency rivalry
has long plagued counterterrorism efforts. For example, because of rivalries
between the FBI and ATF at crime scenes where both agencies are present,
officers have been known to engage in a {"battle of the field jacket."}227 In the FAA
and Custom Service turf rivalry, the FAA is responsible for maintaining security at
US airports and requires that personnel with direct access to aircraft and other
protected areas wear identification badges to help police keep unauthorized people
away. The refusal of Custom officials to wear airport badges, has led to
confrontations between custom agents and local policemen.228
Although "turf" consciousness is not the only problem, experts believed that
a lack of effective communication between agencies can often mean that agencies
on the scene may not know that others are conducting similar investigations. To
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eliminate such conflict, the DOS's Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
meets regularly with the Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorism (PCCT), an
interagency group. Since 1990 when the TSWG began coordinating research and
development program among all counterterrorism agencies, it has reduced the
duplication of efforts. The group has, for example, pooled several projects, once
conducted independently by different agencies to develop high-energy gamma ray
equipment used in detecting explosive weapons, in cargo containers.229
In sum, by carefully weighing the potential threat, analyzing the nature of the
problem and determining the resources available, effective policies can be
fashioned within the limits of the law to detect and prevent terrorist activities at
home and abroad. From the perspective of intelligence, there are unanswered
questions worth debating and more congressional and departmental reforms worth
considering. The challenge, however, is to find ways to prevent terrorists from
carrying out their plans. This will require that the United States government with its
departments and agencies, including the military, assigned counterterrorism
responsibilities and continue to devote substantial efforts to prevent terrorist
attacks, particularly, at major events such as the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in
Atlanta as detailed in Chapter V.
_ . . 165
Endnotes:
U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference Report on Antiterrorism Measures.
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1996:. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (20
April, 1996), 54, no.16, 1044-1045.
2lbid.
3i
U.S. Department of State, President Nixon Establishes Cabinet Committee
to Combat Terrorism Department of State Bulletin (23 October, 1972), 475-480.
4lbid, 475-476.
5/
Quoted in Lewis Hoffacker, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State. "The US Response to Terrorism." Vital Speeches of the Dav XXXXI no
9 (15 February, 1975), 266.
6U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of
the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the
Judiciary, Terroristic Activity International Terrorism. Part 4 94th Congress 1st
session (14 May, 1995),220.
7Laurence Gonzales, "The Targeting of America: A Special Report on
Terrorism," Playboy (May, 1983), 171.
8Wayne A. Kerstetter, "Terrorism and Intelligence," Terrorism: An
International Journal (1978V 3, no. 1-2.
9U.S. Senate, International Terrorism. 62.
10lnformation regarding this concept was documented in The United States
Government Antiterrorism Program. An Unclassified Summary Report prepared by
the Executive Committee on Terrorism for the Special Coordination Committee
National Security Council, June 1979, 2-4,7.
"U.S. Senate, International Terrorism. 35-36.
12Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate,
An Act to Combat International Terrorism 96th Congress, 2nd Session, June 24,
1980, 9. (Washington: D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980). August 16, 1978
statement of Deputy Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, Federal Capabilities
in Crisis Management and Terrorism. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives
166
95l Congress, Second Session (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printina
Office, 1978), 28-29.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, An Act to
Combat International Terrorism: Hearing on S. 2236 95th Congress 2nd session 23
January, 1978, 8.
U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the Committee on the Judiciary, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and
Terrorism. 95th Congress, 2nd session, 16 August, 1978, 59.
15U.S. Senate, An Act to Combat International...: Hearing on S 2?3fi 8.
U.S. House, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism. 56.
17Gonzales, "Targeting of America," 180.
1 ft
U.S. House, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism 56.
19lbid.
20The United States Government Antiterrorism Program. An Unclassified
Summary Report 7 - 8.
21lbid.,8-9.
22This is an excerpt from the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives,
95 Congress, 2" Session, on Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and
Terrorism. The Statement of Ambassador Anthony Quainton, former Director,
Office for Combating Terrorism, 15 August, 1978, 57.
23,, i
"Preemptive Anti-terrorist Raids Allowed," The Washington Post 16 April
1984, A19. '
24ln the wake of the World Trade Center bombing, President Clinton
submitted his Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 in February and focused on
the threat of international terrorism. Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 1995,6-18.
25Dan Carney, "Broad Antiterrorism Measures Stall in Task Force,"
Congressional Quarterly Report. 3August 199R
26An excerpt from the FBI Director Louis J. Freeh statement during his
testimony before a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on April 27, 1995
Antiterrorism Bill. The Director requested for additional funds and legal powers to
167
keep pace with terroristic threat. The bill proposed to authorize $2.1 billion over
five years for additional investigators and equipments. The largest share, $1.2
billion, was for the FBI, with the rest to be divided among other federal agencies
Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 1995, 6 -19.
27lbid.
28lbid.
29Oliver B. Revell, "Structure of Counterterrorism Planning and Operation in
the United States," From Terrorism, published by Taylor and Francis, vol. 14 1991
143-144.
30r
Excerpt from the The US Department of State Structure and Organization
Bureau of Public Affairs Fact Sheet. 26 May, 1995, 1.
31 U.S. House, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management , 52 - 56.
32William Regis Farrell, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In
Search of An Effective Strategy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 97.
33U.S. Senate, International Terrorism. 30.
U.S. Department of State, International Terrorism Department GISI
September 1984.
35Laurence Pope, Department Effort to Combat International Terrorism State
Department Dispatch, 26 April, 1993, 299-301.
36Rufus D. Putney, Director, Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Diplomatic
Security Service, "Enhancing Antiterrorism Skills" The Police Chief (June 1991), 38-
41.
37U.S. Congress, "Antiterrorism Program." Congressional Quarterly 12 April
1983,683.
38U.S. Department of State, Departmental Notice. May 1984.
39Gregory Cerio and Lucy Howard, "Mixed Signals" Newsweek Magazine 7
February, 1994, 23, no. 6, 4.
40lbid.
41 U.S. Department of State, Departmental Notice. 24 May, 1984.
168
2U.S. Department of State, Combating Terrorism: American Policy and
Organization. Department of State Bulletin, August 1982, 6.
^U.S. Senate, Omnibus Antiterrorism Act of 1979 Hearing on s 333 30
March 1979,21.
"Department of State Bulletin, August 1982, 6.
45lbid., 2.
46
U.S. House, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism. 45.
47Clark M. Dittmer, "Combating Terrorism Abroad: State Department
Initiatives." The Police Chief (March 1989), 24.
48
'Ibid.
49Kathleen Green, "Special Agent US Department of State, Bureau of




U.S. Senate, International Terrorism: Hearing on S. 873. 35.
"Department of State Bulletin, August 1982, 6.
54L. Paul Bremer III, "Terrorism: Its Evolving Nature." Department of State
Bulletin (May 1989), 76 - 78.
55lbid., 75.
^John F. Murphy, "State Self-Help and Problems of Public International
Law," in Legal Aspects of International Terrorism, eds. Alona E. Evans and John F.




60L. Paul Bremer III, statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on February 9,1989. Department of state Bulletin May 1989,74-78. See complete
transcript of the hearings in the Superintendent of Documents.
169
ga —
Farrell, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism- In Search of An
Effective Strategy 97.
62The 12 legislative acts are: (1) The "Export Administration Act of 1979" (2)
The "Trade Act of 1974" (3) The "Export Administration Act of 1969 (amended)" (4)
The "Export-Import Bank Act of 1945" (5) The Foreign Assistance and Related Act
of 1961" (6) The "Foreign Assistance Act of 1961" (7) The "International Security
Assistance Act of 1977" (8) The "Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974" (9) The "International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980" (10) Public Law 95-118 (11)
The "International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981" (12) The
"Special Central American Assistance Act of 1979."
U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference Report on the terrorism bill (S 735-H
Rept 104-518), Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 20 April 1996,1044 -1046.
Tightening Embassy Security Worldwide," The Washington Post 23
January 985, A19 sec. A, p. 19.
^Internet search http://www.usdoj.gov.
U.S. Department of Justice, "Terrorism in the United States 1994," Terrorist
Research and Analytical Center, National Security Division (Washington D C •
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 19-25.
67
, The US Government Response to Terrorism. 93.
68Department of State Bulletin, August 1982, 6.
69This information was documented in "FBI Facts and Figures: A
Compendium of General Information about the FBI." Published by the US
Department of Justice Office of Public and Congressional Affairs March 1996,1-2
70
'Ibid.
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations, "Terrorism
in the United States 1982-1992," Terrorist Research and Analytical Center,
Counterterrorism Section, Intelligence Division (Washington D.C • U S
Government Printing Office 1993), 11-12.
72See FBI, "Terrorism in the United States 1993," 23-25.
73r






^Revell, "Structure of Counterterrorism Planning and Operation in the
United States," 143-144.
78lbid.
79Statement of the FBI, submitted by Larry A. Potts to the Subcommittee on
International Affairs and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary,






85James M. Botting et. al., "The FBI's Critical Incident Negotiation
Enforcement Bulletin. April 1995, 12-15.
86lbid.
87Revell, "Structure of Counterterrorism Planning and Operation in the
United States," 143-144.
88FBI, "Terrorism in the United States 1982-1992," 17-18.
"Ibid.
90Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Terrorism in the United States 1995,"
Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, Counterterrorism Section. Intelligence
Division. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 2.
91 U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference Report on the terrorism bill,
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 20 April 1996, 1044 -1046.
171
"92;
2U.S. Department of Justice, "Terrorism... United States 1982-1992," 11-12.
93U.S. Department of Justice, "Terrorism in the United States 1994," 19-25.
94Martin L. Smith, "Overview of INS History" originally published in A
Historical Guide to the US Government, edited by George T. Kurian (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998).
95/
Alan C. Nelson, "Preventing the Entry of International Terrorists "The
Police Chief." March 1998, 50.
96lbid.
97lbid.
98U.S. House, Federal Capabilities In Crisis Management and Terrorism. 59.




103Mary H. Copper, "Combating Terrorism: Agency Turf Battles Hamper
Antiterrorism Fight," Congressional Quarterly Inc. 5, no 27, 21 July, 1995, 640.
104Holly Idelson, "Terrorism Bill Highlights." Congressional Quarterly Report
54, no. 16, 20 April, 1996, 1045.
105Excerpt from "A Brief History of ATF 1789-1998," 1-4. Also see "A
Historical Guide To The U.S. Government," edited by George T. Kurian. (Oxford
University Press, Inc., 1998).
106A Report on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, "Its History,
Progress and Programs." Washington, D.C., 1994, 496-498.
107lbid.
108Special Message on "1997 Strategic Plan," by John W. Magaw, Director
of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
109U.S. House, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism 58.
172
I1OATF. Facts Sheet. 24 March, 1995, 1-2.
112Steven H. Harris, "Terrorism: New Challenges for Law Enforcement." The
Police Chief. 60, no. 9, September 1993, 6.
113Robert Marshall Wells, "ATF Criticized for Action in Ruby Ridge Shootout,"
Congressional Quarterly Report. 9 September 1995, 275.
114r
4Robert P. Cesca, Deputy Inspector General's Memorandum to Secretary
Bentsen, Subject: Department of Treasury's Waco Administrative Review"
11
5Well, "ATF Criticized for Action in Ruby Ridge Shootout," 2725.
116r
Bremer III, "Terrorism: Its Evolving Nature," Department of State Bulletin
May 1989, 76.
117
US Statutes at Large, vol. 88, part 1.
118lbid.
119ldelson, "Terrorism Bill Highlights," 1045.
120Orio K. Steele, "Civil Aviation Security Measures," The Police Chief
June1991,43.
121lbid.
122US Senate, An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearing on S
2236, January 25, 1978, 39.
123lbid., 48.
124Steele, "Civil Aviation Security Measures," 43.
125lbid., 43-44.
126Bremer III, "Terrorism Its Evolving Nature," pp. 74-76.
127lbid., 76.
128Statement on" Aviation Security," by Alexis M. Stefani, Deputy Assistant
Inspector General for Aviation. U.S. Department of Transportation. Before the
Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S.
173
House of Representatives. For details see Final Report to President Clinton White





FAA's standards for certifying explosive detection systems for screening
checked baggage are classified. The certification standard sets criteria for
detection, false alarm, and throughput.
133Trace devices attempt to detect minute explosive quantities inside
luggage or articles due either to contamination or vapors emanating from an
explosive.
134
'Steele, "Civile Aviation Security Measures," 44.
135lbid.
136Stefani, "Aviation Security...," 11.
137ln Vision's Technologies, Inc., CTX 5000 series is the only FAA-certified
explosives detection system.
Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and Imple
mentation Issues, National Research Council, Publication NMAB-482-1, 1996.
1 *%Q
U.S. Congress Senate, An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearing
on S. 2236. 39.
140lbid.
141 U.S. House, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism 58.







148Robert Kupperman, is a senior advisor to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Dr. Kupperman had serve as Chief Scientist of the Arm
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Special Feature: "Terrorism: A









154"Genesis of the CIA," Factbook on Intelligence. March 1993, 4-5.
155Executive Order 12333, 1348. Also see CIA Factbook... 1995, 11.
156Executive Order 12333, 1338.
157Rodman D. Griffin, "The New CIA," Congressional Quarterly Research. 2,
no. 46 16 December 1992, 1083-1085.
158lbid., 1084-1085.
159For an excellent discussion of the role the intelligence process play in law
enforcement policy and strategy, see Justin J. Dintino and Frederic T. Martens,
"The Intelligence Process: A Tool for Criminal Justice Administration," The Police
Chief (February 1979), 60-65.
160Raymond P. Siljander, Terrorist Attacks: A Protective Service Guide for
Executives. Bodyguards and Policemen (Springfield. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas
Publisher, 1980), 87.
161 CIA, Factbook on Intelligence. 35.
162Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism. U.S. Strategy and Regan Policies (London:
Mansell Publisher 1987), 87.
163lbid.
164Brian Jenkins, "The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma," 5
175
TVI Journal. 1985. 52
165Griffin, "The New CIA," 1083 -1084.
166Sue Titus Reid, Crime and Criminology. 7th ed. (New York- Harcourt
Brace College Publishers, 1994, 382 - 385.
167lbid.
168Griffin, "The New CIA," 1075.
169lbid.
170lbid.
Allan Goodman is the Dean of Georgetown University, School of Foreign
Affairs. Quoted in Congressional Quarterly , 11 December 1995, 1075-1076.
172lbid.
173Gary Foster, served as Deputy Director for CIA Planning and
Coordination, LA. Times. 28 May, 1991.
"Senator Daniel P. Moynihan former Vice Chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee was a strong advocate for the abolition of the CIA
National Journal. 21 September, 1991, 2271.
175Griffin, "The New CIA," 1077.
176lbid.
177David L Boren, "The Intelligence Community: How Crucial?" Foreign
Affairs (Summer 1992), 54.
178lbid., 51. Also see USAToday, 30 October, 1992.
179Stansfield Turner, "Intelligence for the New World Order" Foreign Affairs
(Fall 1991), 152.
180Angelo Codevila, "The CIA's Identity Crisis," The American Enterprise
(January/February 1992), 34.
181
Griffin, "The New CIA," 1089.
176
18 Ibid., Also see speech before the Dallas World Affairs Council, 10
November, 1992.
183/
Carroll J. Doherty, "Panel Puts Lid on Increase in CIA Director's Power,"
Congressional Quarterly Report. 20 July, 1996, 2065.
184Griffin, "The New CIA," 1080.
185Farrell, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism. 108-109.
186U.S. House, Department of Defense Appropriation for 1985: Special
Operations Forces. 10 April, 1984, 834.
187U.S. Senate, An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearing on S
2236. 192. " " l
188Farrell, The US Government Response to Terrorism 108 -109.
'U.S. Senate, An Act to Combat International...: Hearing on S. 2236 191.
'Farrell, The US Government Response to Terrorism 108 -109.
U.S. Senate, An Act to Combat International Terrorism- 192.
Farrell, The US Government Response to Terrorism 108 -109.
193U.S. "Military Tries to Catch Up in Fighting Terror." The New York Times
5 December, 1984, A8.
194lbid.
195lbid.
196Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "The State of the Operational Art: A Critical Review
of Anti-Terrorist Programs," in Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and
Crisis Management eds. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Stephen Sloan, New York:
Pergamon Press, 1980, 33.
197lbid.
198Peter S. Probst, "The Terrorist Specter of the 1990's," American Forces
Information Service (AFIS), Defense 92. (January/February 1992), 8.
199Grant Warlaw, "State Response to International Terrorism: Some






Perspectives on International Terrorism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 219.
200U.S. Department of Defense, Role and Missions Review: Steps Toward
Jointness. American Forces Information Services (AFIS). February 1993, 16-19.
201 Ibid.
202U.S. Department of the Army, Intelligence: Its Role in Counterterrorism.
Counterintelligence Production Division, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis
Center, October 1983, III.
203U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Assessment 1995: US Security
Challenges in Transition-Transnational Threats. National Defense University,
1995, 173-186.
204Yonah Alexander, "Will Terrorists Use Chemical Weapon," Security
Affairs. June/July 1990, p. 10. Reprinted by Benard Schecterman and Martin
Slann, Violence and Terrorism 3rd eds. (Guilford, Connecticut: Dushkin Publishing
Group Inc., Annual Edition, 1993), 169.
205lbid.
206U.S. Senate, The Chemical and Biological Weapon Threat, statement for
the Record by Gordon C. Oehler Director, Non-proliferation Center to the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Government Affairs. 1 November, 1995, 6-8.
207Michael L. Moodie is the President of the Chemical and Biological Arm
Control Institute, a non-profit policy research organization in Alexandria, Virginia.
208Joan Stephenson, "Confronting a Biological Armageddon: Experts Tackle
Prospect of Bioterrorism," JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association.
276, no. 5, 7 August 1996, 349-350.
209lbid.
210Gordon C. Oehler, The Chemical. . . 6-8.
211Alexander, "Will Terrorists Use Chemical Weapon," 10.
212lbid, See U.S. Senate, The Chemical and Biological Weapon Threat. 6-8.
213U.S. Senate, The Chemical and Biological Weapon Threat. 6.
178
Alexander, "Will Terrorists Use Chemical Weapon," 6.
215,
5U.S. Senate, An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearing on S
2236.287-290. " " l
216William Mengel, "The Impact of Nuclear Terrorism on the Military's Role in
Society," in International Terrorism in the Contemporary World ed. Marius H.
Livingston (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 411.
217.
U.S. Department of Defense, Role and Missions Review 18-20.
218lbid.
219r
9Richard Shultz, "Can Democratic Governments use Military Forces in the
War Against Terrorism," World Affairs. April, 1986, 20.
220.
U.S. House, "Terrorism: Meeting the Challenge of International
Terrorism," A statement by Counselor Timothy E. Wirth, before the Subcommittee
on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Department of States Dispatch 4 no 29 19
July 1993, 516-520. . . • -
121House National Security Committee approved HR 3237 by voice vote on
July, 1996. The US, Senate version of that legislation backed the DOD
establishment of the "Mapping Agency" and included other intelligence issues
See Weekly Report. 1884.
222lbid.
223lbid.
224See Congressional Quarterly Almanac Conference Acton, Weekly Report,
988, 886. House Passage, 702, senate Passage, 1995 Weekly Report. 1643.
225lbid.
Mary H. Cooper, "Combating Terrorism," Congressional Quarterly
Researcher. Congressional Quarterly. Inc. 5, no. 27, 21 July, 1995, 5, 650-651.
227lbid., p. 640.
228 , "Cracking Down on Hate," Newsweek. 15 May, 1995, 23.
229lbid.
CHAPTER IV
US INTERAGENCY SECURITY COORDINATION
FOR MAJOR EVENTS IN 1986 AND 1994
This chapter, organized in two parts, examines two past contingency
planning and security coordination during: I. The 1986 Statue of Liberty Celebration
in New York City, and II. The 1994 US World Cup Soccer Championship in nine
cities throughout the United States. The experience gained from these two
scheduled major events by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the host cities
Police Department, other state and local law enforcement agencies in 1986 and
1994 was worthy of consideration in security planning for other major events,
including the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta.
I. The 1986 Statue of Liberty Centennial
Celebration in New York
Historical Perspective
The Statue of Liberty has become a global symbol offreedom that makes the
United States so unique and special. This giant sculpture was given to the United
States by the people of France as a gift of friendship in 1886 to honor the idea of
liberty. The Lady Liberty is located on Liberty Island, (originally called Bedloe's
Island). It is over twenty-five stories tall, and currently, considered the tallest statue
in the world. It is composed of one hundred tons of copper, one hundred twenty-
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five tons of iron and steel for a total weight of two hundred and twenty-five tons.1
In 1986, the people of New York State, the United States of America and the
world joined to stage a ninety-six hour long centennial birthday party for the Lady
Liberty. Approximately, twelve million spectators filled New York's harbor, park and
the street to participate in scores of diverse events that accompanied the centennial
celebration. Furthermore, millions within and outside the US watched the great
event on television. Activities such as the twenty-three square-rigged ships,
thirty-three naval vessels from home and abroad, apart from international modern
warships paraded the harbor paying tribute to the statue. An estimated 800,000
visitors flocked into Central Park to attend the New York Philharmonic Orchestra
concert. The lighting of the statue by former President Reagan, the fantastic
firework displays, small water-craft flotillas, crewing competitions and other
festivities were among various attractions that provided national and international
audience with an unforgettable experience. The "unqualified and all-round
success" acclaimed by New York City Police Department, would not have been so
successful, without effective inter-agency coordination and implementation of the
overall planning strategy.2
Security Planning
The NYPD planning started a year prior to the scheduled date for the event.
The department analysts solicited and gained support from an array of law
enforcement agencies-- NYPD Intelligence Division, the New York Terrorist Task
Force, Secret Service, Customs Bureau, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Naval
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Investigative Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Newark Terrorist
Task Force and the Port Authority Police.3 The New York City Police Chief, Robert
J. Johnston, Jr., was given the responsibility of "guiding the project" by Police
Commissioner Benjamin Ward. Over sixty law enforcement agencies, the military,
public service agencies, utilities and private sectors were represented in
approximately 200 conferences to address issues involving division of
responsibilities to ensure an uninterrupted celebration.4
The issue of terrorism was justifiably given the highest priority. The NYPD
Intelligence Division took the lead role in this area. The operational issues resolved
during the department and inter-agency meetings were:
1. Allocation of adequate police manpower to fill details at
the many separate events that were scheduled to take
place;
2. Acquisition of numerous specialized vehicles, aircraft
and power boats to assist in the operation;
3. Acquiring portable buildings and vans to serve as
temporary headquarters at the twenty two separate
locations in the city where activities were scheduled;
4. Developing an effective communications system;
5. Computerization of information and
6. Co-ordination of police and non-police activities.5
Once the primary security and inter-agency assignments were made, a
preliminary plan of action with all training requirements, responsibilities, timeliness,
as well as an operational organization chart was prepared. Specific responsibilities
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were assigned to each particular participating group. The NYPD Chief Johnston
and his designees were in control of the two thousand square-foot command center.
Their function was to facilitate control of field events to ensure that problems were
corrected quickly by agencies assigned. In addition to police personnel, the center
was staffed with nearly forty non-police high-ranking and well-trained officials from
the emergency services organizations, the military service, federal government
agencies and public utilities to respond to any conceivable emergency that might
arise. For example, the department wanted Con Edison's representative on board,
because he could expedite needed services from his company in the event of a
power failure. Every representative in the command center could perform similar
services within his own areas of responsibilities.
A complete jurisdictional chart to identify agencies with their primary
responsibilities to handle terrorist and other incidents in various areas of the harbor
was constructed. For example, Liberty Island, Ellis Island and Governor's Island
were all federal preserves that were not under the NYPD jurisdiction. Secondly, a
portion of the New York harbor is shared between New York City and New Jersey.
Thirdly, most of the participating ships under foreign flags were not technically
subject to local jurisdiction. However, a Memorandum of Agreement (MAA) was
drawn between the police department, the FBI, Coast Guard, Naval Investigative
Service, the National Park Service and other governmental agencies which
ascertained that necessary actions would be taken regardless of jurisdictional
authority. All the planning for the celebration was completed a week prior to the
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major events. But, as Chief Johnston expressed, the question was, "would it work?"6
Potential Threats
While the planning, training and manpower acquisition phase was taking
place, agencies responsible for intelligence made a concerted effort in intelligence
gathering, analysis and dissemination protocol. These multi-agency task forces
included members of the NYPD's Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Secret Service (SS), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF), Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Custom Bureau, Newark Terrorist Task
Force (NTTF) and the Port Authority Police (PAP).7 These agencies were
concerned with which groups pose potential threats of violence, who would be
potential targets of violence, what type of weapons would likely be used and what
would be the extent of damage to human life and property.
Among the groups that were under close surveillance were: the Libyans, the
Chileans and numerous other groups that could utilize violent attention-getting
political statements, thereby using the Statue of Liberty celebration to gain
attention.8 The Libyan threat was the highest on the list, because, the analysts
predicted a possible motive or retaliation on their part to earlier US attack in Tripoli.
Should this theory be valid, the next question was, what would the target be?
The statue itself? The naval ships? The spectators? The subway system? Then,
what means would be used? A portable guided missile launched a mile or more
from its target? A "Kamikaze-type" attack from an explosive-laden aircraft? Time
bombs left in public places? Perhaps an automatic rifle assault on the public similar
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to the disastrous one in the Rome airport several years ago? Libya was certainly a
question mark, but it was an obvious one, and to that degree, the threat it posed
could at least in same measure be evaluated. Other threats such as an
anti-government faction of Chileans, saw the participation of the nation's
thirty-seven foot-long barkentine, the "Esmeralda" in the tall ships parade as a
symbol of oppression. They claimed that political prisoners aboard the vessel were
subjected to torture.9
Another threat posed was within New York where the actual event was
staged. One of the warships in the naval review, Iowa, was in the midst of
controversy. The ship drew protest from anti-nuclear groups who opposed the Navy
announcement to make New York the new home port for the warship. The group
claimed that the ship as reported, was armed with nuclear weapons. That report,
sparked instant opposition from anti-nuclear groups.10 That opposition alerted the
planners of the Iowa's vulnerability to attack. Finally, some twenty-two dignitaries of
the one hundred public officials that planned to attend the celebration, including the
US President Reagan and the First Lady, the French President Mitterand and the
First lady, the US Secretary of State Schultz and former Chief Justice Berger),11
were identified as being at significant risk.
Security Planning Implementation
The Command and Control Center, located in the heart of the NYPD
headquarters communication base, was controlled by the Chief of Departmentwho
assembled all the complex organizational plans so as to work upon implementation.
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This center contained sophisticated communications network, five closed-circuit
video feeds mounted on bridges and building tops in and around the harbor. The
feeds were also mounted on always-moving police helicopters. The video cameras
mounted were constantly scanning the crowd at harbor side and the ships on the
waterways, while the specially designed fabricated digital board traced ship
movements. Both the cameras and the digital display board, projected images on
large monitors inside the command center.12
After one year of intensive planning, in order to convey all theories into
practice, over forty agency representatives, together with the NYPD police
personnel in the Command and Control Center, conducted a rigorous thirty
scenarios command post exercise. These exercises required reactions to all kinds
of emergencies— ship collisions, bomb discovery, subway derailment, fires and
medical related incidents. It kept the participating members on the alert and made
them familiar with one another's operations in order to eliminate confusion about
individual and unit roles.13
Operational strategies were: first, the Intelligence Center in conjunction with
the New York Terrorist Task Force maintained complete secured communications
links to the Interagency Threat Assessment Group (ITAG) within the FBI's NewYork
City headquarters. ITAG responsibility was to analyze all data related to terrorist
threats and work closely with the Intelligence Center. It was also responsible for
conducting criminal activity investigations and providing an armed tactical response
team to challenge terrorists on federal property. Intelligence gathered by member
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agencies were analyzed in the center and, if significant, were given to the Chief
commanding the center. His job was to assess the immediate threat potential and
issue appropriate commands to counter an immediate danger to the public.
Meanwhile, backup investigators from the agencies would act on the data and
attempt to apprehend persons engaged in criminal activity.14
The second line was providing protective services to event dignitaries,
monitoring of high-risk areas and properties. The dignitaries who were at
significant risk were assigned individual security details which included, performing
bomb sweeps at their hotels and residences. This line was also responsible for
continuous operation of numerous motorcades and constant coordination of
security details which was aided by computerization of their schedules.15
To secure harbor-based events from interruption, the entire harbor shoreline
including piers, parks, and private properties within twenty-five miles, was
scrutinized. Extensive aerial and waterside photo surveys were conducted.
Isolated and vulnerable locations where terrorist or extremists groups could launch
attacks were identified by field commanders and sealed with fencing, others had
officers posted or dismantled to prevent access. Naval Investigative Service and
police officers were stationed aboard ships. To exercise control of thousands of
press reporters and vendors accessing sensitive locations, more than thirteen
thousand security clearances were performed by the police department and the
Joint Terrorist Task Force. Access to the Command and Control center were
restricted to identify special participants through designated elevator. Alternative
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security plans were in place to keep a continuous flow of communication, should
disaster strike the main center.16
In sum, the NYPD was determined to take every precaution against terrorist
attacks. The event concluded with no acts of terrorism or diversion of public
attention from Lady Liberty and the symbol of freedom that she represents. The
Department took pride in its success and attributed it to their hard work in security
planning which made all the preparation worthwhile.
II. The 1994 U.S. World Cup Soccer Championship
Historical Perspective
Starting from June 17 through July 17,1994, the United States, for the first
time, hosted the prestigious World Cup Soccer Championship. From 1930 to the
present, the World Cup Soccer games have grown into the world's largest
single-sporting event.17
World Cup Soccer is unique due to the global popularity. Nearly one half the
world's population, almost two billion people watched the games in stadiums and on
television worldwide. The sport holds such importance that some countries have
declared national holidays to watch and give support to their team.18 Over 141
nations with more than 150 million registered athletes started the elimination rounds
in December 1991 to qualify for the 52 match tournaments,19 to be played in the
United States.
Nine major cities and venues across the United States,20 were selected to
host the 52 tournaments. The event was officially opened in Soldiers' Field,
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Chicago, Illinois on June 17,1994 and rounded up by the Cup's final championship
game at the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, California. During the month-long event, an
estimated 3.5 million people of which 1.5 million accounted for visitors from other
nations were in attendance.21
The mere fact that this particular event received international attention,
brought concerns among law-enforcement communities as to how the host country -
the United States - would prepare to handle this World Cup Championship for the
first time. They took into account the extreme intensity of the competition; the
number of games within such a short span of time; the diversity and geographic
location of the venue sites; and the potential symbolic appeal of the competition to
any terrorist group, anti-government factions or individual zealots who would view
the events as an excellent opportunity in which to execute a terrorist act in
furtherance of a political agenda or national cause, or even to embarrass the host
country.
Sport violence is as old as sport itself (Simons and Taylor, 1992). The first
documented incident could be dated back to 532 B.C. in Constantinople during a
chariot race. Riot fans seized the stadium resulting in a clash between fans and the
Roman soldiers and the killing of an estimated thirty thousand people.22
The number of cases of sport-related violence has been increasing since the
middle of the eighteenth century. Most of these incidents were directly related to a
specific sporting event and took place in or around the arena. However, in some
instances, the sporting event was only a trigger that set off a long-standing tension.
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For example, in 1910, black boxer Jack Johnson defeated White James Jeffries,
which caused an outbreak of racial violence that spread throughout the United
States, causing several deaths and many injuries.23 In a massive riot following a
soccer match between Peru and Argentina on May 24, 1964, the modern era
witnessed the deadliest of all incidences of fan violence. Over three hundred
eighteen people died and about five hundred or more were injured.24
The sport of soccer has long been plagued by a history of spontaneous
violence and organized rioting instigated by "hooligans" which have been prevalent
at almost every large competition in recent history. Within the past twenty-five
years, a great number of European countries have experienced major problems in
connection with soccer matches and tournaments. Most of these acts of
soccer-related violence, have long been associated with "hooliganism." Hooligans
are career criminals who envision themselves as an extension of the team. Their
primary purpose in soccer matches or tournaments is to conduct criminal behaviors,
such as assaults, robbery, rape, public drunkenness, public disorder and police
interference.25
In a report by Lord Justice Peter Taylor to the British Parliament on the 1989
Hillsborough Stadium disaster, in which 95 people were crushed and trampled to
death and more than 400 injuries during the Cup final between Liverpool and
Nottingham, Forest noted:
During the 1970s, hooligan behavior became a Scourge at and
around football (soccer) grounds. Rival fans abused and fought
with each other on the terraces. The pitch was invaded, sometimes
to facilitate the fighting, sometimes in an attempt to abort a match
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by whose team was losing, and on occasions to display anger
and seek to assault a referee or player who had incurred dis
pleasure. Throwing missiles, either at a player or a policeman or
at a rival fan, became another violent feature. When the police
responded by searching fans for missiles on entry, the practice
grew of throwing coins (which could not be confiscated).
Sometimes the coins were sharpened in advance to make them
more damaging.26
Of course, the police in Europe have in different ways tried to manage the
crowd control problems endemic to soccer matches. At the same time, some
groups have done their best to outwit the police and circumvent the security
measures undertaken to return soccer to its position as a spectator sport followed
for entertainment and pleasure, rather than an opportunity for violence. All the
mentioned catastrophes and other somber lessons had a great impact on the
European soccer championships held in Germany in 1988 and the World Soccer
Championships in Italy in 1990 and the 1994 World Cup Championships was not an
exception.
The phenomenon of soccer "hooliganism," other soccer-related violence,
including an attempt by terrorist groups to disrupt the events, presented numerous
challenges to the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies.
Security Planning
The FBI began preparations more than two years prior to the event, in order
to address the special security concerns inherent with hosting such a major
international sporting event in the United States. The FBI worked closely with other
law-enforcement counterparts and local officials to coordinate the planning for
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policing the 1994 World Cup tournaments at each of nine venue sites, in an effort to
identify key areas of potential concern and implement effective security
counter-measures. During the two year preparation, the planners covered such
topics as strategic international police cooperation, intelligence gathering, tactical
concepts, cooperation with the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) and
the different local organizers, arena security and match liaison.27
Since European police agencies have dealt with soccer and its associated
problems for many years, it was important that the US law enforcement agencies
learn from their experience. Representatives of the state and local law enforcement
agencies associated with the nine venue sites, as well as FBI field offices, received
briefing and lectures from recognized European experts in soccer-related violence.
For example, additional physical security measures not generally employed in the
United States were studied for their applicability during the 1994 World Cup. Of
course, application of innovative security techniques was also tempered by
American sensibilities. Alan Rothenberg, chairman of World Cup USA '94 declared,
"This is America. This is not a police state, and we are not going to turn it into one"
because of the problems associated with soccer.28
Extensive coordination efforts within and among each of the nine venue sites
such as the host cities and other law enforcement agencies responsibilities were
put in place. This included a close working relationship with the World Cup USA
'94 Coordination Committee, as well as with key European police agencies.
Addressing the FBI conference at the FBI Academy in 1992, Chief Lars Nylen of
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Uppsala, Sweden, the site of the last European Cup Championship, observed:
...from our own experience, we also knew that suddenly the host
nation could get infected with... Hooligan fever-a virus spread
by published stories and rumors and encouraged by the reality
that threats and riots do happen now and then .. .a fever that
makes even the most disciplined police force ready to respond
with violence or sheer frustration if goaded beyond a certain
point by assault, stone throwing, and obscene abuse. To the
ordinary police officer without any experience of soccer problems,
it can be hard to understand the difference in criminal supporter
behavior and the behavior of terrorists or professional rioters.
To avoid... police actions that produce more disorder than
[they] prevent, we had to make sure that the police did not fall
ill with Hooligan fever. Our medicine was good, timely and
accurate information, education and training.29
That became the basis for the establishment of an effective intelligence base to
identify potential acts of violence.
In January and April 1993, the FBI hosted two additional conferences with
other US federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Assisted by the World
Cup USA Committee, the FBI was able to address the unique security
considerations of World Cup soccer. For example, issues concerning disorderly
and criminal behavior are predictable. In such situations, there is always a build-up
period. The police, especially the tactical commander, must be able to "read the
crowd," identify early warning signals and pinpoint those actions that incite
reaction.30 It was also noted that, good planning, trained and experienced law
enforcement personnel, good observation skills, proper tactical interventions and
good police management will make it possible to counteract an extremely negative
and difficult-to-handle situation.
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Even more importantly, it was the beginning of a coordinated US federal
government approach to support local law enforcement for the 1994 World Cup.
One key facet of federal support for World Cup efforts was the provision of
assistance by the Defense Department's Office of Special Events. To ensure that
major special events are conducted in a safe and secure manner, the US Congress
empowered the Office of Special Events to assist local law enforcement agencies in
security preparations.31
The integration of military personnel into soccer security operation required
extensive planning. Local and military planners were to work together to resolve
staffing challenges regarding availability of military personnel and their respective
support roles. This assistance ranged from providing advice on security planning
issues to actually loaning security-related equipment and assets. The DOD was to
assign hundreds of soldiers mostly state-activated National Guardsmen, to support
the host city police departments.32
Through the final game of the World Cup Soccer Championships, the FBI
closely coordinated assistance to local law enforcement with the Office of Special
Events thus meeting all the security planning needs.
Potential Threats
As the 1994 World Cup was an event of international importance, the United
States was concerned not only with Hooliganism but with the threat of terrorism.
Since the Munich, West Germany tragedy, elaborate security measures have
become an integral part of the preparations for a special event. With the rapidly
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changing world situation, as well as the fact that the United States did not know
which countries would qualify to participate in the World Cup until December 1993,
it was difficult to assess the terrorism threat level during the planning period. As
such the threat assessment process was set to evolve throughout the matches.
The assessment process includes developing an understanding of the problem,
maintaining effective coordination and establishing the necessary intelligence base.
Although, there had not been a terrorist attack at an international sporting
event since the killing of Israeli athletes by Arab terrorists at the 1972 Summer
Olympics in Munich, Germany, the potential did exist for this event, perhaps, at a
lower probability than that of Olympics. The absence of a terrorist attack in the past
might be due to the global popularity of the sport. The fear of jeopardizing their
current immigration status; fundraising capabilities, recruitment opportunities,
propaganda activities to support their cause and freedom of assembly within the
United Sates. Second, in 1994, United States law enforcement successfully
apprehended and convicted several fugitives wanted for their involvement in
terrorist activities. For example, on March 4, 1994, four of the six defendants
indicted were convicted on all thirty-eight counts against them, including conspiracy
to bomb targets in the United States, the bombing of the World Trade Center and
the use of explosive devices,33 including the arrest and conviction of members of
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in the United States.
The domestic terrorist groups that were struggling for Puerto Rico's
independence from the United States were under scrutiny. These groups have been
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responsible for the majority of terrorist incidents perpetrated by domestic terrorism
groups within the United States. But during 1993 and 1994, no acts of terrorism
were committed by these groups as compared to five terrorist acts in 1990,
decreasing to four in 1991 and again, only one act of terrorism in 1992.34 This
apparent decrease may be due, in part, to the November 1993 political plebiscite
held in Puerto Rico in which a plurality of Puerto Ricans voted to maintain their
commonwealth status. The election result appeared to have deflated the
independence movement of Puerto Rican nationalists, minimizing terrorist threats
from these groups.
Additional areas of concern stemmed from intense soccer rivalries between
country teams, who could spawn the types of violence commonly seen at soccer
games throughout the world. Existing ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes, or
historical differences between countries could also be fueled by their participation in
the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship.35 Physical security concerns within the
venue and event sites, encompassing areas of potential vulnerability to terrorist
threats, or acts of random violence, were carefully weighed. The unique challenges
presented by World Cup Soccer resulted in a coordinated law enforcement effort
directed at countering any potential threat designed to disrupt the event. In the
capacity as lead agency in combating terrorism in the United States, the FBI sought
to assess the potential threat that the 1994 World Cup Soccer could pose. In
addition, the massive media coverage afforded by this event could have been
viewed by international or domestic terrorist groups as an excellent forum to stage
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their cause.36
In analyzing the potential for soccer-related violence during a 1992 FBI
conference at the FBI Academy, the phenomenon of soccer hooliganism presented
numerous concerns to the FBI and US law enforcement officials. One consideration
by experts was that the sheer cost and the great distances involved may preclude
travel by violence-prone individuals (hooligans). In one of the many sessions,
Adrian Appleby noted "There is no doubt about whether they will come. They are
planning to come now!" He explained that the hooligans traveled further, at greater
expense, during the 1992 European Soccer Championships in Sweden. In addition,
promotional packages and travel incentives already in existence may further
facilitate the travel of fans, including the hooligan element to the nine venue sites
for the World Cup.37
These hard-core English hooligans are considered to prepare to attack the
police in the absence of other targets, but even they are more opportunists than
terrorists. Experience shows that, at heart, the troublemakers are cowards who
give up when faced by professional police intervention. They start something only
when they believe that have a chance to succeed.
The lack of violent terrorist activity in the United States in 1994 was more an
outcome of increased awareness and security countermeasures than decreasing
threat. The February 1993 bombing attack on the World Trade Center in New York




The primary jurisdiction for venues site security rests with local law
enforcement authorities, in all the nine venue sites. While the Europeans have had
tremendous success in quelling violence within soccer arenas, in many cases the
violence has left the stadium and moved into the surrounding neighborhoods. This
is further aggravated by the sheer scope of the competition - fifty-two matches
scheduled across the United States during a one-month period. As such, security
challenges were faced by not only the local jurisdictions surrounding venue sites,
but adjacent jurisdictions and other sites where national teams were residing for the
matches.38
The establishment of a low threshold for intervention in the form of selected
arrests; extracting leaders, agitators, and violent persons from the crowd served to
defuse any form of aggression and deter further violence. This was accomplished
through the designation of a special arrest team, which worked in close cooperation
with undercover officers, documentation teams, and international liaisons. Due to
the cooperative efforts of the FBI and US law enforcement, no dramatic incident of
soccer-related "hooliganism" or terrorist acts of violence dampened the event.39
Although Americans are often passionate supporters of their favorite football,
basketball and baseball teams, the United States has never experienced the level
of emotional involvement in athletic competition that is associated with the World
Cup. Currently, with the 15.9 million participants in the United States, soccer has
become the second most popular sport among young people in America.40
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An unfortunate by-product of the enthusiasm and favor associated with
soccer is the phenomenon of soccer-related violence. Although most of the violence
associated with soccer is minor, there is some directly related organized criminal
activity, which has come to be known as "hooliganism." The soccer match and
hooligans' role as spectators are secondary to the violence. It is not uncommon for
a core group of fifteen to twenty hooligans to incite a large crowd of a hundred or
more to riot.41
After-event reports concerning the security arrangements and World Cup
Soccer incidents, however, regard problematic any World Cup Soccer
championship in recent history, despite the tremendous attendance and support
from the American people, competition from major league baseball and little
tradition among Americans for the game soccer.
Summary
By reviewing and evaluating past contingency planning and security
coordination, the knowledge gained from the successful conduct of scheduled major
events in 1986 and 1994 by the FBI, the host city police department and other law
enforcement agencies were accumulated and shared among counterpart agencies
charged with similar security planning during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in
Atlanta.
Although the two major events were scheduled in ten US cities, the security
planning and coordination strategies were similar in nature. As lead agency for
counterterrorism in the United States, the FBI played a key role in all of the security
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planning for the two special events, which received a high degree of visibility both
domestically and internationally.
The FBI, in coordination with its law enforcement counterparts and local
security officials, successfully implemented effective security countermeasures
designed to counter any potential threat devised to disrupt the (1986 Statue of
Liberty Celebration and the 1994 World Cup Soccer Championship) events,
including international and domestic terrorist or soccer-related violence.
Chapter V will include assessment of the security arrangements and
implementation of the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta, its security
problems resulting in the bombing of the Centennial Park on July 29,1996, and a
proposal to reduce the probability of future Olympic tragedy.
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CHAPTER V
ATLANTA, GEORGIA: THE SITE OF THE 1996 OLYMPIC GAMES
In Atlanta Georgia, substantial contingency planning and security
coordination was undertaken prior to the 100th Anniversary of the Summer Olympic
Games beginning July 20th through August 4th, 1996. The Atlanta Olympic
security success was then dependent upon creative planning, cooperation and
extremely close coordination among the dozens of community agencies.
This chapter reviews the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games organization, security
planning and coordination by the Atlanta Police Department (APD) and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in conjunction with other US law enforcement
agencies charged with similar responsibilities during the Games. Security
organization for the Games is represented in three phases: The Developmental
Phase, the Experimental Phase, and the Operational Phase. These plans served as
a blueprint for security operations during the 1996 Centennial Games in Atlanta.
Detailed narratives as to the organization, the security planning and coordination by
law enforcement agencies for this event, begins with a historical perspective of how
Atlanta bid for and won the hosting of the 1996 Games.
Historical Perspective
Atlanta, Georgia (Appendix A), was one of the fourteen US cities lobbying
for the right to merely bid for the Games of the XXVIth Olympiad. This great historic
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event was very significant to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the
athletes because 1996 marked the 100-year anniversary of the modern Olympics.
Conventional wisdom held that the centennial event would surely be awarded to
Athens, Greece, site of the 1896 Games to commemorate its anniversary. It was
after all, ancient Greece where the first recorded Games occurred in 776 B.C. and it
was in Athens where the Games were reborn, through the efforts of a young
Frenchman, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, in 1896.1 Based on the aforementioned
reasons, most insiders assumed naturally that Athens, Greece, the Olympic
birthplace and sentimental favorite, would be awarded the Centennial Olympics'
hosting in 1996. As summarized by Bill Payne, "in many ways, history and
sentiment were against us."2
Certain considerations such as, a strong backing for a candidate city by all
the levels of its government, and the demonstration of thorough arrangements to
cover any eventual loss, increases the chances for selection as host city for the
Games by the International Olympic Committee's (IOC). In addition, the city's
organizing abilities, coupled with existing sports facilities, hotel capacity and a
reliable transportation system were cited as prerequisites for endorsement and
nomination by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC).3
In February 1987, an Atlanta attorney William Porter (Billy) Payne,
approached the then Mayor Andrew Young about the possibility of the city bidding
to host the 1996 Summer Olympics. Three years later, Bill Payne emerged as
President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Atlanta Committee for the
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Olympic Games (ACOG) in 1990.4 Through his leadership and the cooperation of
three African-American Atlanta Mayors (former Mayor Andrew Young, Mayor
Maynard Jackson and then incumbent, Mayor Bill Campbell) who strived to
represent the continuity in the growth process of Atlanta, the dream of hosting the
1996 Olympics in Atlanta became a reality.
Although, Atlanta had never bid for an Olympics before, and no city in the
last fifty years had won the right to stage this great event in its first attempt, Payne
was optimistic that he would somehow bring Atlanta and the rest of the world the
best Olympics of all times.5 Chaired by Payne and co-chaired by Andrew Young,
ACOG became a private, not-for-profit corporation that was expected to deliver not
only the Olympic Games, but everything related to it including building new
facilities, communications, corporate services, Games' services, host broadcasting,
licensing, marketing Olympic programs and operations and most of all, providing
security for the Games. Among the fourteen of the US bidding cities, Atlanta,
Georgia and Minneapolis, St. Paul, were the only semi-finalists selected by the
United States Olympic Committee (USOC). The USOC which is responsible for
promoting and encouraging the Olympic movement within the country in Spring
1988, officially nominated Atlanta to bid for the Games citing, the city's organizing
track records and the existing infrastructures.6
Starting September 12 through 21, 1990, the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) - the nonprofit Organization entrusted with the control and
development of the Olympic Games, with its eighty-seven members met in Prince
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Tokyo's Takanawa Hotels to select one city from among six (Athens, Greece;
Atlanta, Georgia; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Manchester, England; Melbourne, Australia
and Toronto, Canada), to stage the 100th-anniversary celebration of the modern
Olympic Games in the Summer of 1996.
On September 18,1990, with a vote of fifty-one to thirty-five on its fifth ballot,
the IOC selected Atlanta over Athens and the Games of the XXVIth Olympiad, the
Centennial Games was awarded to "the City of Atlanta."7 This award returned the
Summer Olympic Games to the United States for the second time in just over a
decade, after being host on three previous occasions: 1904 in St. Louis, 1932 in
Los Angeles (LA), and 1984 again in LA,8 since the Modern Games began in 1896.
The state of Georgia with 7,055,000 people, ranks tenth among the fifty
states of the United States in population. It is the largest state east of the
Mississippi, and is larger than any other state in the southeastern region of the
United States.9 Georgia has a 59.441-square mile area, with a 109-square mile
population density. The state is 320 miles furthest North to furthest South and 410
miles furthest East to furthest West, stretching from the picturesque foothills of the
Appalachian Mountains to the golden beaches of the Atlantic Ocean. It is boarded
by South Carolina, Florida, Alabama and Tennessee.
The state of Georgia is grouped into four special geographic areas:
Georgia's Mountains in the extreme north of the state, Georgia's Metropolitan
Atlanta in the upper middle, Georgia's Historic South in the central to lower middle
and Georgia's Beaches on the seaboard in the lower southeast of the state. Within
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these areas, the state is divided into nine travel regions as shown in figure 1
above: Historic High County Region, Northeast Georgia Mountains Region, Atlanta
Metro Region, Presidential Parkways Region, Historic Heartland Region, Classic






Figure 1. Georgia Regional Map
Courtesy of Carl Vinson Institute of Government. The University of Georgia.
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Coast Region.10 Georgia is known as the "Peach State," (named for King George II
of England), and nicknamed "The Empire State of the South." The gold dome on
the Capitol was mined from Dahlonega, Georgia, the site of the first gold rush in
North America. Georgia is the home of two former U.S. Presidents - Jimmy Carter
and the late Franklin Delano Roosevelt.11
The first ever held Summer Games on the East Coast, was the largest
peacetime gathering organized, including 16,000 athletes from over 197 countries
around the world, 17,000 press, 8.5 million ticketed spectators, and infusion of an
estimated 400-500 thousand daily visitors to the Metropolitan Atlanta area.
During the two-week period, the athletes were involved in two hundred fifty
four competitions in over twenty-eight sporting events. An astounding 3.5 billion,
(more than half the world's population), watched the biggest-ever Olympic
extravaganza through television transmission, radio broadcasts, and newspaper
coverage.12 This is the only such event that had the entire world's attention. The
event hosting was very significant to Atlanta as noted by John A. Lucas (1992), "the
summer of 1996, marked exactly 132 years after General Sherman's army burned
Atlanta to the ground,"13 during the Civil War.
Regional Review
Atlanta is the largest city in the state of Georgia, with a population of 2.9
million.14 The Olympic Games of 1996 held in Atlanta, Georgia according to
reports, were equal to "twenty Super Bowls occurring simultaneously."15 Although,
the city has a track record for accepting tough challenges and prevailing by sheer
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enthusiasm, the vast number of participants, spectators along with the resident
Olympic spectators, experienced one of the most complex, geographically
dispersed Olympic Games sites in Olympic history. A record number of visitors
descended upon the city to test Georgia's legendary southern hospitality. Atlanta
would not be all it is today without the contribution by prominent Atlantans and
corporations such as: its home grown corporate giant; the Coca-Cola company, the
creator of the Cable News Network (CNN), ("the high-tech, fast-paced,
state-of-the-art international news broadcasting"), and owner of two professional
sports teams - Ted Turner; its first black Georgian elected to Congress since the
Civil War, Mayor of Atlanta, 1981 -1989 and a key member of the Atlanta Committee
for the Olympic Games (ACOG)-Andrew Young; the famous author of the book,
"Gone with the Wind" - late Margaret Mitchell and with its reputation as "the
putative capital of the American civil-rights movement" accredited to the world
renowned civil rights leader, Martin Luther King Jr.16
The twenty-six Olympic Games venues were concentrated in the heart of the
city of Atlanta. Some venues were located in other Georgia counties as well as
three other states and the District of Columbia.
Within the Atlanta area in Figure 2, a three mile (5 kilometer) imaginary circle
with the central Atlanta business district at its center, called the "Olympic Ring."
The ring covered the Georgia World Congress Center, the Olympic Stadium, the
Atlanta Fulton County Stadium, the Olympic Family Hotel, the Olympic Village, the
Olympic Center (including the International Broadcast Center, Georgia Dome,
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Georgia World Congress Center and the Omni), the Centennial Olympic Park and
the Atlanta University Center.
Other Georgia venues outside of Atlanta were: Stone Mountain Park, located
Figure 2. The Olympic Ring
Courtesy of the Atlanta Police Department (APD)
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16 miles (25.6 kilometer) east of Atlanta, hosting tennis, archery and cycling
competitions; while beach volleyball was held at Atlanta Beach in Clayton County
located south of Atlanta. Soccer semifinals and finals, preliminary rounds of
volleyball and rhythmic gymnastics were held in historic Sanford Stadium on the
campus of the University of Georgia in Athens, located fifty miles (85 kilometers)
northeast of Atlanta. Exciting equestrian and mountain biking competition were
held at the Georgia International Horse Park - Conyers, located thirty-three miles
(53 kilometers) east of Atlanta. Women's softball was held on the banks of the
Chattahoochee River, Golden Park in Columbus, Georgia, located one hundred-five
miles (168 kilometers) southwest of Atlanta. The scenic Lake Lanier located near
Gainesville, Georgia, fifty miles (88 kilometers) southeast of Atlanta, was the site for
rowing and sprint canoe/kayaking. The historic Wassaw Sound in Savannah
located two hundred forty-eight miles (398 kilometers) southeast of Atlanta along
the coast of Georgia featured Olympic yachting.
Out of state venues were: white-water slalom canoe/kayaking at Polk County,
Tennessee located one hundred-thirty miles (209 kilometers) on the Ocoee River,
northwest of Atlanta. Preliminary and quarter-final soccer matches were hosted in
other cities around the United States: at Legion Field - Birmingham, Alabama
located one hundred forty-six miles (235 kilometers) west of Atlanta; the Orange
Bowl - Miami, Florida, located six hundred seventy miles (1072 kilometers) south of
Atlanta; Citrus Bowl - Orlando, Florida, located four hundred forty-seven miles (715
kilometers) south of Atlanta and RFK Stadium - Washington, D.C. located six
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hundred forty-two miles (1027 kilometers) northeast of Atlanta. The four Olympic
Villages within the state of Georgia were divided between Atlanta, Athens,
Columbus, and Savannah. The main village was the biggest and best ever. The
eight building complex built within the five kilometer radius of the Olympic Ring
located at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, with more than 5,400
beds, housed the majority of the 16,000 athletes, coaches, and other officials.17 In
addition to the four primary Olympic Villages were other satellite sites outside the
state of Georgia to house competitors in venues such as Birmingham, Miami,
Orlando, and Washington D.C. Due to the vast area of the Olympic Games sites,
planners were faced with an enormous task of providing security.
Socioeconomic and Racial Issues
Some of the problems which confronted ACOG and the Olympic planners
within the region were politically driven. For example, many of the major Game
sites, as well as the Olympic Village, were located in economically depressed racial
areas. With the problem of unemployment and high crime rates ever present in the
Metropolitan Atlanta areas, Olympic organizers were forced to address those
issues. The announcement by Billy Payne that monies realized will only be spent
on Olympic Games preparation and not on urban development, drew fierce
opposition from the black community in Summer Hill.
To address the issue of financial support for poor communities, the National
Association of Black Journalists in its panel discussion on "African-Americans and
the Olympic Movement," stressed the lack of support from ACOG since most of the
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Olympic venues were being built in African-American neighborhoods. For example,
the main Olympic Village, where most of the athletes, coaches and officials were
housed during the Games, was in the Techwood area at Georgia Tech.18 Atlanta
activists charged that thousands of poor people were being displaced from their
Techwood/Clark Howell homes, while the homeless were subjected to repressive
measures in violation of their civil rights as the city prepared for the Games.
Activists Ed Loring explained that the Atlanta Housing Authority deliberately allowed
the Techwood homes to deteriorate to fulfill what Coca-cola and Georgia Tech's
dreamed about - "getting rid of the poor."19 Another very sensitive issue was that
of the two stadiums where "neighborhood residents had substantial input."20 The
Fulton County stadium, according to complaints, helped to bring the neighborhoods
down rather than improve them as was intended. The new Olympic stadium which
was to be razed after conversion, was to fit better into its surrounding.
The selection of Atlanta as an Olympic city created the right political climate
to justify the demolition of the project. Although refuted by the city officials and
members of the Atlanta Committee for the Games, the ACLU of Georgia filed a suit
challenging the constitutionality of Atlanta's parking lot, city nuisance ordinances
passed after it was awarded the Olympics in 1990. The new laws prohibit people
from occupying vacant buildings, or "sleeping in parks, on the grass or on
benches."21
Another controversial issue during the preparation period was the Georgia
state confederate flag which blacks claimed invoked memories of slavery. A bill by
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Governor Miller before the Senate legislature to have the flag changed before the
Games failed. These socioeconomic and racial issues, heightened the security
concern for the Olympic planners.
Organizational Structure for the Games
The establishment of an Olympic Organizing Committee prior to planning for
the Games, was to meet the requirements set forth in the Olympic Charter - the
document that establishes the main requirements for the organization of the
Olympic Games.22 Immediately following the selection of the city of Atlanta, by the
IOC in September 1990, the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG)
was incorporated in 1991 to plan and stage the Games.23 The delegation of its
responsibilities under the Olympic Charter to ACOG by the City of Atlanta and the
entrustment of its responsibilities to organize the Games to ACOG by the United
States Olympic Committee (USOC), empowered ACOG to plan and stage the
Games on behalf of the City of Atlanta and the USOC.
Security provision for the Games was organized into two primary bodies, one
existing under the auspices of the Olympic Organizing Committee, and the other
comprised of the participating law enforcement leaders from the local, state, and
federal departments and agencies. These two security organizations have separate
but overlapping functions. The Olympic Organizing Committee's private security
was responsible for its assets and the Olympic family; enforcement of the rules,
regulations and procedures necessary for the safe presentation of the Games; and
coordination of certain security-related efforts of other groups. To accomplish their
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functions, ACOG security functions were satisfied by two groups - private security
and volunteers.
Once ACOG's private security role was defined, a written commitment was
drafted to acknowledge the assignment and organization of its security services. If
for any reason the organizing committee fails to meet its security commitments, the
law enforcement community will then inherit the shortfalls. The local, state, and
federal law enforcement contingent was responsible for public safety and the
general well-being of people and property during the Games. It was specifically
responsible for responding to threats or acts that may affect persons or property in
any aspect of the Olympic Games.
In Atlanta, the interagency planning structure, figure 3, was known as the
Olympic Security and Support Group (OSSG), which comprised of over forty
agencies. OSSG was organized based on the "Olympic Model."24 The Olympic
Model is based on an interagency committee process. The OSSG mission was to
develop a "master security plan" that would serve as a blueprint for agencies
providing Olympic security services.25 At the top of the figure, the Atlanta Police
Chief Beverly Harvard and the Georgia Commissioner of Public Safety Colonel Sid
Miles jointly chaired the OSSG. The Olympic Security Planning and Coordination
Committee (OSPCC), was organized from the OSSG and was responsible for the
day-to-day management of the OSSG planning process. This included overseeing
work performed by the nineteen subcommittees and the staff support arm, referred
to as the Integrated Planning Group (IPG). The most important structure, was the
OLYMPIC SECURITY SUPPORT GROUP
Co-Chair
Colonel Miles, GSP Chief Harvard, APD
OLYMPIC SECURITY PLANNING COORDINATION
COMMITTEE





Figure 3. Olympic Security Planning Structure
Courtesy of the Atlanta Police Department
(Jl
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establishment of the Atlanta Police Olympic Agency Planning Office (APO), by a
written special order signed by the Atlanta Police Chief Harvard in June 1993. The
mission of the APO was to manage and coordinate all agency preparations for the
1996 Olympic Games including performing its normal police services as well. The
APO was organized to also work closely with Olympic Planners - ACOG, OSSG,
OSPCC, IPG and other law enforcement agencies in providing Olympic security
services. In short, the Atlanta Police APO was the primary organizing unit
responsible for developing and implementing approved plans supporting the 1996
Olympic Games. The APO was the accountability center that managed all of the
tasks required to be completed in preparation for providing Olympic security
services. In this capacity, it served as a clearinghouse as well as an Olympic
resource center for the rest of the department.
During the 1996 Games, the Operational Phase was set in motion
approximately two weeks prior to the 1996 Olympic Games opening ceremonies,
with the exception of the Olympic intelligence functions which were initiated months
earlier in order to monitor national and international events with potential bearing on
security preparations. Although the Developmental and Experimental Phases often
overlapped, all three phases were closely linked and inter-related. Finally, the
organization of the Games into these three phases was critical to the city of Atlanta
law enforcement agencies and their counterparts since it generally follows the
sequence of events regarding Olympic security preparations and implementation.
217
Security Threat Assessment for the Games
Threat is a measure of how likely a subject is to succeed in carrying out
some activity that may cause harm. Threat is based on an assessment of the
subject's intent and capability. Threat assessment then, is the collection and
collation of all available intelligence, both classified and unclassified concerning the
subject. To Olympic security planners, the threat posed by terrorism is transforming
and can, at times intensify in direct relation to changes in political, social and
economic situations occurring around the world. In essence, the terrorist threat is
ever present.
The threat of terrorism during the Games in Atlanta was grouped into three
distinct categories: the international terrorist organizations that have demonstrated
their capabilities to function within the United States, the domestic groups that have
been active over the past decade, and the racially-oriented/radical groups
depending upon their motivation.
Security considerations for the Olympic Games have evolved over the years,
but a philosophy for Olympic security emerged nearly a quarter of century ago
following the Munich "black hooded assassin" at the Olympic village. This tragedy
and recent terrorist attacks demonstrated not only the increased threat but also the
changing nature of terrorism. According to Brian Jenkins, "there is an identifiable
and fairly high level of anxiety" about terrorism among the general public, that "the
threat assessment is close to an all-time high."26 Jenkins and ACOG continued to
debate whether foreign or domestic terrorism posed the greater risk.
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Security officials with ACOG, according to Ron Martz, were "reluctant to
discuss security preparation, --- and they wouldn't point out specific groups that
might target the Games."27 But terrorist experts meeting in Chicago to explore
trends in international and domestic terrorism agreed that the militant Middle
Eastern groups, particularly radical Muslim fundamentalists opposed to the peace
process between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel's recent
agreement, are likely to pose the biggest threat.28
Although intelligence officials contend that no threat to the Olympic Games
was detected, experts were concerned that areas such as hotels, utilities, and the
park may be vulnerable to attack. To alleviate such concern, potential terrorist
targets like the Georgia Institute of Technology's nuclear research reactor, a few
blocks from the Olympic Village would be closed and its nuclear fuel shipped to
Savannah for storage. But some security analysts agreed that state-sponsored
terrorism is less likely at the Games because even those countries that featured in
the DOS' annual report on terrorism - Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the Sudan's
teams and officials will be represented during the Games. Contrary to the security
analysts' beliefs, Robert Heibel argued that the Islamic fundamentalist, not really
owing support to any particular state, could attempt to disrupt the Games.29
The FBI begun its preparation for the Games early in order to address "the
special security concerns generated by this international event." The formation of a
counter terrorism network by the FBI in close coordination with Olympic security
officials and other local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, was to
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neutralize any potential terrorist threats and concerns."30
International Terrorist Groups
The international terrorist groups most likely to execute a terrorist act during
the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, include: Abu Nidal, based in Libya, was
responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre; and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), due to their past affiliation with the Black September
Organization. The PLO is currently committed to the return of occupied territories
to Palestinians and the creation of an independent homeland; the Palestine
Liberation Front (PLF), a radical faction led by Abu Abbas, who masterminded the
October 1985 attack on the Achille Lauro ship, in which one US citizen was killed;
Al-Fatah, a Palestinian group believed to have stopped terrorist acts since Arafat
signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1993; Eyal, an Israeli right-wing group
believed responsible for the 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin; the Provisional Irish Republican Army, known as the (PIRA), an armed wing
of Sinn Fein, the political party seeking removal of British forces from Northern
Ireland; the PIRA has actively carried out various criminal activities in the United
States in support of its terrorist operations.
Supporters of formalized terrorist groups such as the Egyptian Al-Gama'at
Al-lslamiyya, responsible for a machine-gun attack on Greek tourists at a Cairo
hotel in April 1996 that killed eighteen and wounded more than twenty; the HAMAS
and Hezbollah, responsible for the bombing of the US Embassy and Marine
barracks in Beirut in 1993, hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985 and kidnapping of
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many American hostages. These groups continued to view the United States as an
attractive refuge and staging area. Some supporters in the US are believed to be
conducting criminal activities to include military-style training in support of terrorist
groups' objectives.
International terrorist group considered as loosely-affiliated extremists which
continued to view the US as both a staging area and a target, may seek the
assistance of selected domestic terrorist groups to aid them in their intelligence, site
fundraising supplying equipments as well as protection prior to and after the
terrorist act. The most prominent has been the emergence of the International
Radical Terrorism (IRT), responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center and has also been charged with the 1993 aborted plot to bomb several sites
in New York City, including the United Nations. The FBI believes that, along with
continuing state sponsorship of international terrorism, the IRT poses a significant
threat to US national security.31
Domestic Terrorist Groups
Over the past years, terrorism in the United States has continued in a
general trend in which fewer attacks are occurring, but individual attacks are
becoming more deadly.
The rise of militia movements in the United States now confronts federal
authorities with plausible risks of terrorism from within. The American "ultra-right"
from the FBI's perspective, has widely adopted the "leaderless resistance" concept,
meaning adherently organizing themselves into tiny cells that are extremely difficult
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to detect or infiltrate. One example, is the "Unorganized Militia of the United
States," founded by Indianapolis attorney and former Marietta resident Linda
Thompson. This group actively promotes the formation of militia groups throughout
the US. Militia members were charged with the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City that killed over 168 people in April 1995. Within
the same month, militia groups were arrested in central Georgia and accused of
conspiring to stockpile bombs for a "war" with the government. Although initial
reports of a plot to disrupt the Olympics were discounted, the raid illustrated that
such elements lurked not far from the Games' center.
The Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces (PACRF), a domestic
terrorist group which directs its terrorist activities at the US, receives no foreign
direction or financial assistance, is dedicated to achieving total Puerto Rican
independence from the United States. The Al-Fuqra, a secretive US-based militant
black Muslim sect not aligned with the Nation of Islam, continued to pose a threat.
The recognition of the Palestinian team for the 1996 Games by the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the four suicide bombings by
Palestinians in late February and early March 1996 claiming sixty two Israeli lives
within nine days, shook the foundations of the peace process. It was apparent that
the Jewish Defense League (JDL), would definitely involve itself with the protection
of Jewish citizens within the Olympic arena. Its involvement raised concern among
Olympic security planners, that is, the possibility for the JDL to utilize the Olympic
Games for the purpose of retribution for past acts against Israel.
Racially Oriented and Radical Groups
In the Olympic security radar were the racially oriented groups which could
mobilize to cause a vast amount of disruption during the 1996 Games. Groups
categorized as "right-wing" were defined as being racist, anti - black, anti - Semitic
and for the advancement of the white race. In addition to advocating white
supremacy and the hatred of non-white races, these groups have also engaged in
acts of provocation and assault against federal and state law enforcement officials.
Groups such as the Aryan Nations based in Hayden Lake, Idaho, the Order
and Posse Comitatus, all fall into the "right-wing" category. For example, in 1995
two members of a Minnesota "patriot" group were convicted of plotting to use ricin
to kill US Marshall and Internal Revenue Service agents.32 Another radical white
supremacist group called the White Aryan Resistance, based in California, is
reported to be recruiting neo-Nazis and teenage skinheads.
The most significant instance of "right-wing" terrorism occurred in July 1993,
when members of the American Front Skinheads attempted to bomb the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) headquarters in
Tacoma, Washington. Finally, extremists in the United States continued to
demonstrate their interest and experimentation with unconventional weapons. The
World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombing show that almost anyone can
make fertilizer bombs; and the Tokyo subway disaster confirmed that any good
chemist can make nerve gas. This is supported by the manufacturing of the
"biological agent ricin from castor beans by the Patriot's Council in Minnesota in
CHAPTER VI
THE 1996 ATLANTA OLYMPIC GAMES
ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
The 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games were organized in three phases:
the Developmental Phase, the Experimental Phase, and the Operational Phase and
are examined separately in this chapter. First, the Developmental Phase involved
extensive research, written plans, identification of needed resources, establishing of
training requirements and identification of agency roles and responsibilities.
Second, the Experimental Phase addressed the testing of the plans through a
series of training exercises that simulated real-life Olympic Security incidents. Plans
and preparations were either validated or revised as needed, during this phase.
Third, the Operational Phase was about actual implementation and execution of
those security plans.
I. Developmental Phase
The first step in the process was to lay out the hierarchy of command to have
a clear understanding of participating agencies' respective roles and inherent
responsibilities. This "Atlanta's Version of the Olympic Model," was called the
Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG). The OSSG was a quasi-official
organization of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials and ACOG
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security personnel involved in planning the Games. Figure 4 illustrates the "Atlanta




















Figure 4. The Atlanta Olympic Model Planning Structure.
Courtesy of the Atlanta Police Department.
At the top of the planning structure is the OSSG established on Septemb
11, 1991. The OSSG, comprised of over forty agency members, from the local,
er
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state, and federal law enforcement, was jointly chaired by both the Georgia
Commissioner of Public Safety, Colonel Sid Miles, and the Chief of the Atlanta
Police Department, Beverly Harvard.1 The OSSG's "ultimate responsibility" was for
the development and implementation of the public safety master security plan to
serve as a blueprint for agencies providing security services and for securing the
1996 Games by creating a safe and secure environment.
Other responsibilities were to:
Manage the Olympic Security Planning Coordination Committee
(OSPCC). This includes appointing agencies, reviewing and
approving all works of the OSPCC.
Insure coordinated efforts with the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic
Games (ACOG) on all public safety related security issues as it
pertained to the development of a comprehensive security plan for the
1996 Games.
• Authorize the formation of all subcommittee membership and
chairpersons.
• Establish a process of interaction with the media.
• Develop policies for resolving conflicts among the components of
the planning organization. The OSSG co-chairs were to set an
agenda for OSSG business and approve all requests for outside
support and services as they relate to the development of the master
plan.
Due to the OSSG's large membership and the need for effective decision-
making and conflict resolution, a smaller executive committee evolved, the Olympic
Security Planning Coordination Committee (OSPCC). The OSPCC was an
interagency group led by Major Jon Gordon of the Atlanta Police Department.
Major Gordon was in charge of Olympic Security Planning for the department. The
OSPCC managing board comprised of upper and middle managers from
participating public safety agencies.
The following responsibilities were assigned to the OSPCC. First, to
implement policy and assume responsibilities as directed by the OSSG. Second, to
manage the development of the public safety master plan subject to OSSG
oversight and third, to be responsible for managing the day-to-day security planning
for the 1996 Olympic Games. This included overseeing the work performed by the
nineteen subcommittees and the staff support arms referred to as the Integrated
Planning Group (IPG). Another responsibility included managing the conflict
resolution mechanism between venues, subcommittees, and the IPG. Developing
memos of understanding (MOU) with appropriate agencies, subject to approval by
the OSSG. The IPG is a multi-agency planning group with representatives from
several agencies involved in the Olympic Security Plan Development Process. The
IPG provided essential planning and research support to the entire Olympic
Security Planning Structure. It served as the integrating mechanism for the Olympic
Security Plan Development process. In accordance with policy set by the OSSG,
the OSPCC was to manage the Olympic Security Plan Development process. The
IPG operated as the staff-arm of the OSPCC and in accordance with the directives




A subcommittee was assigned to each of the nineteen identified key
responsibilities that law enforcement faced in planning security for the Olympics. A
subcommittee is a group of public safety planners from participating agencies that
were responsible for developing strategic and/or operational plans and procedures
for their respective areas of support and special operations. They also identified
resources required to support their plan.
The nineteen subcommittees were: Accreditation, Aviation, Communication,
Community Relation, Criminal Justice, Dignitary Protection, EOD/Bomb,
Infrastructure, Intelligence/Terrorism, International Entry, Intransit Security, Media,
Public Safety, Site Survey, Tactical, Traffic Control, Training, and Olympic Village.
Each of the nineteen subcommittees was responsible for developing a plan to
satisfy a particular critical function as indicated by the names of the subcommittees.
Once the subcommittee planning was completed; it was the responsibility of the
OSPCC, along with the IPG, to compile a comprehensive Master Security Plan.
Olympic Security Master Plan
The Master Security Plan served as a blueprint or guide on how the law
enforcement agencies were to provide a safe and secure environment for the 1996
Olympic Games. Its objective was to manage the design, development,
coordination, and implementation of the security system for the Games.
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Planners designed this blueprint by applying lessons learned from previous
Olympic Games to improve methods and operations for the 1996 event. The
Master Plan utilized a wealth of knowledge and experience from the FBI, USSS,
and the Department of Defense Office of Special Events who which experienced
special event planning and were willing to share its professional knowledge.
The Master Plan identified approximately eighty (80) sports, function, and
training venues where the presence of law enforcement personnel were required
during the Games. It was anticipated that in some cases, agencies with primary
operational responsibilities would have to augment their existing personnel through
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) or Manual Aid Agreements (MAA) with
secondary agencies in order to provide an adequate number of law enforcement
personnel to perform Olympic security functions. Additional personnel would be
derived from local law enforcement agencies around the state and as a last resort,
the US DOD.
Olympic venues requiring law enforcement assignments were assigned to
lead agencies on the basis of jurisdiction. These assigned agencies had jurisdiction
over the resolution of any public safety incidents that occurred therein except such
venue responsibility was delegated to another law enforcement agency; for
example, in an emergency response incident involving the Olympic family, the FBI
might assume jurisdiction.
The Master Plan outlined the role of ACOG and public agencies. On specific
Olympic Security functions, public agencies were to cooperate closely with ACOG
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in the delivery of public safety services. Besides being responsible for traditional
law enforcement duties which included but were not limited to; arrest situations,
emergency responses, criminal investigations, traffic control and others, there were
a number of additional significant functions that the agencies were to perform
throughout the Games. These functions were planned through OSSG Security
Planning Subcommittees. The functions were organized into two categories: those
conducted in preparation for the Olympic Games, and those conducted during the
Olympic Games.
Functions conducted in preparation for the 1996 Olympic Games included:
Accreditation, Media, Community Relations, Training, Site Survey and Olympic
Village, Infrastructure and Criminal Justice. Functions conducted during the Games
included: Fire and Rescue, Public Safety, Communications, International Entry,
Tactical, Aviation, EOD/Bomb Management, Intelligence Dignitary Protection, In
transit Security and Traffic.
ACOG Security Role
The Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) was included in the
planning structure because of its Olympic Security role. Although ACOG's role is
different from that of law enforcement, the need to coordinate and cooperate at all
phases of preparation and operations were essential. Besides, the organizing
committee was the source of much information by the law enforcement community
to facilitate its own preparations.
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At ACOG, the president, also serving as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
has two senior executive assistants and six vice-presidents. In addition, the Chief
Operations Officer (COO) reports to the CEO. Under the COO there are two
assistants, one deputy and seven officers in charge of administration, operations,
broadcasting, Games' services, management, sports, international organizations,
and others. The officer in charge of operations oversees Olympic Security.
However, the security function under operations is included along with other
functions such as operation management, Games support (accreditation, logistics,
medical, press operations and transportation) as well as technology, venue-based
planning, the Para-Olympic Games, and airport operations. The six major security
program components developed by ACOG consist of:
1. Resource Management




6. Athlete Delegation Security
Resource Management
Resource Management is the development and acquisition of all equipment
and services as well as personnel required to secure the Olympic Games.
Equipment and services include the Department of Defense (DOD) support,
237
sponsorships such as "the Sensormatic Electronics Corporation" consortium,2 and
other sources for equipment and resources.
The Sensormatic Electronics corporation was to provide a high-tech but low-
key electronic device to enable security officials to monitor every venue from a
central command post. The system was to be built into all Olympic Games
accreditation badges. In addition, the device provided closed-circuit cameras,
program management, infrastructure support, biometric access control at all athlete
villages, vehicle sanitization equipment and software for the ACOG Security
Command and Control Center.3
ACOG included in their planning a provision for the DOD Office of Special
Events, (OSE), to provide, install, maintain, and remove linear fencing, fence-based
intrusion detection alarm systems for all athletes' villages, surveillance devices,
communications equipments, access control turnstiles, crowd control/vehicle crash
barriers, x-ray machines, DOD equipment and portable secondary power sources.
Security personnel were to be drawn from the law enforcement community
outside the state of Georgia, ACOG staff and volunteers, contracted private
security, and as a last resort, military personnel from the United States Department
of Defense. James Christie stated, "The federal government has allocated $35
million to the DOD to assist in security. By US law, the military cannot be involved
in law enforcement, but it can carry out services such as bomb detection, inspection
of vehicles, and surveillance of venues."4 While normal policing was conducted by
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the over fifty local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, volunteers
performed less critical duties.5
As part of the planning ACOG officials confirmed the Pentagon's plan to
commit over 10,000 troops in security related positions during the Games. Assigned
to a special unit base at Fort McPherson and headed by Brigadier General Robert
Hicks Jr., the Olympic Joint Task Force coordinated all non-emergency military
support for the Games and planning for events that might have military personnel.6
Command and Control
ACOG anticipated this model center to be the primary vehicle used for
testing all systems and equipment before and during the Olympic Games beginning
mid-1994 through August 1996. The main ACOG Security Command Center was to
be located at ACOG Headquarters. All law enforcement and ACOG venue Security
Command Centers were co-located at each of the venues, to allow direct links to
the sophisticated communications network between venue command posts and the
ACOG Security Command Center. Also included was a direct link between the
ACOG Security Command Center and the law enforcement Joint Coordination
Center (JCC).
Access Control
Several levels of access control were planned to be used during the Games,
with the highest level being deployed at the Atlanta Athletes' Village. All other
sports and function venues' level of control were to be equipped with proven access
control systems and procedures to create a secure Olympic Games environment.
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Some of these systems and procedures include: magnetometer and x-ray
screening, contraband searches, limited entry turnstiles, fence-based intrusion
detection system with CCTV monitoring, biometric technology and vehicle
sanitization equipment.
Interagency Coordination
The planning allowed ACOG security staff to provide coordination and
cooperation through membership on the OSSG and OSPCC who in turn provided
oversight to the IPG and the various law enforcement subcommittees. In addition,
ACOG security staff was to notify the IPG of all ACOG inter-organizational venue
planning meetings to facilitate attendance by law enforcement planners and venue
commanders. During the Olympic Games period, coordination was to be facilitated
by the co-location of law enforcement and security personnel within venue
command posts and the presence of ACOG security personnel at the law
enforcement JCC and law enforcement personnel at the ACOG Security Command
and Control Center.
Crowd Control
ACOG security staff was to assume responsibility for enforcement of all
"house rules" within the venues and the general marshaling of crowds. This control
was to be accomplished through a well coordinated usher, security, and law
enforcement team at each venue. ACOG planned to use between 6-8,000 private
security officers at a 3:1000 ratio security guard to spectators; 2,000 Security Team
Program (STP) Volunteers and 5-6,000 regular security volunteers. Approximately
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33% of the ushers were to be volunteers and about 67% to be paid ACOG staff,
utilizing a 4:1000 usher to spectator ratio.7
Athlete Delegation Security
The importance of the athletes' security in the overall success of the Olympic
Games, since the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, cannot be overemphasized.
ACOG Security Program planned to divide athlete security into five basic
components: Threat Assessment, In-transit Security, Athletes' Villages, Sports
Venues, and Training Venues.
The Intelligence Specialized Management Center (ISMC) was to develop
Threat Assessment and disseminate as necessary. Intransit Security was to be
provided by ACOG security personnel equipped with two-way radios aboard each
bus transporting Olympic athletes and with the assistance of the Intransit Security
SMC, provide police escort for the buses to travel between sports and training
venues and the athletes' village. As reported in Ebony magazine, "perhaps the most
comprehensive security apparatus has been devised, consisting of 22,000 security
personnel, made up of Local, State and Federal Law Enforcement agencies,
including the FBI, the CIA, the SS, and units of the US military, to provide "around"
the clock surveillance and armed security patrols to be deployed to secure the
Olympic Village, athletes' residents, and other critical sites."8
The Olympic Village was the focal point for the entire 1996 Olympic Games.
Accordingly, its vulnerability and protection was a major concern. The Village
Subcommittee's primary responsibility was to develop (in close coordination with
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ACOG), a comprehensive public safety/security plan relative to the operation of the
primary Olympic Village at Georgia Institute of Technology. The Village
Subcommittee would not be operational during the Games, however, Village
Subcommittee personnel were to be available for consultation on Village topics.
Coordination of planning for the Village was to be conducted by the state of
Georgia, through Georgia Tech and the Georgia State Patrol. The Olympic Village
Subcommittee's four general operation concepts included:
1. The development of a comprehensive public safety/security
plan for the Olympic Village in close coordination with ACOG.
2. Identification of the necessary security related resources to
support the Village operation plan.
3. Identification of all tasks necessary to implement the plan.
4. Assigning tasks to individual representative agencies,
monitoring progress, assessing, and coordinating the
developed plans with the Village Commanders.
Agency Planning Office
The third organization included in the planning structure was the Agency
Planning Office (APO). According to the Olympic Master Security Plan, this office
could only be established at the discretion of an agency's Chief Executive Officer.
The APO was established for the Atlanta Police Department, the State of Georgia
with fourteen different agencies led by the Georgia Department of Public Safety, the
Chatham County Police Department, the Clayton County Police Department and
Sheriff's Office, the Columbus Police Department, the Conyers Police Department,
the Dekalb County Police Department and Sheriff's Office, the Federal Bureau of
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Investigation, the Fulton County Police Department and Sheriffs Office, the Hall
County Sheriff's Office, the Muscogee County Sheriff's Office, the Savannah Police
Department, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the United States
Coast Guard, and the United States Secret Services. As an interagency group,
their duties were to coordinate Olympic planning and operational activities. In
addition, they were to have direct input into the planning process as to the other
agency's role in Olympic Public Safety Operations. The primary work period for
APO was scheduled between mid 1994 to mid 1996. The first major document
jointly produced by OSSG and APO planners was the Olympic Master Security
Plan.
Atlanta Police Department (APD)
The Atlanta Police APO was the primary organizational unit responsible for
developing and implementing approval plans supporting the 1996 Olympic Games.
Establishing an APO, outlining its role and directing its normal duties, were critical
first steps in preparing for the Olympic Games.
The Atlanta Police Olympic agency Planning Office although informally
functioning since September 1992, was officially established in June 1993 by a
written special order signed by Beverly Harvard, the Atlanta Police Chief. Under
the command of a deputy chief, the planning staff consisted of one major, one
lieutenant, two sergeants, eleven officers and an administrative assistant. The
APD's APO staff acquired most of their knowledge through consultations with
243
professionals from previous special events. For example, the FBI, U.S. Secret
Service and the Department of Defense Office of Special Events (OSE) provided an
after-action report and other planning documents, and shared their expertise about
both cooperation and coordination as well as inter-agency planning.
It should be noted that police planners from New South Wales, Australia
were actually assigned to the Atlanta Police APO in the months preceding the
Olympic Games. Additionally, officials of the APD prior to and during the Olympic
Games included planners from Nagano, Japan, host city for the 1988 Winter
Olympic Games and members from the Salt Lake City law enforcement community,
host of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. Their contribution and feedback were part
of the learning process.
Extensive research of past Olympic Games and major international special
events were conducted by APD planners. The Olympic venue security model is a
good example of material synthesized from previous special events and modified to
satisfy the 1996 Games" requirements. The model also provided a generic outline
for developing operational plans as it relates to the Agency Command Center
(ACC) and the Joint Coordination Center (JCC).
Basically, as a host city, the APD would be responsible for all Olympic sports
and functions venues within Atlanta City limits. Most of these were located within
the Olympic Ring which is an imaginary circle with 1.5 miles radius (figure 2, page
209) extending from the Georgia World Congress Center (GWCC) through the
heart of the city. The APD's plan was to coordinate the Traffic Specialized
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Management Center (TSMC), the EOD Specialized Management Center, and the
Joint Coordination Center (JCC). The department also intended to provide
personnel to all other SMCs in addition to overseeing the numerous sports, training
and function venues for which it was primarily responsible.
The State of Georgia plan was to coordinate activities outside the city of
Atlanta such as the Aviation and Intransit Security Specialized Management
Centers. The state would also provide personnel to all other SMCs in addition to
overseeing the numerous sports, training, and function venues for which it was
primarily responsible.
Because the venues were spread out geographically around the
southeastern states, where jurisdictional responsibilities overlapped, joint working
groups from both teams were to be formed. For example, a number of venues
located inside the city of Atlanta were actually on the state of Georgia property.
Consequently, these venues were the responsibility of the state's law enforcement.
The FBI was the lead agency for tactical situations related to terrorism since they
have primary jurisdiction over terrorist acts.
Establishment of Agency Command Center
With over forty other agencies involved with providing Olympic security
services at the local, state, and federal levels, planners needed an understanding of
how the APD would integrate its operations with the rest of security providers.
The necessary support mechanisms could not be planned for, tested, and
implemented without a firm understanding of the APD's Olympic "chain of
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command," its security roles and responsibilities. The mechanism for initiating the
APD's Olympic security operation was its Agency Command Center (ACC). It
served two purposes; 1.) to facilitate the management and coordination of all the
APD's Olympic security operations and 2.) to serve as the focal point of the APD's
















Figure 5. APD Agency Command Center (ACC) Chain Of Command
The ACC figure 5, comprised of three groups: The Olympic Command Staff, the
Operations Group and the ACC Support Group. The Command Staff and
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Operations Group, were responsible for deployment, operations and recovery of the
Olympic Discretionary Forces (ODF) and Olympic resources. The Operations Group
consisted primarily of Logistics, Communications, Venues, and Special
Management Centers (SMCs), Traffic Management, Public Safety, Media, Protocol
and Employee Transportation. The Support Group was responsible for providing
administrative support to the Operations Group. The ACC was managed and
operated by the administrative arm of the Operations Group and the Support Group
under a commander responsible for managing ACC support operations allowing the
Command Staff and Operations Group to focus on Olympic Security Field
Operations. Included were the following functions: Information Management,
Manpower Scheduling, Equipment Support, Records, Time Keeping, Liaison to
Joint Coordination Center (JCC) and Liaison to Atlanta Committee for the Olympic
Games (ACOG).
The ACC staff handled all Olympic related functions, events, incidents, and
administrative paperwork. Therefore, to understand the type of Olympic Security
functions to be performed by the ODF was critical at the planning phase.
ACC Operations relied on computer technology to support internal staff
functions as well as external security operations. The Atlanta Police Department
intended to use three specialized computer applications during the planning and
operational phases of the Games. The three applications were an Auto-Cad




This system produces venue drawings and site plans to enable Olympic
competition and cultural event tracking, event simulations, assignment locations
and traffic management plans. This data was vital to law enforcement venue
planners as well as for any special law enforcement teams that would be operating
in the venues. The venue and map files created by this system, provided valuable
support to law enforcement, traffic management and ACOG transportation planners.
An in-house mapping developed by planners enabled the APO to receive
regular updates of ACOG's computerized venue drawings and maps. These
mapping section was created to support the ADP's map-based Police Command
and Control System (PCCS). It allows APD's venue planners and commanders to
plot large scale venue drawings, which graphically displayed how ACOG was
organizing a venue site.
Police Command and Control System (PCCS)
The PCCS was developed as a tool to assist the APD's commanders in
managing the department's resources in order to provide a normal level of police
services, while accomplishing its Olympic mission during the 1996 Games. The
PCCS consisted of two components: the Central Manager, and the Field Manager.
The Central Manager was located in the ACC and used for situation display,
incident management, scheduling and timekeeping. The Field Manager was used




The need to share pertinent information across agency lines among the
numerous participating law enforcement agencies providing Olympic security
services was paramount. This was to be accomplished through an incident tracking
system. It was the one common thread that linked the Olympic law enforcement
operation center together. This system allowed law enforcement agencies to access
the information by connecting the system's terminal to a network modem, and
staffing a position in the JCC.
The APD's Agency Command Center was to provide technical support of the
Incident Tracking System for APD users, while the DOD Office of Special Events
(OSE) were to provide technical support for use of the system at the JCC.
To identify personnel requirements for providing normal police services
during the Games, the APO prepared a comprehensive assessment of existing
personnel allocations in the department. Alternative staffing strategies were then
mapped to support executive level decisions regarding staffing for normal public
safety mission as against Olympic security mission.
To evaluate work loads based on calls for services and investigative case
loads, all officers were required to work a minimum of six days per week, twelve
hours a day. The APD recognized that employees to be assigned to specialized
functions needed additional training or equipment. This was especially true for the
tactical, bombs/EOD, aviation and motorcycle functions. The FBI, United States
Secret Service, ATF, and the Department of Defense provided local law
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enforcement agencies with many specialized training opportunities. These included
practical exercises, classroom instruction, and the preparation of training video's as
will be discussed in the Experimental Phase.
II. EXPERIMENTAL PHASE
The reliability of the Developmental Phase outcome was dependent upon the
identification of important training requirements at the Experimental Phase. The
training function is primarily concerned with the identification and documentation of
training peculiars to the 1996 Olympic Games, and the facilitation of the scheduling
and delivery of training necessary to meet those needs in a timely manner. These
training requirements received attention during the transitional period.
The Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG) Training Subcommittee was
responsible for identifying Olympic related training requirements for all aspects of
Olympic Security Operations. The Training Subcommittee Membership included
subject matters and training experts from participating public safety agencies. The
helpful work product of the Training Subcommittee was the Master Training
Calendar. The Calendar listed all scheduled public safety training courses at the
local, state, and federal level that were available to participating public safety
agencies. In addition, the Training Subcommittee developed ten Olympic lesson
plans and fifteen Olympic training videos for use by OSSG agencies.
A law enforcement agency may choose from the following venue training
topics, to train their personnel; Law Enforcement Section Commanders were to take
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an assessment of their training and communicate their training needs to their
agency. Their agency then coordinated with the Training Subcommittee.
The listed training topics and training exercise were consistent with the
recommendations of the Training Subcommittee.
Training Topics
- Accreditation - Diplomatic Immunity




- Courtesy / Professionalism
- Crowd Control / Mass Arrest
- Cultural Awareness
- Lost and Missing Persons
- Media Police
- Enforcement Policies &
Procedures
- FAA Briefing (Security Badges)
- First Aid / CPR
- Hazardous Material Incidents
- Helicopter Land Procedures
- Hostage Situations
- Laws and Ordinances: Federal,
State, County and City
- OlympicSecurity Organization
Structure: Agency Chain of
Command
- Role of ACOG Security
- Peaceful Demonstrations - Political Asylum/Defection
- Radio Communications - Screening Procedure




- Table Top Exercises - Command Post Exercises
- Field Test Exercises - Seminars
-Venue Orientations: Policies and Procedures, Role of ACOG
Security, Role of Law Enforcement Security.
Two training packages were designed at both the agency and interagency
levels, although the subject matters were the same. Coordination of the training
function was provided by the Atlanta Police Department. The training general
operational concepts were as follows:
• Research training programs and packages from previous international
special events.
• Meet with individuals who previously coordinated international special
events training activities.
• Conduct an assessment of training requirements across agencies and
functions.
• Conduct an assessment of training market resources.
• Develop a training plan and translate it into a planned curriculum.
• Identify and acquire necessary resources to accomplish a training
plan.
• Identify and train instructors to teach courses in their functional area.
• Develop and produce training material to support training activities.
• Coordinate, facilitate, and conduct training whenever appropriate.
• Maintain a comprehensive log for all Olympic-related training
activities completed by participating agencies.
• Develop a handbook for public safety security personnel assigned to
the 1996 Olympic Games.
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The purpose of the Table Top Exercise was for participants to evaluate
plans, policies, procedures, resolve questions of coordination, and assignment of
responsibilities.
Table Top Exercises were conducted by representatives from the
Department of Defense Office of Special Events (OSE). It was a structured
dialogue designed to clarify what was known and/or unknown about the topic of
discussion. Key planners and operations personnel were presented with situations
and scenarios that were designed to clarify Olympic policies, procedures and
responsibilities. The key point was that responses must be based on what was
written in the plans.
Command Post Exercise
These exercises involved testing Olympic security preparations at the system
level. For example, OSE professionals such as Dr. Bellavita, conducted virtually all of
the Table Top and Command Post Exercises for the Olympic law enforcement
community. Command Post Exercises (CPE) were designed to conduct scenario
driven exercises to identify possible problems with policies and procedures used to
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coordinate an agency(s) action during operations. It involved commanders and mid-
level personnel. Messages are directed specifically by radio, telephone, or computer to
individuals or agencies who are then responsible for coordinating their responses with
other participants. Command Post exercises were conducted for participating agencies
in the area of traffic control and command center operations. The Nuclear Defense
Agency also conducted a two-day Command Post exercise that focused on the law
enforcement community's response to a radiological incident.
Douglas Pasternak and Jennifer Seter, noted that "US Counter-terrorism
Specialists were involved in two training exercises: the first exercise presented law
enforcement agents with a terrorist scenario that included the discovery of a
radiological explosive device at the Georgia Dome, and the detonation of a second
bomb at Stone Mountain Park, 16 miles east of Atlanta."9 The second exercise
"code named Olympic Charlie, presented a scenario that involved the release of
lethal VX nerve gas during the Olympics."10
Over twenty-five rigorous Command Post exercises required reactions to all
kinds of emergencies including; a bomb discovery, defection, food poisoning, fire,
and a radical fundamentalist group demanding the release of six prisoners in Israel,
just to mention a few. These simulated exercises were an attempt to put theory into
practice thus enabling participants to be familiar with other agencies' operations. It




These exercises were intended to evaluate the actual operational capability
of organizations' Olympic plans in an interactive manner. It provided an opportunity
to integrate Olympic plans, personnel, and equipment.
The 1996 Olympic Games Field Training exercises were conducted by
representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). It involved close
coordination with the organizing committees who were testing their own preparation
as well. A Field Training exercise tested an actual field response to a scenario
deploying personnel and equipment in real time. Two Field Training exercises were
conducted by the FBI. One involved the Olympic Stadium, the MARTA rail line, and
a city water station. The other exercise involved the airport, the Athletes' Village,
and satellite sports venues. According to Ron Martz, "rather than showcase their
forces with extensive exercises, Atlanta officials kept most of their exercises under
tight wraps."11 Melinda Liu et a!., states:
With the Olympics only three months away, federal authorities are
building what may well be the biggest counter-terrorist screen in
history. The force includes the FBI, the CIA, the Secret Service,
Local and State Police, and US Military Units. A training exercise
two weeks ago forced field commanders to reach a nerve-gas
attack and a plane hijacking simultaneously; another test
simulated the detonation of a small nuclear device.12
Other training methods involved seminars. These training methods were
given by outside agencies to provide information on dignitary protection (US Secret
Services), tactical response and incident command (FBI), diplomatic immunity and
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asylum (DOS), and venue operations (ACOG). Those involved in this training were
Olympic Commanders and Olympic planners.
Ron Martz alleged that Olympic Village staffers were introduced to "the harsh
and often frightening realities of chemical agents and other hazardous materials
during a closed-door seminar conducted by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)."13 The seminar included topics such as basic introduction to
chemical agent and other hazardous materials, characteristics of hazardous
materials, signs and symptoms of exposure, short and long-term effect of exposure
and treatment.
On the agency level, each law enforcement agency was responsible for the
Olympic training of its agency personnel. In the case of the APD, the Training
Academy and APO coordinated the preparation and conducting of Olympic training.
The Atlanta Police Department
The department began conducting Olympic training with the department's
personnel two years prior to the opening of the Games. There were different
training methods, and numerous training aids used with the staffs of the Training
Academy and the Agency Planning Office (APO).
To cover the unique duties and responsibilities associated with Olympic
security operation, the APD first introduced Olympic-related topics, into the in-
service training cycle as parts of its yearly mandated curriculum. In addition to
formal classes, including Table Top, Command Post, Field Exercises and Seminars
(earlier covered), the APD made use of home study materials, roll call videos, and
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the Law Enforcement Handbook (LEH). The LEH, which reinforced the training,
was provided to all APD sworn officers for quick reference to operational and other
Olympic related information that they might need during Olympic operations.
Subjects included in the curriculum were; Asylum/Defection, Diplomatic
Immunity, Language Services, Media Relations, Intelligence, Bombs/EOD,
Lost/Missing persons, Dignitary Protection, and Accreditation. These areas were
included in the department's annual training to ensure department-wide awareness
of the unique nature of hosting a major international special event.
Annual training is mandated training that all law enforcement officers must
attend each year in orders to be certified as Peace Officers in the State. It was
developed primarily for the first line supervisors, officers, and investigators. At the
APD's Training Academy, the staff of the APO in 1995 annual training classes
presented an overview of the 1996 Olympic Games and its impact on the personal
and professional lives of its employees. A total of twenty hours of Olympic-related
subjects were taught during annual training in 1996.
APD personnel also took advantage of a number of outside training
opportunities prior to the Games. The ATF, the FBI and the US Secret Service also
provided substantial training opportunities for local law enforcement officers.
More than 4,500 local, state, and federal officers assigned to Olympic
venues under State Law Enforcement Control took a week-long crash course in
Georgia law concerning guarding the Games at the State Public Safety Training
Center in Forsyth County.
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Study shows that the officers were being trained at a rate of "500 per week"
at a total cost of "$ 600,000 to the state."14 Among that group were 700 officers
from eleven different agencies, authorized by Vice President Al Gore, after Olympic
organizers and state officials expressed concerns about the assigned number of
security personnel. All 700 were sworn in as Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI)
Agents, giving them dual state and federal authority. Over one hundred were
assigned to the APD and received additional training there.15
The study concluded that many of the plain clothes Federal agents were to
team up with state and city officers to form two person ID teams, circulated in and
around the venues to help spot potential problems and defuse them before they
escalated. Due to the different jurisdictions of the agencies involved, Major Mile and
Police Chief Harvard coordinated through a cooperative effort an additional training
classes before the Games, to help their officers spot situations that could lead to
terrorist incidents. "They will have to learn that a strong briefcase or equipment bag
could contain plastic explosives, that an illegally parked car could contain a bomb,
and that the well-dressed but unusually nervous visitor could be an international
terrorist."16
State law enforcement officials also conducted extensive helicopter
exercises around Olympic venues to familiarize air crews with sites they may have
to fly into during the Games. The venues included those in Downtown Atlanta, as
well as Wolf Creek in South Fulton County, Atlanta Beach in Clayton County, Stone
Mountain, the International Horse Park in Conyers, Lake Lanier and the University
258
of Georgia. Involved in the exercises were helicopters form the military as well as
local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Announcement of the exercises
was made by State Officials to warn the public of the noise especially at night,
explained Gary McConnel.17
Over 45,000 ACOG volunteers studied their Games' time operational
materials, assigned uniforms and underwent an extensive training process. The
Olympic Security Volunteers were to serve basically as "the eyes and ears for the
police during the Olympics."18 Instead of having multiple firms supplying up to
8,000 guards, as in Los Angeles, ACOG proposed a single major firm that would
supply fewer but better-trained and qualified guards. They were to be
supplemented by 2,000 volunteer international police officers and up to 6,000 other
volunteers at a lower security level.19
According to Bill Rathburn, "You get better quality using volunteers, than
poorly paid security guards who may not report for work because they have no
long-term investment in the job."20
The volunteers were screened and interviewed before undergoing strenuous
sessions of general training to graduate to specific venue training, according to the
venue, they were to be assigned. They were to work under direct supervision of
their venue commanders or supervisors. Mock exercise training of investigators,
protective personnel, and volunteers ranged from a mini-library on terrorism
maintained by the OIC to orientation video packages providing checkpoint staff with
training in questioning techniques, identification alteration clues, smuggling tricks
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and personality profiles of typical terrorists. More detailed training at the end
allowed volunteers to become familiar with the venue management team, venue
locations and procedures, and job specific instructions. Venue specific information
package accompanied the venue tours and volunteers were equipped with venue
pocket guides to use as quick reference during the Games.
The developmental and experimental phases were put to test when Olympic
sponsor-United Parcel Services (UPS), conducted a security test on July 19th in
which a fake bomb was delivered to the Georgia World Congress Center (GWCC),
the site of six Olympic sports, without ACOG notification. The package, which
contained a wired device, was detected by Olympic guards after passing through
the UPS checkpoint. Part of the building was evacuated. According to reports, the
incidents infuriated ACOG officials.21 "It caused a lot of unnecessary anxiety," as
was confirmed by ACOG spokeswoman Lyn May.
III. OPERATIONAL PHASE
The 1996 Centennial Olympic Games security planning was operational on
July 5,1996 immediately following the opening of the Olympic Village and the arrival
of athletes in Atlanta. The pulse of Olympic Security at the Operational Phase adds
to the excitement and anticipation of what planners had worked towards for more
than five years.
Security provision at the Operational Phase was based on an interagency
Operations-Conceptual Model as illustrated in the "Olympic Security Operational
Structure." Figure 6 shows how the many different agencies at the local, state, and
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Figure 6. Olympic Security Operational Structure
Courtesy of Atlanta Police Department
In the United States there is a very definite division of federal, local, and
military law enforcement responsibilities. These divisions are outlined in the
Constitution of the United States as well as the constitutions of the individual states.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the protection of life and
property and the maintenance of public order are primarily the responsibility of the
state and local government. Essentially, the security structure reflected a
confederation of organizations committed by statute and charter to satisfy Olympic
public safety tasks. Jurisdiction was the first criteria in determining lead agency
status over a venue or appropriate agency to provide Olympic Security Services.
Operational Components
One of the structural components that went into action during the 1996
Olympic Games was the Agency Command Centers (ACC). The ACC was the heart
of the Command and Control of the over forty public safety and security agencies.
All Olympic-related functions, incidents, events, and administrative paper work were
handled by ACC staff. Olympic Village Operations and Venue Command Posts
were all located within ACOG security. These functions were all within the
jurisdiction of their respective agency. The Joint Coordination Center (JCC)
received and disseminated information to and from all public safety security
agencies. The JCC was not a command center. Its purpose was to maximize the
direct and immediate access to pertinent information in order to facilitate the highest
degree of coordination between participating law enforcement agencies. The
Hartsfield Coordination Center (HCC), dealt with the safety and security of athletes
and dignitaries in and out of Hartsfield airport. Since no one agency single-
handedly managed multiple operational functions, the Specialized Management
Centers (SMC) were created to combine agency resources thus addressing such
crucial areas as: Air Support; Traffic; In-Transit Security; Dignitary Protection; Bomb
Technicians and Olympic Intelligence Center.
Air Support was managed from the Aviation Management Center (AMC).
The AMC was responsible for surveillance and related tasks such as traffic and in-
transit security between the airport, Olympic Village, training and competition sites
and the transporting of bomb and tactical personnel when needed. It was also
responsible for the management of Dignitary Protection. Because of the unique
overlapping of responsibilities, dignitary protection, in-transit security and traffic
functions were co-located. However, the operations of these areas were from
strategic off-site locations. Bomb technicians employed sophisticated equipment on
the leading edge of technology such as; explosive Total Contaminant Vessels
(TCVs), Golden X-Ray Machines, Post-Blast, Investigation Equipment, complete
demolition systems for electric firing and many others. These groups were based
throughout the security network and were directed by the Bomb Management
Center (BMC). The Olympic Intelligence Center (OIC) was processed in a multi-
agency center. It received real-time classified intelligence from around the world as
well as direct leads from the more than 120 undercover investigators throughout the
state of Georgia.
The IOC had professional liaison officers from state and federal agencies
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along with a selected team of analytical experts who were responsible for the daily-
unclassified threat bulletins for each command center. Another indispensable
component to the entire structure was Tactical Operations. Joint exercises featured
a variety of situations that could be faced. These efforts allowed managers from
different agencies to perfect coordination of resources to confront the demands of
each crisis. There also were the Satellite Joint Operation Centers (SJOC), at each
of the nine locations outside of the Atlanta region that hosted Olympic events -
Gainesville, Savannah, Columbus, and Athens, in Georgia; Miami and Orlando, in
Florida, Birmingham, in Alabama, Washington, D.C. and the Ocoee River in
Cleveland, Tennessee. Detailed operational functions of these components will be
covered as it is applicable in this chapter.
Within the "Olympic Ring" inside the city of Atlanta, were eleven competition
venues and a variety of other Olympic-related activities including the Athletes'
Village, the IOC Hotel, and Centennial Olympic Park. However, the APD shared
responsibility for providing Olympic security services with a number of different law
enforcement agencies. For example, the Athletes' Village, Olympic Center, Georgia
State University and Centennial Olympic Park were inside the Olympic Ring but on
state property. Consequently, the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command
(SOLEC) had primary responsibility for venue security at these locations, similarly,
the Atlanta University Center, which was originally the responsibility of the Atlanta
Police Department. The three venues were delegated to the Fulton County Sheriffs
Office as was the IOC Hotel. The Atlanta PD was the lead agency for traffic
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management on the surface street inside the Olympic Ring but not for the interstate
highways or the MARTA rapid rail system.
Law Enforcement Versus ACOG Security Role
The two entities responsible for operating the venue sites were the
organizing committee (ACOG) and the law enforcement agencies. The relationship
between the two was much the same as was between other private security
providers and public law enforcement agencies. The relationship was an
interdependent one, but the role of each was distinct. Effective cooperation and
coordination between law enforcement and ACOG Security was predicated on a
clear delineation of roles and responsibilities as illustrated in Appendix B. This
delineation can be summarized as "inside and outside" venue roles.
ACOG Security Roles
During the venue's security operational period, the law enforcement agency
with security jurisdiction within an Olympic venue was responsible for traditional law
enforcement duties including, but not limited to, all arrest situations, criminal
investigations, crowd/demonstration control, emergency public safety response,
bombs/EOD, dignitary protection, air support, tactical response, traffic control on
public streets and general assistance to private security providers.
The Law Enforcement Venue Commanders were primarily responsible in the
case of any public emergency or public safety incident that occurred at a venue




The lighting of the Olympic flame, in any host city, marks the official
commencement of the Olympic Games. According to Hill (1996); "The Olympic
torch is a modern invention, dating only from 1936."22 Study shows that in ancient
Greece, a sacred truce was called to enable athletes to compete peacefully at the
Olympic Games. Before the Games, runners-called "heralds of peace," traveled to
Greece proclaiming the beginning of the truce and issuing the clarion call to the
Games. Following the symbolism of a torch lit in Olympia, Greece by the rays of the
sun, the torch relay has preceded every Olympic Games since the custom was
revived in 1936.23
The security of the Olympic Torch Relay began in April 27, 1996 when the
Olympic Torch arrived in Los Angeles from Greece- where the flame is historically
ignited at Mt. Olympia. At the L.A. Coliseum, thousands of spectators watched as
ACOG President and CEO Billy Payne received the flame from the Greek high
priestess and lit a special cauldron to launch the US portion of the relay. The flame
traveled through forty-two states and Washington, D.C., in 15,000 circuitous miles.
It covered counties, major cities and state capitals of America. The eighty-four day
relay, culminating July 19,1996 at the opening ceremonies in Atlanta involved more
than 10,000 torchbearers which included 5,500 individuals selected through a
program developed by the Coca-Cola Company, the official sponsor of the Torch
Relay, 2,000 Olympians and others selected by ACOG and the United States
Olympic Committee (USOC).24
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The logistics for the relay were intimidating. Crowd, traffic, and possible
sabotage were the primary concerns. ACOG, Coca-Cola and the State of Georgia
Olympic Law Enforcement Command were jointly responsible for ensuring that the
torch arrived on schedule for the lighting of the Centennial Olympic Cauldron. The
general route of the caravan was determined by ACOG, and Coca-Cola who plotted
the detailed route which included traveling on horseback, canoe, steamboat and
sailboat.
Most of traffic and crowd control coordination with local communities began a
week to ten days prior to the torch arrival in Metropolitan Atlanta. In the early days
of the Torch Relay, some of the law enforcement officials, most of whom were state
troopers, were spread all across the country to assist in coordinating the Torch
Relay with local law enforcement jurisdictions.
In preparation for the challenge as the Olympic torch moved through Metro
Atlanta on its final two days en route to the Olympic Stadium, the entire contingency
of forty-six state law enforcement personnel assigned to protect the flame during its
cross-country relay, were made available to run with the torchbearers thus
preventing photographers and enthusiastic spectators from stepping into the
torchbearer's path.
Rafer Johnson, a 1964 gold medallist became the first US runner among the
10,000 Olympic Torch Relay team members who were designated to carry the flame
from L.A. to Atlanta for the "Opening Ceremony."25 The bearer of the final Olympic
torch as reported by Steve Wulf, was a "closely guarded secret."26 The climax of
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the torch lighting came when the torch was handed over to Muhammad Ali, who was
described as "the surprise and inspired choice to light the Olympic Cauldron."27
Ali, a world renowned and famous athlete who had won the light-heavyweight
boxing gold medal in Rome, bravely with his trembling arm, ignited the wick, leaving
the over eighty-three thousand crowd from around the world with great joy and
emotions.
The successful Olympic Torch Relay from the Los Angeles Coliseum, to the
lighting of the cauldron at Atlanta Olympic Stadium July 19, 1996, was due in-part
to advanced work coordination of the 46 officers assigned to the relay security by
the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command (SOLEC), headed by Gary
McConnell.28 It was also through joint cooperative efforts by all the local law
enforcement personnel throughout thousands of the police jurisdictions. According
to McConnell, there were no "threats or any real serious criminal activity toward the
torch or the torch relay group."29
Accreditation and Access Control
Part of the security efforts to deter or prevent terrorism, sabotage or random
violence during the 1996 Olympic Games, was through strict access control of all
venues and Olympic facilities. As a result, over 40,000 Olympic staff and
volunteers, 10,000 athletes, 15,000 media representatives, including Olympic
families, contractors and providers went through background screening in order to
be issued an accreditation card. The development of this credential system by the
Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG), was for the purpose of 1.)
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Identification, 2.) Controlling access of authorized persons into ACOG controlled
facilities, and 3.) Limiting access to restricted areas within ACOG controlled
facilities. The process of obtaining such a credential was called accreditation.
Accreditation was essentially the process of determining whether an
individual was qualified to have full or partial access to Olympic-related venues and
properties. Although managed by ACOG, government law enforcement agencies
played an important support role in the accreditation process by accessing
exclusive information- criminal history, intelligence etc. and contributing it in a
sanitized form to assist ACOG in making accreditation decisions. The State of
Georgia through the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) and the Georgia Crime
Information Center (GCIC), managed the input of law enforcement information into
the accreditation process.
All persons working within an ACOG-controlled facility were required to have
in their possession the proper ACOG issued credential. This included all law
enforcement personnel assigned to work inside an ACOG controlled facility. It
should be noted that all law enforcement personnel were exempted from a
background check since a background check was a condition of employment in
their respective agencies.
The Accreditation Badge, an ACOG issued credential figure 7, consisted of a
category code which identified, for example, APD personnel as law enforcement, a
venue code which identified the venue(s) they were allowed to access, the zones
within a venue for which entry had been pre-approved, the credential holder's
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name, a photograph, and their agency. In addition to a photograph, the
accreditation card had several words or numbers to further identify the bearer. This
included large color-coded letters that automatically identified the person by



































Figure 7. The Accrediation Badge.
Courtesy of Atlanta Police Department
The Olympic ID card or accreditation card, according to Martz, "in what
Atlanta Olympic Security Chief Bill Rathburn says "[was the most sophisticated
electronic security technology in the history of the Olympic Games.]"30 Known as
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the "ID3D Handkey Hand Identify Verifier,"31 or hand scanner. This device was
used to control access to high security areas such as the athletes' village and the
command center for the ACOG.
The new high-security tempering and counterfeiting device, is part of an
emerging system of automated identification technologies known as "biometrics."32
Developed by the "Recognition Systems of Campbell, California," this device "was
shown in a 1991 test by Scondi National Laboratories" to be the fastest and a 99.9
percent or better accuracy rate. These high-tech systems were tested extensively
in the laboratory as well as during a live audition at the Atlanta Sports '95
competition according to Paul Tarricone.33
Biometrics, according to officials of the Security Industry Association, "uses
unique individual physiological or behavioral characteristics to verify identity."34
Among the "physical characteristics that can be used to accurately identify an
individual because they remain relatively stable and are unique are fingerprints,
voice prints, palm prints, hand geometry and retinal blood vessel patterns."35
Bill Wilson described the scanner as capable of taking a three-dimensional
reading of an individual's hand, and then compares it to a master measurement
stored in an individual machine, a master computer, or in a microchip on an ID card.
For the Olympics, the master measurement was retained in a microchip in
individual identification cards. In the process of accessing the venues, if the hand
in the machine failed to match the measurement in the microchip, access was
denied.36
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Due to the scope of the accreditation process and the time constraints, four
accreditation centers were activated to facilitate the accreditation application
process. The four centers were: 1) The Main Accreditation Center, 2) The Athletes'
Accreditation Center, 3) The IOC Accreditation Center, and 4.) The Savannah
Accreditation Center. As a single-use facility, the Main Accreditation Center (MAC)
was located in Downtown Atlanta on Peachtree Street. It functioned as the primary
accreditation center for volunteers, vendors, staff and others associated with the
Olympic Games. The Athletes' Accreditation Center (AAC), located at the eastern
hangar of Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, functioned as the primary
accreditation center for athletes, trainers, coaches, and others associated with the
athletes. The IOC accreditation Center (IOCAC) located within the Atlanta Marriott
Marquis, the Olympic Family hotel, functioned as the primary accreditation center
for the Olympic Family. While the Savannah Accreditation Center (SAC) and
Ocoee Accreditation Center (OAC) located at the Savannah Airport, and Tennessee
respectively, functioned as the primary accreditation center for all Olympic Games
accreditation in Savannah, Georgia, and Ocoee, Tennessee.
Access Control and Screening Point Security
The purpose of access control was to establish guidelines for managing
access into and within ACOG's operated facilities during the exclusive use period.
Access and Screening point security involved spectator access points, other access
points including athletes, VIP's, media etcetera and deliveries which included
equipment, vendor goods and mail. Only ticketed spectators and or accredited
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individuals were allowed entry into venues or other access controlled areas.
Access controllers manually search hand-carried items and utilized "magnetometers
and handwands"37 to screen spectators and accredited individuals for prohibited
items prior to entry being allowed. Access control officers were assigned to monitor
magnetometer alarm signals, while the access control supervisors were positioned
in close proximity to respond to problems or to assist as required.
Law enforcement personnel assigned to venue access control points were to
provide assistance to ACOG personnel, upon request, with any accreditation
matters that may involve a violation of a criminal statute. Law enforcement interest
in access control within a ACOG venue as stated in their handbook, was from a
"public safety" standpoint to insure only authorized persons were in an ACOG
venue. All persons without a ticket accessing an ACOG facility or restricted area
were required to wear and properly display an ACOG issued credential. The
credential was subject to examination by law enforcement personnel and authorized
security personnel on demand.
In some instances, "day passes" were issued to those individuals who
arrived at the venue without a credential. Those individuals must have been pre-
approved or otherwise accredited. Day passes were coded to indicate the date for
which the day pass was to be valid, and were venue and date specific with the
bearer's name visible. Day passes were to be requested through the Venue
Manager and distributed at the venue's Accreditation Help Desk. The Venue
Security Manager was to aware of the valid code for the day pass for each day.
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Information received by law enforcement personnel regarding lost,
misplaced, stolen, or confiscated ACOG issued credentials were to be reported to
an ACOG security supervisor through the officer's chain of command for action to
prevent its unauthorized use in the future. The credential could be invalidated by
ACOG only. Should individuals attempt to gain access using an altered or
counterfeit credential, the matter was to be referred to a Law Enforcement Venue
Commander. This commander must insure that a thorough follow-up investigation
is completed to determine the suspect's identity and any applicable criminal
violation(s).
Olympic Villages and Athletes Security
The primary concern of any Olympic Organizing Committee since the
aftermath of the 1972 Olympic Village terroristic tragedy is the safety of the athletes
and Game sites. Study shows that primary threats in the past have been directed
against the athletes housed at the Olympic Villages with secondary considerations
for the Game sites themselves. Although the threat of terrorism remains, ACOG
officials promised a safe and secure village for athletes.38
All aspects of the 1996 Olympic Village Security were planned by the Village
Sub-Committee and coordinated as needed with all other planning groups having
peripheral Olympic Village Security responsibilities. The Village Subcommittee
roles and responsibilities were the determination of the level of security required for
the village. This included physical security devices, access control systems, and
security staffing requirements for the village.
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Of the four Athletes' Villages in Georgia Tech, Savannah, Lee College in
Tennessee and Columbus, particular attention was paid to the main Olympic Village
at Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech). Described as "A city within a
city," the Village was home to approximately 15,000 athletes and Olympic officials.
The Village was self-contained and provided medical, dental, dining, recreational
postal services, a shopping complex with banks and other services. The DOD/OSE
provided, installed and maintained approximately 580,000 feet of linear fencing,
fence-based intrusion detection alarm systems for all athletes' villages, surveillance
devices, communications equipment, access control turnstiles, crowd control,
vehicle crash barriers, x-ray machines, EOD equipment and portable secondary
power sources.
The 1996 Olympic Village relied more on technology than in past Games.
The Village was the site of most of the technology driven systems. On this note,
Rathburn stated, "we will have the most sophisticated security that has never been
achieved before in the Village."39 Unlike the Barcelona Village, which used
electrified fencing, Atlanta Villages opted for a "stress sensitive" fence. The ten
foot-high chain-link fence which surrounded the village as described by Kim,
employed "cutting edge surveillance cameras called "Speed Domes."40 The "Speed
Domes pan," a small Panasonic camera in a rotating mount could "tilt, to provide a
360-degree field vision." The device which focuses faster than the human eye was
backed by a network of several hundred fixed video cameras."41 Employment of the
"smart" identification cards with computer chips embedded in them, with a high tech
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close-circuit TV System, electronic anti-theft devices on equipment and software
package called "Visual Reality Security (VRS) 2000," linked it all together. This
high-tech system, was manufactured by Sensormatic Electronics Corporation
(SEC).42
The SEC provided integrated access control, alarm monitoring, and closed-
circuit video, surveillance systems throughout the Olympic Village and at each of
more than forty venues in and around Atlanta. Key elements of the system
explained Chiera included:
1. A hand free access control technology using a chip embedded in the
accreditation badge.
2. Hundreds of compact, high-speed, dome-type surveillance cameras, and
3. Hand geometry readers. These palm devices were installed at the entrance
of high-security areas. A "map" of the user's hand was recorded and stored
inside the radio frequency chip embedded in the badge. In this two-pronged
system, the information contained in the badge and user's hand geometry
must match in order for the person to gain access.43
The Athletes' Village at Georgia Tech with "about 14,000 residents and
10,000 staffers," was sanitized prior to July 6,1996 actual residential occupation.44
As the single largest consumer of law enforcement manpower resources, security
operation on the perimeter was supported by ACOG Security Department. Because
of the heavy concentration of athletes within the Village, security was extremely
tight and only those accredited persons with access privileges to the villages were
allowed to enter. Serviced by a large transportation mall that functioned as a bus
pickup and drop-off point, access to the village was through two entrances, one for
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foot and the second for vehicle traffic. Both entrances were manned on a 24-hour a
day basis. Law enforcement provided perimeter access control and general
augmentation to the private security component.
The fenced perimeter was broken by several white-tented entry stations. To
access the village, residences and staffers must pass through sensormatic door
frames similar to the airport metal detector. Access control supervisors were
positioned in close proximity to respond to problems or assist as required. Upon
arrival at a village, athletes were screened by means of their issued radio frequency
badges and hand geometry at the residential access control points or by visual
verification of their accreditation badge. Access controllers were assigned to
monitor alarm conditions at each RF postal, the access controller visually inspected
the badge to ensure the bearer's picture matched the badge. If the badge caused
the RF sensor panel light indicators to change from amber to green, access was
allowed into Olympic Village by an electronically controlled turnstile. If upon
reading the badge, the sensor panel alarm indicator light changed from amber to
blue and an alarm sounded, this indicated a lost, stolen or canceled badge.
Similarly, if the sensor panel alarm indicator light remained amber, indicating either
a valid but defective badge or an invalid, counterfeit badge, access was denied.
Further, the access controller would confiscate the badge and the "Chief de
Mission" assumed control of the situation.
Individuals who left the secured environment had to repeat all steps of the
screening process. Those athletes within the secured umbrella would gain access
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through the RF/hand geometry at the Village. Athletes within the Olympic Village
who left the residential zone and returned were required to submit to the RF and
hand geometry screening process before re-entering the residential zone. Athletes
within the Olympic Village who left the international zone were required to submit to
the RF and hand geometry screening process upon entering what was described as
the "zone 2 Boundaries."45
While Olympic officials had concentrated on controlling access into the
village, they also gave careful thought to minimizing potential problems within the
fence. Athletes from risk-prone nations were closely monitored. A top secret
"antipathy matrix" was used to map out where teams from countries known to be in
conflict politically or militarily were to be housed. For example, the Israeli and the
Palestinian teams due to the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, the
Kuwaiti and Iraqi teams due to the Gulf War, and likewise teams from Taiwan and
the People's Republic of China (PRC), since China failed to recognize Taiwan's
independence. The above teams and others were separated and housed as far
apart as possible within the Village.
Olympic Sports and Function Venues Security
Protection of the venues and visitors during the Games was another major
challenge to security officials. Unlike the Munich Olympic Games, where the entire
Olympic site was located within one city and under the control of the West Germany
Federal Police and the Munich Municipal Police, or the 1992 Barcelona Summer
Games in Spain where one person was responsible for all security, "including
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Olympic, non-Olympic and infrastructure sites,"46 the Atlanta Olympic Centennial
Games sites were located in at least fifteen separate law enforcement jurisdictions.
Included were Municipal/County Police agencies, County Sheriffs and University
Campus police.47
Another concern as stated by Pasternak and Seter was that, "the crazy-quilt
security arrangements with more than 35 federal, state, and local agencies at forty
Olympic Venues (Appendix C) could cause confusion."48 While agencies will be
providing security on Olympic sites, some experts were worried that "other areas
like hotels, businesses, and utilities, may be vulnerable to attack."49
In the Atlanta Games, venue-specific operational plans that were to
maximize public safety and security within the operational boundaries of their venue
site were developed by the law enforcement venue commanders, in conjunction
with their agency planning office. Each venue command post operation had a venue
commander, assistant venue commander(s), administrative and clerical support and
radio operator(s).
Atlanta Committee for Olympic Games (ACOG)
The Joint Coordination Center's main function was to handle and facilitate
information dissemination, information display, live video feed, information
management, ACOG information links, and information intelligence retrieval.
Information was passed to and from the JCC from agency command centers and
the specialized management centers. As was anticipated, an excess of fifty (50)
public safety agencies with direct Olympic Games responsibilities staffed the JCC
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with at least one (1) agency personnel on a 24-hour basis. The JCC also
maximized multiple liaison assignments for agency representatives by providing a
centralized location. The primary agency assigned the responsibility of the JCC
was the APD, with shared assistance from the State of Georgia Law Enforcement
Personnel staffing was determined on a venue-by-venue basis.
Agency Command Center (ACC)
The Agency Command Center (ACC) function was to handle and facilitate
dispatch links, emergency commands, logistical support, staffing and scheduling,
information coordination, officer transportation, venue oversight, intelligence links,
inventory control equipment, and SWAT. Their communications links were to the
Agency's Regional Command Center, the JCC and venues manned by the agency.
The six types of ACC's as illustrated in the "Law Enforcement Agencies with
Primary Operational Responsibilities" (Appendix D) were:
1. Agency Command with Regional Command Centers and
Venues.
2. Agency Command Center with direct links to venues.
3. Collocated Venue and Agency Command Center.
4. Agency Command Center with no venue.
5. Agency Command Center with Assets.
6. Joint Operations Center.
Agency Command with Regional Command Centers and Venues
These centers were agencies responsible for multiple venue and functional
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assignments from Regional Command Centers to facilitate the flow of information
from the various venues, and function as information is channeled into the Agency
Command Center (ACC). The Regional Command Center (RCC) was basically the
same as the ACC, but functioned on a smaller scale.
Agency Command Center with direct links to venues
In this center information flows directly from the venues to the ACC. In the
collocated venue and ACC, both the ACC and the Venue Command Post (VCP)
were housed within the same location, most often, operating together as one entity.
For instance, some agencies had a responsibility for one venue site. Instead of
manning two separate locations (VCP and ACC), it was more feasible to operate at
one location. One example was the Georgia International Horse Park at Conyers.
Agency Command Center with no venue
This type of command center had no specific venues assigned to its agency.
It was necessary to establish this type of command center for logistical special
support for participating public safety agencies during the Games.
Agency Command Center with Assets
There were no venues attached to this type of Command Center, instead
assets from the agency were attached. This type of Agency Command was used
most often by federal agencies. An example of the assets attached to this
command center was a tactical emergency response team, hostage rescue, bomb
technicians, robotics et cetera, and Joint Operations Center (JOC) - This type of
center was typically found at satellite locations. All Olympic Command and Control
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Centers (JCC, ACC and Venues), were collocated at a special location. Others
included.
Satellite Venue Operations (SVP)
Satellite venues were generally venues located outside of the Olympic Ring.
The satellite public safety operations structure for the 1996 Olympic Games was
paralleled (but on a smaller scale) to that of the operational structure within the
Olympic Ring. Most of the satellite operations were conducted out of a multi-
agency Joint Operations Center (JOC).
Functions of the Satellite Joint Operations Center included coordinating and
facilitating officers' scheduling and transportation, maintaining communications links
to ACOG, SWAT, Specialized Management Centers, Venue Command, and to the
Joint Coordination Center. Satellite JOCs had direct links to the Joint Coordination
Center in Atlanta, the Specialized Management Centers ACOG, and venues.
Specialized Management Centers (SMC)
Specialized Management Centers contained trained units of personnel
having expertise in specific areas. The units were capable of performing multi-
agency functional tasks. Many of the specialized units were collocated to enhance
and expedite the coordination of security operations.
The specialized management units that were identified were Air Support,
Bomb/EOD, Dignitary Protection, Intelligence, In-transit, and Traffic. Their main
function was to handle or facilitate communications, equipment, roll call, operations
coordination, assignments, scheduling and information management.
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There was a direct communications link from the Specialized Management
Centers to other functions in the Olympic Security operation structure. The direct
communications links were necessary in order to expedite the flow of information
during crisis situations and potential crisis situations. For instance, an SMC was
able to communicate directly with a venue, bypassing protocol (JCC and ACC)
whenever a situation dictates.
The Hartsfield Airport Coordination Center (HACC1
The Hartsfield Airport Coordination Center provided information coordination
for Hartsfield International Airport's public safety operations. Participating agencies
reported directly to their respective agency command centers. The HACC's two
primary responsibilities were airport operation and international entry.
The HACC coordinated and facilitated ACOG liaison, accreditation security,
security operations, communications, information management, and interfaces with
Agency Commands and Specialized Management Centers. Participating agencies
represented were the Atlanta Police Department, private security companies,
ACOG, US Customs, US Department of Agriculture, Federal Aviation Admin
istration, and the Immigration and Naturalization Services.
The law enforcement duties at a venue site were the primary responsibility of
a single law enforcement agency. Law enforcement personnel were responsible for
traffic control on public roads, crowd control, security of venue operational
boundaries, and emergency response to any public safety incidents at venue sites.
ACOG security forces were responsible for access control, crowd management,
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protection of ACOG property, venue perimeter and venue interior security at the
venue site, and traffic control on venue property.
A law enforcement personnel member at a venue site was a separate
operational component that supported ACOG's venue operations in coordinating
venue operations with ACOG security. The law enforcement venue commander
and law enforcement field supervisors were assigned to the same venue site to
insure the highest degree of continuity at a venue site.
Law enforcement venue commanders reported directly to their ACC. Law
enforcement personnel assigned to a venue had radio communications with each
other at their venue site only. The venue command post was required to monitor
radio traffic between law enforcement personnel assigned to their venue site and
the talk group for their agency's command posts. Both law enforcement venue
personnel, ACOG security at a venue, and the venue manager met on a daily basis
to assess the previous day and prepare for the next day. Prior to the start of
competition at a venue site, law enforcement venue personnel and ACOG security
conducted a sanitization sweep at each venue site and activated a full venue site
accreditation system. Partial deployment of personnel at each venue site was
planned three days prior to competition. Although opening time varied at each
venue, venues were opened to spectators between two hours range before the start
of competition to allow a thorough screening.
Martz explained that ACOG's wish for the 1996 Games, was for "high-tech
but low-key security."50 While there were still plenty of uniformed guards as many
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as 22,000, including up to 10,000 military personnel and more than 5,000 private
security guards, electronic security measures played a far greater role than in past
Olympics.51 Technology such as the IBM computer-based system was used to
monitor alarms and access-control points at all venues; a sensor ID: an
identification system utilizing a computer chip embedded in an ID card that was
read by electronic monitors at access control points, a hand geometry reader: a
device that measured the topography of an individual's hand, compressed such
information into a digitized file that was stored on the main computer and in the
computer chip in an individual's credentials.
In order to gain access to high security areas such as the ACOG Command
Center and Olympic Village, the information in the chip must match the user's hand.
Speedome: a programmable surveillance camera was integrated into the overall
system but could also be manually operated. SensorLink: a system that
compressed video transmissions from the speeddomes so they could be transmitted
through telephone lines to the central command post et cetera. To maximize its
potentials, it was important for agencies involved in the provision of public safety
during the Games to understand technology and its applications.
The over "5,000 unarmed private security guards sponsored by the nation's
largest private security firm, Bong-Warner were used for a variety of functions at
Olympic venues and athletes' villages."52 Their duties included monitoring security
access points in person and by a complex CCTV network, taking tickets and
ushering. The largest group of volunteers, at least 40,000 of all ages, was
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assigned to sports and function venues to help during various events. One of the
"high-ranking volunteers" was Douglas Green, a retired deputy police chief for
Calgary, who headed Olympic security during the Canadian 1988 Winter Games.
The volunteer concept gained acceptance with the International Association
of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Kris Turnbow noted, "Whoever came up with this
concept really hit the nail on the head because of the amount of training these
officers will bring to the Games."53 Volunteer groups, according to Mariani, included
"sports officials and judges who must be certified by the governing body of their
sport."54 Other volunteers were assigned to computers, copiers, and fax machines
and administered local area networks. In the medical field, the ACOG enlisted
doctors, paramedics, emergency medical technicians certified in CPR. About ten
percent of the volunteers provided language services. Each National Olympic
Committee (NOC) was provided with hosts who spoke its language and was familiar
with Atlanta. Some served at information booths for Olympic spectators from
around the globe, while others picked-up international VIP at the airport and
performed other tasks.55
Venue Procedures
Upon arrival at a specific venue, ticketed spectators formed into queuing
lines at designated entrances. Queuing lines were configured in a fashion that only
one ticketed spectator was allowed at a time to enter an access-controlled post.
ACOG security personnel made sure that all spectators preparing to enter a venue
perimeter possessed a valid ticket before they were screened. Spectators were
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screened utilizing magnetometer operated by ACOG security personnel supported
by law enforcement. Magnetometer portals and hand-held magnetometer wands
were used for screening persons at all venues. X-ray devices were used for
screening all hand carried items for contraband and weapons. If a prohibited item
was discovered, the person was removed from the queue. If weapons and/or illegal
items were discovered, the access controller would deny access to the venue and
relinquished control of the situation to a law enforcement officer stationed at the
access control point. Omni-directional Close Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras,
sometimes referred to as "speed domes," were used to monitor certain public and
controlled access areas within each venue. The camera was programmed to "work
a beat" or be controlled through a computer by an operator hundreds of miles away.
At an ACOG command center, one can monitor crowds, athletes or traffic at events
ranging from canoeing on the Ocoee River in Tennessee to yachting in Savannah,
Georgia. An undercarriage vehicle inspection system was used to check all
vehicles entering into restricted areas.
APD Venue Operation
As the host city, the Atlanta Police Department (APD) was the lead law
enforcement agency at site venues within the Olympic Ring. The three sports
venues were the Olympic Stadium, the Omni Coliseum, and the Atlanta-Fulton
County Stadium. The other three were function venues- the Main Accreditation
Center, the Main Press Center, and the Airport Welcome Center. The entire venue
planning initiative was coordinated through the Agency Planning Office (APO).
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The APD had primary law enforcement jurisdiction as well as investigative
jurisdiction at venues for which its agency had operational responsibility. For
example, at the Olympic stadium, the APD was responsible for the development
and execution of security operations plans, policies and procedures, and a system
of administrative and operational support. The APD was expected to coordinate
efforts with venue counterparts in ACOG security, and to enforce all state criminal
and traffic laws. Security jurisdiction responsibilities of the APD covered all routine
law enforcement services at the stadium except for the investigation of major
criminal cases such as homicide and sexual assault. All non-major criminal cases
which included but were not limited to traffic, fighting, criminal trespass, shoplifting,
disorderly conduct, scalping, simple battery, simple assault, unauthorized sales, et
cetera.
The APD, with its investigative jurisdiction at the stadium, was responsible
for the investigation and prosecution of all major cases including homicide and
sexual assault that occurred within the stadium. The operational boundaries of the
stadium included north of the stadium to the Festival area, south of the stadium to
Little Street, east of the stadium to Capitol Avenue, and west of the stadium to
Interstate 1-75/85.
Law enforcement personnel provided 24-hour presence in the Olympic
Stadium during the security operational period, and to key venue operational areas
such as accreditation, language services, logistics, medical, protocol, sports,
transportation, technology and venue management. Its staff at the command post
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were a venue commander, assistant venue commander, relief venue commander,
field supervisor, field officer, administrative officer, liaison officer,
information/reporting officer, radio dispatcher, messenger and clerical. The staff
inside the Olympic stadium was to perform the following functions: fix venue posts,
fixed perimeter posts, roving venue patrol, roving perimeter patrol, mobile perimeter
unit, relief unit, plain clothes unit, fixed traffic post and mobile traffic post.
Venue Commander
The APD assigned Major L. J. Robinson as the Venue Commander for the
Olympic Stadium. The Venue Commander had overall operational responsibility for
the command of law enforcement personnel assigned to the venue. He also had
authority over resources assigned to venue. It was his responsibility to inform and
otherwise coordinate with the Agency Command Center all changes of status of
venue security. He worked together with ACOG security to carry out the security
mission.
Assistant Venue Commander (AVC)
Assistant Venue Commanders, Captain K. R. Boles and Lieutenant A. J.
Biello, assumed overall operational responsibility in the absence of the Venue
Commander. When both the Venue Commander and Assistant Venue Commander
were present, the Assistant Venue Commander was subordinate to the Venue
Commander, and assisted the Venue Commander with his duties. Relief Venue
Commander The Relief Venue Commander assumed overall operational
responsibility in the absence of the Venue and Assistant Venue Commanders.
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Field Supervisor
The Field Supervisors were to ensure that law enforcement venue personnel
were properly equipped and at their assigned posts. Field supervisors responded
to the scene of disturbances at the venue and assisted officers in taking appropriate
action. Field supervisors also ensured that law enforcement officers' basic human
needs were met with no compromise in security coverage by coordinating relief
personnel. Field Supervisors reported to and received direction from the on-site
Venue Commander. Field Officer Law enforcement personnel were assigned to
either a fixed or roving post at venues. Any incident, situation, or request that law
enforcement venue personnel believed required immediate attention, was promptly
forwarded to the Field Supervisor for resolution.
Administrative Officer
This was an officer who performed administrative duties as was required by
the Agency Commander or Venue Commander. He or she handled messages and
information flow within the venue, which was not to be broadcast over the various
radio frequencies due to the sensitive nature of the information. This included
information overheard by third parties adjacent to venue security officers or law
enforcement officers equipped with radios. The Administrative Officer also
transported necessary paperwork concerning arrests and disposition of property.
Liaison Officer
The Liaison Officer was a single officer assigned to venues in which the APD
had investigative Jurisdiction but not Security Jurisdiction. The Liaison Officer was
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the agency's point of contact at the venue. The Liaison Officer -1. Established
direct communications with the Venue Commander. 2. Attended all meetings and
briefings at the venue. 3. Maintained communications with APD. 4. Coordinated
requests for assistance by the law enforcement agency with Security Jurisdiction
and his her own agency.
Information/Reporting Officer
An officer assigned to a fixed location within the venue. It was the officer's
duty to answer law enforcement and public safety questions, or make the
appropriate referral. He or she also completed a police incident report or an
Olympic incident report, whenever justified by circumstances.
Radio Dispatcher
The Radio Operator was responsible for maintaining communications with
the command center, specialized management centers, and other public safety
agencies as needed. The Radio Operator also maintained a communications log.
Federal Agents
Agents from numerous federal law enforcement agencies were sent to
support the Atlanta Police Department in the Stadium Complex. The agents were
sworn locally and performed law enforcement duties within the operational area of
the venues.
Mass Transit Security
Given the magnitude of the events and sport venues, the volume of ground
transportation, pedestrian traffic, coupled with the potential risk posed to athletes,
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the safety and expeditious movement of the athletes, the IOC dignitaries, and the
thousands of visitors between point of entry, housing and Games sites were
necessary for orderly conduct of the Centennial Games in Atlanta. The major
problem for the 1996 Games was the problem of transportation.
The traffic function was a fundamental and critical task within the overall
security mission. The traffic function was primarily concerned with the management
of routine predicted traffic flow problems as well as coordination of responses by
the law enforcement emergency reaction teams to unanticipated traffic problems.
The Traffic Subcommittee which worked with ACOG transportation in
planning for the overall routine traffic management, ultimately evolved in the traffic
management operation unit. The group included: Atlanta Police Department (APD),
Georgia State Patrol (GSP), Atlanta Fire Department (AFD), Georgia Department of
Transportation (DOT), Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), and
ACOG. Because traffic was a multi-agency functional area, it required the
establishment of a Specialized Management Center (SMC). It was collocated with
Dignitary Protection and In transit, as well as ACOG Transportation during the
Games.
The largest demand for transportation was for the athletes, who were to be
transported each day from their quarters at the Olympic Village to the sport and
function venues and returned to the Village after the competition. In transit security
was primarily concerned with securing the routes of ground transportation that was
used by Olympic athletes. Notably, different levels of security were required
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depending on athletes and countries involved. For example, buses carrying high
risk athletes and their officials, such as the Israeli, Palestinian or the Taiwan teams,
were provided with extra security such as plain clothes SWAT personnel on the
buses, escort vehicles, and if possible armored buses.
Transportation to and from the venues was the responsibility of both ACOG,
the State of Georgia, and the City of Atlanta. While APD Chief Beverly Harvard and
the State Department of Public Safety (SDPS) Commissioner Sid Miles shared the
responsibility for spectators transportation to all sports venues, transportation for
the movements of IOC/NOC members, athletes, officials operating staff, media
personnel, and VIP guests was coordinated by ACOG.56
Traffic Management
The development or establishment of a Traffic Management Plan (TMP) was
designed to facilitate the most efficient movement possible for vehicular and
pedestrian traffic throughout the Olympic Ring. The APD was the lead agency
since it had primary traffic management jurisdiction inside the Olympic Ring.
Traffic management operations, as a joint effort, were coordinated through
one center called the "Atlanta Traffic Operation Center" (ATOC) and represented by
each agency. ATOC was located on the second floor of City Hall East, inside the
Atlanta Police Department's Agency Command Center (ACC). During the
operational period from July 18th through August 4th, each of the agencies had a
specific operational role to perform as described below:
1. The Atlanta Police Department was responsible for traffic
direction, traffic enforcement, and its commanders were the
293
final arbiters of any legal changes in traffic control on city
streets. Also, the APD was the lead agency responsible for the
traffic plans for all eight Olympic road course events.
2. The Atlanta Bureau of Traffic and Transportation was
responsible for the placement of traffic control signs and some
informational signs, the regulation of all city traffic signals, and
the placement of traffic barricades on all city streets.
3. The Atlanta Fire Department reviewed the Traffic Plan to
insure that traffic lanes were designated for use by fire and
medical emergency vehicles responding to a call within the
Olympic Ring.
4. The Georgia Department of Transportation was responsible for
all state roads and highways, as well as the four interstate
highways passing through the city of Atlanta. They controlled
the closing of exit ramps off the interstate highways. The
GDOT was the lead agency and with its new Advance Traffic
Management System, provided video feeds, through fiber optic
cable, to the Bureau of Traffic and Transportation and the
Atlanta Police Department's Agency Command Center.
5. The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) was
responsible for the public transportation system that included
buses, vans, and rapid lines. Their input was important to
insure that street closures and restrictions did not adversely
impact their bus and van routes, as well as their daily
schedules.
6. The Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games was
responsible for the movement of the Olympic Family which
included IOC members, NOC members, athletes, sponsors,
media, staff, and volunteers to and from all Olympic venues
within the state of Georgia. ACOG's transportation system was
a private enterprise separate from the MARTA system.
During the Olympic operations, National Guard personnel supported the
Atlanta Police Department at the implementation of the Traffic Management Plan.
Two positions in the Atlanta Traffic Operations Center (ATOC), were staffed by
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military supervisory personnel throughout Olympic Operations. Their personnel
consisted mostly of military and security police. As part of their traffic management
duties, military personnel supported five of the eight Olympic Road course events in
the city of Atlanta. One of the examples was assisting police personnel in
restricting public access to the road courses.
A number of Technical Supports were used to facilitate the Traffic
Management Operations. These supports were provided by several computer
systems by Olympic sponsors such as IBM. These included the "Advanced
Transportation Management System (ATMS)," and "AutoCad Map System" and live
video feeds from the APD airship.57
Automated Traffic Management System
The ATMS service area included more than sixty miles of freeway and
twenty-five miles of HOV lanes, managing traffic flow in five counties and
Metropolitan Atlanta. It consisted of over one hundred video cameras strategically
placed along interstate highways located inside the Interstate 285 perimeter as well
as major intersections of Atlanta's city streets. Each video camera was capable of
panning, stopping to hold one view, and refocusing the lens to the desired level of
magnification. These functions were controlled by personnel at the State's Traffic
Management Center and the Atlanta Police Agency Command Center. In addition,
electronic message signs were in place along the Interstate highways and were
controlled from the State's Traffic Management Center. These signs were used to
relay up to date information regarding traffic conditions to the general public.
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AutoCad
The AutoCad Map System sponsored by IBM included computer generated
maps of the city of Atlanta. The computer program allowed traffic management
planners to graphically display the traffic flow patterns, transportation routes, street
closures, and street restrictions. Consequently, the maps generated by the AutoCad
system graphically summarized the traffic plan. Planners could modify the Traffic
Management Plan easily. Color coding information made the maps easy to
understand. Copies of the Traffic Management Plan were widely disseminated
throughout the Atlanta metropolitan areas, via the local newspaper, community
meetings, and business associations.
The AutoCad Map System was complimented by a set of documents that
listed all of the street closures and street restrictions within the Olympic Ring. The
documents provided a greater level of detail than the information depicted on the
AutoCad maps. Each traffic document included the name of the street, the section
of the street with north/west and south/east boundaries, how the street was being
used, and the effective date(s). Road closures were classified as full-time or part-
time and no unauthorized vehicles were allowed.
Atlanta Police Airship
The Atlanta Police Department had operational control of the world's largest
flying airship during Olympic operations. Its use was donated to the department by
the Kroger Company. The airship was equipped with sophisticated video equipment
loaned to the department by the British army, which flies a similar airship in the
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United Kingdom. The airship provided a stable, long-term observation platform from
which to monitor vehicular and pedestrian traffic flows. The airship broadcast
directly to the Atlanta Police Agency Command Center. The video feed was also
shared with the State of Georgia and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During
flight operations, there was always at least one Atlanta police officer on board to act
as a spotter. The airship was airborne approximately twelve hours per day.58
Transportation Services
At the request of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), transit agencies
from across the United States helped to provide transportation assistance to ACOG.
Over 2,000 buses were loaned from various transit agencies across the nation to
handle the transportation needs of attendees.59
MARTA provided rail service, buses, and van shuttles to most venues. State
officials supplemented MARTA's 265-person police force with at least 200 federal
agents who were sworn in as state officers. Gary McConnell stated "[MARTA's role
in Olympic transportation was the reason the state decided to add it to its lists of
responsibilities which included seven sports venues, the Athletes' Village,
Centennial Olympic Park and the Torch Relay.]"60 Although Marta Police Chief
Gene Wilson served as venue commander, there were several state officers as
assistant venue commanders.
Another form of transportation during the Games, was the use of a fleet of
"up to 200 helicopters."61 As visitor accommodations during the Games was at a
premium in a 90-mile radius from Atlanta, the service allowed efficient
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transportation of spectators from further outside the city.
As envisioned, some or all helicopters were equipped with supplemental
"Global Positioning Systems, Navionic coupled with the Automatic Data Link system
(ADS) provided emergency, security, VIP, personnel transport and news-
gathering.62 Steven T. Fisher explained that non-critical helicopter routes, such as
those for VIP and "rotary-wing" airline operations, were to access "multi-modal"
transportation points such as subway stations, bus stops or points with walking
distance of games avenues.63
All air support were provided on a mission basis. It included, six observation
helicopters, four transport (UH-1 or UH-60) helicopters, two MEDEVAC helicopters,
one heavy lift helicopter and one light fixed wing transportation aircraft, all available
on a 24-hour/day during the operational period. In short, no one aircraft was
dedicated to any agency. All observation helicopters used for night time support
were equipped with high intensity directional search light or "Forward Looking Infra
Red" (FLIR). All DOD provided observation helicopters had a sworn law
enforcement aerial observer as part of the crew. Only DOD personnel, sworn local,
state, and federal law enforcement officers; FAA and public emergency services
personnel performing Olympic security related duties were allowed to fly on DOD
provided security aircraft.
Besides providing and controlling twenty-four hour aviation support to the law
enforcement security forces in the immediate vicinity of Atlanta, Athens, and Lake
Lanier, other aviation support mission included the following:
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In-transit which had the need for observation helicopters to assist in route
security and provided police observation of in-transit athletes' buses.
Venue Commanders provided upon request in support of scheduled event.
Air support covered traffic control, security over flights with night-time illumination,
and limited command and control support.
Emergency Response Team (ERT) The primary use of helicopters was to
transport ERT's from their staging or assembly area to the desired "landing Zone
(LZ) where they were to discharge the ERT. This service was for all participating
local, state and federal teams, except FBI HRT.
FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) Using the Army/National Guard UH-1H
helicopters flown by FBI crews, provided 24-hour support to move the HRT to a
designated venue. These helicopters were completely under the control of the FBI,
but complied with all established air support procedures.
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Transport helicopter support was
available on an immediate response basis of order to move an EOD team and
equipment to a predetermined landing zone. Upon completion of delivery of
personnel and equipment, the helicopter(s) returned to the FSA and reverted to
"Standby Status."
Dionitarv Protection This service was available for federally recognized
dignitaries VIP only if helicopter assistance was necessary. Air Security and
Surveillance for the ground movement of a threatened dignitary and the possible
movement of security forces involved in dignitary protection were the only
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anticipated aviation support missions.
Traffic Law enforcement was in need of periodic use of observation
helicopters to assist in traffic management. Traffic information obtained by air
support was relayed to the In-Transit Committee representative at the JCC and
appropriate venue commanders.
JCC Command and Control Support Observation helicopter support with a
live day night video down link capability to the JCC was required. This afforded
JCC the ability to have command and control support for any game related incident
and at the same time have live video fed into the JCC to allow monitoring the
incident in progress and to facilitate decision making.
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Support MEDEVAC support for the
Olympics was not a security responsibility. However, since medical evacuation was
a public safety issue and airspace at all venues was restricted, Air Support was
involved in MEDEVAC planning and support. Primary MEDEVAC support came
from civilian Emergency Medical Service (EMS). If a need occurred to augment the
civilian EMS capability, DOD provided MEDEVAC helicopter support was made
available at the FSA.
MEDEVAC helicopters were prepared to move patients from Olympic sites
and activities to nearby medical trauma centers. Again, MEDEVAC support was
provided by Air Support on a mission basis only, with two criteria: 1) competent
medical authority requesting the MEDEVAC support, and 2) no civilian EMS was
available to fly the mission.
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Heavy Lift Helicopter Support Heavy lift "(CH-47 or CH-53)" support was
required to be available on a contingency basis. The mission of the heavy lift
helicopter support was to assist in the expeditious re-establishment of municipal
services and utilities placed out of service by natural or man-made catastrophes.
Additionally, they were available to assist in any mass casualty situations.
Air Transportation to Off-Site Locations Fixed wing transportation support
was required to support contingency requirements to move key security personnel
(no ACOG security personnel) from the FSA to any of the off-site Olympic cities, for
example Media Village in Dekalb. With one hour's advance notification, fixed wing
transportation support was available to move up to twelve personnel (with limited
equipment). The fixed wing aircraft transported the personnel to pre-determined
airports, where the requesting Olympic off-site law enforcement agency assumes
transportation support for the transported personnel and equipment. The fixed wing
aircraft returned to the FSA after discharging its cargo at the off-site airport.
VIP and athletes of high risk, that is, past Presidents, current government
officials, foreign state executives, if necessary, were transported by armored
limousines or by helicopters to Game site. While those of a lesser threat were
transported in standard executive vehicles with a security team depending on the
situation.
Despite the meticulous traffic planning by the Subcommittees and agencies,
the deployment of the "Advanced Traffic Management System"64 by the GDOT to
alert motorists to alternate routes, accidents, construction, and delays in traffic,
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some commanders and Olympic bus drivers were furious about what were
,,65
described as "embarrassing organizational glitches."
Complaints during the Games, ranged from MARTA's lack of staffing to meet
an Olympic level of crowds, to persistently late transportation to and from Game
sites and the IBM coordinated computer system's frequent technical troubles, and
others. For example disoriented drivers caused athletes to be late for their
scheduled events, and excessive crowds were misdirected into the wrong venues.
In an effort to re-organize the shaky shuttle bus system which was maligned
for late arrivals, breakdowns and inexperienced drivers; Olympic organizers, top
federal transportation and city officials decided to dump over twenty-five buses from
the ACOG fleet, improve synchronization of traffic signals, and assign military
drivers to some buses. "To cut down buses getting lost" according to Downey,
drivers were consistently assigned "to routes rather than being switched around."66
But despite all the transportation clutter, there was no major security threat en-
routes to and from the Game sites.
Emergency Response Elements
In a given scheduled major event such as the Olympic Games, emergencies
are always anticipated especially now that Olympics are vulnerable to terrorist
attack. The two emergency response groups in operation during the 1996 Olympic
Games in Atlanta were the Fire and Emergency Medical Services (Fire/EMS). Their
respective roles and responses during the bombing of the Centennial Park are
detailed in Chapter VII.
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Fire/EMS Response
The Fire/EMS established guidelines were to ensure maximum coordination
between Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Medical Services, and Law
Enforcement Venue Commander. The ultimate goal was to provide the highest
level of public safety and the expeditious delivery of emergency services at the
Olympic sites.
The Fire and Rescue function under the Atlanta Fire Department, was
primarily coordinating the public safety response to incidents involving fire of
hazardous materials, while contracted with EMS personnel to ACOG to provide on
site emergency medical services.
Both the Fire and EMS coordinated and implemented all firefighting,
emergency medical, rescue, disaster, and mass casualty issues for the 1996
Games. Since EMS personnel in Georgia are regulated by the state public health
agency, therefore, the state health agency established a formalized system known
as the "Public Health Command Center" (PHCC),67 to ensure a rapid and
coordinated response to all public health issues during the Games. This center was
a physical location, staffed with public health professionals and a federal
emergency response staff. "Its primary function was to coordinate response to all
public health issues, including media, disease out breaks, food safety, and
prevention services."68 Every county with an Olympic venue had its public health
response team and were operational twenty-four hours per day.
One medical disaster, according to Meeham et al, the Georgia Division of
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Public Health (GDPH) had "primary responsibility to coordinate a medical response
in a disaster situation,"69 for example, standard disaster measures such as
evacuation, mass shelter, and transportation. However, during the 1996 Games,
concern was centered more on the management of mass casualties that could
occur from a terrorist incident. Others included the real possibility of a chemical or
biological terrorist incident. To this effect, federal government resources within the
GEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DOD, and mutual aid
agencies were mobilized as needed.
Emergency Response Team (ERT)
Atlanta Emergency Response Team during the Olympics was at the direction
of the FBI Operational Center (FBIOC). Its mission was to immediately respond to
a potentially critical situation to evaluate the need for tactical deployment of SWAT
teams. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between agencies was
instrumental in dictating responses to problems and resolutions for participating
emergency response teams.
The Emergency Response Command Post (ERCP) located at City Hall East
on Ponce De Leon Avenue, was manned on a twenty-four hours per day shift, on a
rotational basis between representatives of the different agencies involved. For
example, on July 8, 1996, the Atlanta SWAT team began Emergency Response
standby duty with twelve members on a 6:00 am to 2:00 p.m. shift. A twelve person
element of the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) assumed duty from 2:00 p.m. until
10:00 p.m. While the Norfolk SWAT team stationed in the Naval Reserve Center
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on the Georgia Tech Campus assumed duty inside the Olympic Village at 10:00
p.m. until 6:00 am completing the twelve-hour shift for that day. Each Command
Post had secured communications and fax capabilities.
Members of the Assessment Team had seven persons on standby for each
shift. This team consisted of a supervisor, the on duty SWAT team leader, a
hostage negotiator, a technically trained agent, a radio technologist, an evidence
response team person, and a HRT representative. A tactical operations center
monitored intelligence for each ERT. Tactical personnel assigned to a particular
shift was to report for duty forty-five minutes prior to their shift in order to receive
the latest intelligence and tactical update. If a venue officer responded to a
problem, and determines tactical assistance was necessary, the officer would:
7. Notify the immediate supervisor, and request assistance on
the scene.
8. The supervisor after assessing the situation in turn forwarded
the information through the chain of command to the Venue
Command Post (VCP) who in turn notified the ACC, JCC or
JOC.
9. A field supervisor in VCP also notified the primary ERT either
by telephone (primary) or radio (secondary) requesting their
assistance.
10. The primary ERT team if necessary responded with mutual
assistance.
11. The FBI Emergency Response Team Commander was then
dispatched to provide assistance and observe the situation, if
FBI SWAT/HRT was not designated as the primary responder.
12. The primary ERT was responsible for resolving the crisis or (if
federal jurisdiction) command of the situation was then
transferred to the FBI.
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13. A Mobile Command Post responded to every crisis situation to
provide a Forward Technical Operation/Command Post.70 In
handling major incidents or high-risk situations relating to the
1996 Olympic Games, such as the Centennial Park Bombing,
ACOG security coordinated with and supported law
enforcement in expediting the deployment of tactical response
teams to the scene.
Communication Network
Another key element for the successful operation of the 1996 Olympic
Games in Atlanta revolved around an effective communications system. Given the
size and scope, the simultaneous scheduling of multiple events the geographic
location of Olympic venues, the large number of public safety personnel and
numerous law enforcement jurisdictions involved in securing the Games, the high
volume of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and the necessity for immediate
decisions and response to remedy demanding situations, all combined to
necessitate a communication capability dedicated to the 1996 Olympic public
safety.
The purpose of was to establish a coordinated radio communications
network between law enforcement's venue command post, ACCs, SMCs, the JCC,
and Joint Operations Centers (JOC). This networking system was to facilitate the
flow of information throughout the venues of Olympic public safety operations. The
importance of a well coordinated communication networking was emphasized by
Special Agent Juan Montes during the security planning for the Olympic Games.
Montes stated "One of the major things that I saw that's going to be very important,
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is communication between all those different agencies. If we can keep those
communication avenues free, clear and open at all times, ... it will run much more
smoothly."71
During the operational phase, communication across agency lines became
critical. To facilitate the communication process the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC), granted ACOG exclusive temporary rights to ninety public
safety frequencies for the Games.72 All ACC, Specialized Management Center
(SMC) and ACOG Security Command Center were responsible for forwarding all
pertinent information to the Joint Coordination Center (JCC). Pertinent information
as classified by law enforcement, are "all information with the potential of having an
impact on another agency, a specialized law enforcement function, or the overall
security operation of the 1996 Olympic Games"73
A combination of three types of radio communication systems were used
during the Games. This included, the existing radio systems, the 800 MHZ tracking
systems and the DOD/OSE radio system. For communication compatibility, both
the APD and part of the state communication systems were upgraded. The
resulting network was a collaboration between IBM, AT & T and Motorola which
consisted of a three-tiered information tree designed to provide critical data to
decision makers in a speedy manner. Mark Moron described the system as "the
largest ever designed for a sporting event."74
The first level of dissemination was through a group paging network which
allowed for immediate notification of an incident to anyone on the network. The
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second, was by voice mail boxes, allowing a more thorough understanding of the
event. The final element of the network consisted of a comprehensive e-mail
system connecting law enforcement, ACOG, and sponsored security and allowed
detailed information, announcements and alerts to be distributed electronically.
Information Flow Procedures
The Joint Coordination Center (JCC) in figure 8 below, coordinated the
timely and accurate flow of pertinent information, in order to facilitate the highest


















Figure 8. Joint Coordination Center Information Flow
Each participating agency in the JCC was responsible for accessing incoming
information that was relevant to the respective agency.
All incoming information were forwarded directly to the Center Manager or
designee. Information was transmitted into the JCC through radio transmission,
telephone conversation, facsimile transmission, courier, live video, computer
network, television network, or a JCC agency representative. All incoming
information regardless of the service were recorded in an "Incident Record,"75
maintained on file by the Center Manager at the JCC. These information were
reviewed and decisions regarding its distribution were made based on the Center
Manager's assessment of its significance.
In priority order, all pertinent incoming information were displayed to the
entire JCC or disseminated specifically to the affected agency representative(s)
with icons and number coding used to differentiate the types of information
displayed to the entire JCC on the video screen or monitors. The Center Manager
then documented all incoming information onto the automated "Incident Tracking
System."76 Copies of the preceding shift's incident log were made available to all
participating public safety agencies on a daily basis and saved for future reference.
The law enforcement venue personnel had no direct communication with the
JCC, since all information that were to be relayed to the JCC from the venue level
were channeled through the Law Enforcement Venue Commander, the ACC
Commander, then to the JCC.
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Venue Officers
Law Enforcement personnel assigned to an Olympic venue, depending on
the agency with primary law enforcement jurisdiction at that venue, were assigned a
DOD radio and were able to communicate only with other officers assigned to that
venue, as well as the Venue Command Post. Law enforcement personnel had the
option to carry their department issued radio in addition to the DOD radio.
Law enforcement personnel assigned to Public Safety and Traffic functions
but not specifically to Olympic venue, were to communicate with their law
enforcement agency through the agency's normal communication device utilized for
the operational period.
Agency Command Centers fACCs^
These centers were made able to communicate with their Venue Command
Post, all SMCs, other Agency Command or Coordination Centers and the JCC.
Each ACC monitored the radio traffic from the venue command posts within their
jurisdiction and the ACC talk groups.
An Atlanta talk group system was used by all ACCs for interagency radio
communications with the Central Radio Center (CRC), enabling each ACC to talk
with and monitor the activities of other ACCs, as well as their venues. A "talk
group" is a channel that was radio programmed in to allow communication between
all parties that have the channel selected on their radios.77 Information to be relayed
to the Central Radio Center from the venue command posts as shown in figure 9,
were transmitted by a law enforcement venue supervisor by telephone.
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Specialized Management Center (SMC)
Through the use of the DOD/OSE "state of the art" walkie-talkies and based
systems to many venues in the SMCs, law enforcement personnel were able to
communicate with all Agency Command and Coordination Centers, Venue














Figure 9. Atlanta Police Department Information Flow
Olympic venues. SMC communicated by radio with venues by switching to the "talk
group" of the ACC with security jurisdiction at the venue. Venues were able to
communicate with SMCs by telephone or by requesting that the SMC change to the
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agency's talk group for radio communications.
Joint Operation Center (JOC)
No direct communication between the law enforcement venue personnel and
the JOC was allowed. All information needed to be relayed to the JOC, from the
venue level, were channeled through the Law Enforcement Venue Commander and
subsequently to the JOC. The dissemination of such information was then executed
by the commander of the JOC. In most circumstances, communication protocol
requiring the transmission of sensitive tactical information was done through the
use of "landline" telephone or digital voice privacy radio, to minimize the likelihood
of being overheard by non-essential personnel.
Summary
The development of the Olympic Master Security Plan (OMSP) blueprint by
the OSSG, and the inter-agency planning efforts conducted by OSPCC and IPG
were necessary. The OMSP primarily served as a guide on how the different
agencies would collectively provide for the safe and secure environment for the
1996 Olympic Games. It provided a conceptual picture describing Olympic security
methods, and procedures. It described the coordination among Olympic security
agencies, especially regarding level and types of services, that is, just what public
safety and security agencies would do and in what time frame.
Because of the potential long-term consequences, the selection of agency
planners and the establishment of an agency planning office (APO) arguably
determined whether or not the agency's Planning, and ultimately, the Operational
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Phase, would be successful. In this chapter, planning at the Developmental Phase
has been covered. Section II reviews the effectiveness of the planning process
through a series of testing at the Experimental Phase.
The most important aspect of the Experimental Phase was to validate
Olympic security plans. As a result of the Table Top, Command Post and Field
Exercises involving different scenarios, it was clear how all aspects of Olympic
security services were to be supported and provided. These joint exercises allowed
managers from different agencies to perfect coordination of resources to confront
the demands of each crisis. The application of the Experimental Phase was to
uncover shortcomings and deficiencies which are generally much easier to contact
than during the Operations Phase. In Atlanta, the rigorous work of the security
plans during the Experimental Phase greatly improved successful security
operations.
This Phase of the Olympic security preparations also uncovered areas of
weaknesses in the proposal plan. This was true on both the agency and
interagency levels. The only way to identify and resolve the weakness of a plan
was through testing which was provided by the Experimental Phase. The Training
Subcommittee was not operational during the Games, however training personnel
were available to advise on training issues. Section III of this chapter, focused on
the implementation of what was planned at the Developmental Phase and tested
during the Experimental Phase.
At the Operational level, ACOG Security staff provided coordination and
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cooperation through membership on the OSSG and OSPCC committees who in turn
provided oversight of the IPG and the various law enforcement subcommittees. Its
security program divided the security of the athletes into five basic components:
threat assessment, in-transit security, athletes' village, sports and training venues.
Threat assessment was developed by the Intelligence Specialized
Management Center (ISMC) and disseminated to ACOG as necessary. In transit
security was provided by private security officers or security volunteers equipped
with two-way radios aboard each bus transporting Olympic athletes and with the
guidance of the In transit Security SMC which provided police escorts and heavily
patrolled transportation corridors for the buses to travel between sport and training
venues and the athletes' village.
There were several levels of access control used during the Olympic Games.
The most sophisticated of these security equipment were used in Downtown
Atlanta where most of the events took place, with the highest level deployed at the
Atlanta Athletes' Village. While other sports and function venues had somewhat
lower levels of access control, all were equipped with proven access control
systems and procedures in order to create a secure environment for the Olympic
Games. Some of these systems and procedures included magnetometer and x-ray
screening, contraband searches, limited entry turnstiles, fence-based intrusion
detection systems with CCTV monitoring, radio frequency proximity and biometric
technology and vehicle sanitization equipment. At highly secured areas, such as
the Olympic Village, an elaborate clearance system was established that relied on a
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biometric" scanner to determine people's identity through an optical scan of their
hands. In order to gain entry, a person's hand print must match digitized versions
that were stored in computer chips embedded in identification badges.
The movement of people other than athletes was closely controlled and
monitored. Each person had a security clearance level, giving some members of
the staff access to some locations but not to others.
Application of these high-tech systems was "the most sophisticated
electronic security in the history of the Olympic Games."78 It was not surprising that
many security experts, including Louis Chiera called the 1996 Olympics "[the
technology games.]"79
During the Olympic Games period, coordination was facilitated by the
collocation of law enforcement and security personnel at the Law Enforcement Joint
Coordination Center and law enforcement personnel at the ACOG Security
Command and Central Center. Law enforcement and ACOG security collocated
operations at all venues. These command posts had access to most technology
including; live Atlanta Olympic Broadcast and NBC TV video feeds from helicopters
and blimps, Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) monitors, Geographic Information System
(GIS) database and a satellite-based global positioning system.
Coordination of communication functions was agency-based consistent with
jurisdiction. However, assistance in coordinating the performance of the overall
communication equipment was provided through the DOD/OSE, Georgia State
Patrol, and the APD.
315
Unfortunately the 1996 Olympic Games were plagued with "a tardy
transportation system," computer failures, and security breaches80 during the first
week of the Operational Phase. Although off-stage transportation and technical
troubles were quickly resolved with the help of top federal transportation and
DOD/OSE officials. According to Andrew Young, the co-Chairman of ACOG "no
one could run a transportation system as big as ACOG's without problems."81
To ease the security and traffic problems during the Games, efforts were
made to generate public support for the Traffic Management Plan. Details of the
Plan were widely disseminated to all facets of the affected public. Universities
within the Olympic Ring did not hold summer schools during the Games. University
employees were scheduled vacations during that time in an effort to solve parking
problems. As a result of these public awareness and support, Olympic traffic
conditions in Atlanta were much better than projected.
Finally the Atlanta Police Department's (APD's) Olympic security role was an
integral part of an overall, comprehensive security operation carried out by all of the
government and private security providers. Despite the bombing of the Centennial
Park, there was a strong consensus that the law enforcement community
succeeded in carrying out its Olympic security mission. Furthermore, plans
developed during the Developmental Phase, tested during the Experimental Phase,
supported successful security operations during the Operational Phase.
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION AND ASSESSMENT OF SUCCESS
This chapter has a dual purpose. First, it reviews the coordination effort
between the FBI and other ancillary agencies assigned with the responsibilities of
investigating the Park bombing. Second, a brief comparative analysis between the
1972 Munich attack and the 1996 Atlanta bombing incident will be explored.
The General Security Concern
In the United States, substantial contingency planning and security
coordination was undertaken prior to the 100th Anniversary of the Summer Olympic
Games hosted by the City of Atlanta beginning July 20 through August 4, 1996.
While terrorism was at the forefront of security planning for the Summer Games,
providing such a security coverage is a top priority of every law enforcement
agency involved in the organization, public safety, and security planning effort. Law
enforcement officials ranging from police officers, military personnel, private
security guards and others, were assigned the responsibility to thwart everything
from mugging to terrorist bombing during the Games.
In a meeting with officials from ACOG security personnel, the APD, Games
security sponsor Sensormatic and more than one hundred downtown businesses
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leaders, Atlanta Police Major Jon Gordon allayed concerns about crimes in the
Downtown area and the threat of terrorism. Gordon explained that while there is
always a decrease in major crimes, "pick-pockets"1 increase in an Olympic city
during the Games.
Similarly, two dozen corporate security directors were warned by four
security advisors and specialists in terrorist activities during a one-day seminar on
"improving corporate security and dealing with potential terrorist attacks."
According to Brent Brown, tight security at Olympic venues in Atlanta could make ill-
prepared downtown buildings and businesses easy targets for terrorist attacks.2 In
agreement Robert Fink stated that terrorists "are going to take a soft target over a
hard target most of the time."3 Fink added that good planning and continued
training of employees helped raise awareness and turn a vulnerable business or
facility into a hard target. The security director's major concern was on the best way
to convince business leaders that the threats from domestic and international
terrorists were real.
Olympic Centennial Park
The Centennial Olympic Park, is located in the center of Atlanta's downtown
Olympic complex within the "Olympic Ring." The Park was described as Bill Payne's
legacy to Atlanta, "one that would long outlive the Games."4 The twenty-one acre
enclave with a price tag of over $50 million, was to be a "low-security village
square" for those with or without tickets to mix and taste the Summer Games
unhindered by the metal detectors and bag searches required at every other
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Olympic site. Price described the Centennial Park as by design, more of a "market
place than a shrine to Olympic sportsmanship,"5 and "a place to seize the main
chance." He further stated that:
The park was surrounded by such highly secured Venues as
the Georgia World Congress Center, the Omni, the Georgia
Dome, the Main Press Center and the hotel that housed the
Dream Team and other prized athletes, . . . Centennial Park
was, in effect, the soft underbelly of an otherwise impregnable
armor.6
Before the Games, security experts were privately critical of ACOG's lack of
"[thorough planning.]"7 To Jeff Beatty, the Centennial Park was wide open for
terrorism. "In the venues they chose security as the most important thing; at
Centennial Park, they chose access. Those two things are diametrically opposed -
open access means poor security."8
Park Jurisdiction
Although the Park is in the heart of downtown, it is actually on state property
and thus the law enforcement responsibility of the State Olympic Law Enforcement
Command (SOLEC) during the Games. The agency was also responsible for
controlling traffic on streets around the park, even though they are within the city of
Atlanta. A number of uniformed law enforcement officers were detailed to the area
by state officials to police the park. Included were two-person undercover "ID
teams" assigned to watch for suspicious activity, such as gangs, petty thefts, and
pickpockets. The "ID teams" were to mingle freely in the crowds and alert
uniformed officers of any potential problems or threats.
325
Bomb Threats
Prior to and following the pipe bombing of the Centennial Park on July 27,
1996, the White House was acutely aware that the Games were quite inviting as a
target for terrorism due to the number of bomb threats posed. All established
guidelines were to be followed in the event of a bomb-threat and disposing of
suspicious packages. Policies were established to minimize the effects of a bomb
threat or suspected explosive device on the normal development of events at an
Olympic venue and to maximize public safety in the event an actual device was
found.
On pre-threat precautions, a number of security measures were adopted to
increase the difficulty of transporting an explosive device into a venue or function
sites; for example, accreditation, established and implemented house rules,
checking bags, utilizing magnetometers, daily sweeps etcetera.
When a bomb threat was received, the person receiving the call was to notify
the Law Enforcement Venue Commander (LEVC) or designee using the proper
code. The LEVC was to notify the on-site EOD Bomb Technician, the Bomb
Management Center and the ACC, which in turn were to notify the JCC/JOC.
Venue security and maintenance personnel were to conduct a search and
investigate any suspicious items found, while overseen by the venue bomb
technician. Using the provided Bomb Threat Checklist, they were required to obtain
the exact word of the caller and exact location of the bomb.
The person receiving the call was to be thoroughly debriefed. Information
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was to be forwarded to the BMC and the ACC as it was received. A Police Incident
Report (PIR), or an Olympic Incident Report (OIR) was to be prepared by the
investigating officer. In an "Open Records Act request by Mother Jones; the GBI in
response reported that the FBI were jointly withholding incident reports on twenty
one suspected packages discovered near Olympic venues by bomb squads.
Seventeen of the twenty-one suspected packages were found on the day of the
Centennial Park explosion."9
The GBI and the APD claimed that only one bomb was found at the Games,
but Olympic officials such as Larry Whitlock, informed Mother Jones that a number
of other fully functional bombs were discovered near Olympic venues and
deactivated.10 Whitlock's claim was supported by Donna Burns, special projects
director of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA). Burns
acknowledged that Olympic bomb squads "disrupted" sixteen packages using a
water cannon or manual deactivation but would not confirm how many were fully
functional.11
During the last Summer Games held in the United States at Los Angeles
1984, a right-wing "Aryan" paramilitary group call the Order, made elaborate plans
to bomb several Olympic sites. Upon arrest and detention of group members,
several like-minded militias vowed to continue what they saw as the "Order's
unfinished business,"12 though no incidents related to that threat were reported
during the Games. A similar occurrence was reported in April 1995 after federal
agents acting on an informant's tip arrested two members of the "112th Battalion of
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the Militia-at-Large for the Republic of Georgia," near Macon, Georgia.13 The two
men were charged with conspiracy and possession of unregistered explosives. It
was widely reported by law enforcement officials at the time that the group had
targeted Olympic venues, though authorities repeatedly denied there was any
connection with the Summer Games in Atlanta.14
Contrary to the 1984 Los Angeles threat, the Atlanta Games were disrupted
by a deadly pipe bomb planted at the Centennial Park. It was a reality that tested
the many years of planning and training. It also tested Bill Payne's rhetoric, which
insisted that the Games "will be the best organized and most efficiently managed in
the history of the Olympic movement."15
Incident Response Structure
Much concern was devoted to the potential occurrence of major incidents,
which could disrupt the 1996 Olympic Games. Accordingly, there was an extensive
level of prior experience brought to the planning and execution of special functions
such as intelligence, tactical, fire and rescue, to crime prevention and suppression
technique as was covered in previous chapters. These additional training and
extensive testing were to perfect capabilities.
The Incident Command Post comprised of sixteen personnel units. At the
top of figure 9 is the venue commander who was responsible for all law
enforcement incident activities, as well as normal operation within the venue. The
Venue Commander was also responsible for the development and implementation
of strategic decisions and the approving, ordering and distribution of resources
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within the venue. The Venue Commander (VC), regardless of range had complete

































Figure 10. Incident Command Post Structure
Courtesy of the Atlanta Police Department.
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Other responsibilities included:
1. Assess the incident.
2. Establish a command post.
3. Notify the ACC.
4. Notify ACOG Security.
5. Assign incident command staff.
6. Conduct initial briefing.
7. Make necessary coordination with other agencies.
8. Request additional resources as needed.
The Information Officer was directly under the Venue Commander. Its
function was to develop accurate and complete information regarding incident
cause, size, situation, resources, and other pertinent data. The Information Officer
was also responsible for the documentation of said information on the incident form
and forwarding the form to the Venue Commanders and aiding in the dissemination
of the information. The Incident Operations Supervisor (IOS) was responsible for
overseeing the incident from the incident location. The IOS was to implement the
strategies and tactics under the direction of the Venue Commander. Other
responsibilities included:
1. Continuous appraisal of the tactical situation.
2. Providing the command post with incident related information as it
occurs.
3. Briefing the Venue Commander on deployments.




The purpose of incident reporting was to establish guidelines for the
gathering of information related to the law enforcement and security functions of the
1996 Olympic Games. However, the success of the 1996 Games was in large part,
dependent upon the free flow of information between participating agencies. In
order to encourage and speed that flow of information, temporary procedures were
put in place for the duration of the Games. The method and procedures outlined
below were to insure that information were collected and evaluated in the most
efficient manner possible. It was anticipated that information will come to security
officials from citizens, ticket holders, Olympic family members, intelligence services,
police agencies and the media, in various forms and for various reasons. Little of
that information required traditional crime reports, but its collection was to be no
less critical.
The procedures that followed were to de-formalize the information gathering
process as much as was possible while ensuring that all necessary information
were gathered in a timely and complete manner. The two forms of reporting
procedures were Olympic Incident Reports (OIP's) and Police Incident Reports
(PIR's). The OIR's was to be completed by any security official (ACOG or police)
who felt they had information which should be transmitted to other security or law
enforcement personnel. The six general categories of this information are:
1. General Information (Intelligence - This was information that
may alert others to potential problems or crimes that could
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occur during the Olympics. For instance, an Olympic
athletes reporting that he or she overheard a group of
foreigners talking about demonstrations should their team fail
to win a medal.
2. Sick/Injured Persons
3. Damaged Property
4. Lost, Found or Mislaid Property
5. Stolen Property
6. Suspicious person, vehicles, and activities.
Police Incident Reports (PIRs)
While most information were transmitted with an OIR, there were cases that
required official police reports. These incidents are handled by police officers as
they normally would with two exceptions:
1. They were to request another officer to handle the report if
they are on a fixed post with other duties.
2. If the report was of such a nature that it would normally be
screened by department policy the reporting party was to be
sent to the venue command post to make the report.
However, some discretional options were allowed in some circumstances.
1. OIRs were to be completed by law enforcement venue and
security personnel at the time the information was received
and turned into the venue command post immediately. If the
reporting party was assigned to a fixed post, they were to radio
the venue command post and advise that they had an OIR to
be picked up.
2. Venue command post personnel was to be responsible for
evaluating the information and distributing it to necessary
personnel. At the very least, the information was to be faxed
immediately to the Joint Coordination Center and the Agency
Command Center.
332
3. The Joint Coordination Center was responsible for entering the
event into Info 96 and assigning a log number. This was to
make the event available to all Info 96 users. If the event was
of such a sensitive nature that JCC personnel felt logging on
Info 96 was inappropriate, they were to handle such
distribution by FAX or other means to the Olympic Intelligence
Center or other Agency Command Centers.
4. The Agency Command Center was to evaluate each incident
to determine if it should be logged as an agency report or
needed follow-up. If the report was to become an agency
report, the ACC was to assign it a case number and insure its
proper filing. If, in the opinion ofACC personnel the incident
needed further follow-up, they were to insure that the request
was made to the proper personnel.
5. The original copy of all OIR's was to remain at the venue
command post throughout the Games at which time they were
to be turned over to the Agency Command Center.
Responding to the Bomb Scene
Law Enforcement Officers responding to the bombing scene were to
establish a command post and immediately deploy personnel for perimeter control,
to secure the scene. No one was to be allowed in the area until the EOD
technicians had arrived and cleared entry to the damaged area. This was to ensure
that proper investigative procedures may be followed, evidence was to be protected
from contamination, and danger from a secondary explosion was reduced.
Extreme caution was to be exercised in any rescue attempt by:
1. Requesting a bomb disposal unit, fire and rescue unit, and
other emergency units and utility services if necessary.
2. Preservation of life and rescue of any victim as the first
concern.
3. Estimating the size of the incident and the number of law
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enforcement officers needed to set up a large enough
perimeter to secure the scene. Contamination of evidence
was of a concern since minute bomb fragments are essential
evidence and may be destroyed by walking through the debris.
Therefore, the scene was to be treated as though it was a
homicide or other serious crime.
4. Attempting to locate witnesses to the incident and keeping
them at the scene until the EOD investigator arrived.
In Atlanta, the nature of the incident at the Centennial Park determined the
different unit and law enforcement support. For example, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had on-call response teams available to respond and
assist with major fires, thefts of explosives, post blast investigations, and processing
of evidence as needed. ATF responses were to be coordinated through the
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Bomb Management Center (BMC). The FBI
response teams were to conduct investigations and post-blast investigations related
to terrorist activities in areas covered under the federal jurisdictional guidelines.
EOD Representative
The purpose of the EOD Bomb Management Center was to provide
coordination and direction for all Olympic EOD support in the event of an incident
involving an explosive or related device. In addition, the Bomb Coordination Center
(BCC) was an extension of the BMC. In conjunction with and under the direct
auspices of the EOD BMC, the responsibilities of the EOD BCC was to stage EOD
personnel and equipment for ground and possible helicopter response to any EOD-
related incident inside and adjacent to the Olympic Ring on a 24-hour-a-day
schedule.
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In addition to military, federal, state and other local law enforcement EOD
qualified personnel, the EOD BCC was manned by at least seven EOD qualified
Bomb Technicians who were members of the Atlanta Police Bomb Squad (APBS)
along with their equipment. The Bomb Technicians were supported with military
EOD response equipment. If the device was authentic the LE Venue Commander
was to notify the EOD Management Center and the ACC. An EOD team and K-9
team were to be immediately flown from Dobbins Air Force Base at Marietta to
render the device safe or remove the explosive hazard. Once on the scene, the
EOD team assumed control of the situation.
Tactical/SWAT Representative
At the Command and Control were three elements within the FBI Emergency
Response Team. The first element was the Assessment Team, the second element
was the Tactical Teams, and the third element was the Command element
containing the Mobile Tactical Operations Center (MTOC), a Mobile Command Post
and a communication vehicle. This group of thirty-two persons including TOC
personnel were stationed at City Hall East. In support of this Emergency Response
mission were two DEA helicopters at Peachtree/Dekalb airport, and two UHIB Huey
helicopters at Dobbins Air Force Base.
In an incident such as the Park Bombing, the Assessment Team and an eight
person Tactical Team were dispatched by the Special Agent In-Charge (SAC) in the
FBI Operation Center (FBIOC) to respond directly to the scene of the incident
where the Assessment Team supervisor was to meet with the ranking law
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enforcement person at the site. The supervisor was to contact the Atlanta SAC to
brief him or her about the situation. The SAC in turn, was to decide whether or not
the Bureau was to assume command and control of the incident and if additional
assets should be committed to the resolution of the incident. The deployment of the
FBI tactical teams required that, the SAC and/or ASAC proceed to the incident
scene to assume command and control.
The second element dispatched through the on-duty SAC authorization were,
the two additional eight-person Tactical Teams. The team's movement was either
by ground vehicle or by helicopters. Deployment by helicopter was coordinated
with and approved by the on-duty SAC. It should be noted that the on-duty SAC
must approve utilization of helicopters to transport FBI resources. The Operations
Center coordinated in conjunction with the Olympic Law Enforcement Air Security
Operation Center and the agency responsible for the incident venue, were to
coordinate the deployment by helicopters.
The third element dispatched was the command element which included the
Mobile Command Operations Center (MCOC), the Mobile Command Post (MCP),
and the Communications vehicle. These vehicles were to proceed directly to the
scene of the incident and be directed in their deployment by the Assessment Team
Supervisor, the SWAT team leader, and the Crisis Management Coordinator.
During the process, the FBIOC remained in constant contact with the tactical
response elements in order to provide the latest intelligence updates on the
situation. The FBIOC was also responsible for alerting the tactical team on standby
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to prepare and assume duty at the tactical CP at City Hall East. The US Marshall's
Command Post, was used as a conference room by the SAC. The US Marshall's
TOC was dispatched for the Assessment Team and the Emergency Response
element. This vehicle was deployed to support tactical operations at the crisis site.
The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) Commanded by the Special Agent
In-Charge was deployed to assist the Atlanta SAC during the Olympic Games.
Bombing Investigative Role
The Centennial Olympic Park was closed to tens of thousands of visitors
after a "crude homemade pipe bomb exploded at 1:21 a.m., Saturday morning,
killing two and causing injuries to more than one hundred eleven people.16 The
bombing was condemned by the Olympic officials, athletes, the State Department
and throughout the world. President Clinton described the bombing as "an evil act
of terror... an act of cowardice that stands in sharp contrast to the courage of the
Olympic athletes."17 He vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice.
The nature of the incident and where the property was located granted
jurisdictional authority to both the federal and state agencies to investigate the
bombing of Centennial Olympic Park. Since the bombing was investigated as a
terrorist act, the lead responsibility of the probe shifted to the FBI. The FBI bomb
experts' role in conjunction with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF), was to identify the type of explosive device used. The two agencies were to
determine from their files whether the bombing fits profiles of previous bombings,
either in the method or the type of explosives used. During the criminal
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investigation, state officials deployed a task force of over a hundred additional
members of the Georgia National Guard to the downtown area. Additional
"thousands of military personnel and security officers were deployed by Olympic
officials to "re-sweep" all Olympic venues for explosive devices."18
The investigating officials were hesitant to "point a finger too quickly for fear
of wrongly singling out one group"19 as being responsible for the bombing, as in the
case of the Oklahoma City bombing. Analyzing the explosive device, security
experts described them as "a nail-studded pipe bomb,"20 most often "the weapon of
choice for domestic groups, particularly right-wing militias than international terrorist
organizations."21 Brian Levin who monitored hate crimes believed the pipe bomber
could come from three profile groups: (a) an anti-government supremacist, or militia
group, (b) a sociopath, or (c) someone with a personal vendetta.22 Levin pointed to
the "random acts of terrorism" mantra that is a staple among anti-government
terrorists who might view the Olympics as a movement toward a New World Order
or government takeover. Such groups known as "leaderless resistance," was
coined by the White Supremacist, and has been co-opted in the extreme anti-
government movement. Larry Preston Williams disagrees. He described the
bombing as "the work of a loner," that "the park was picked more for its
accessibility and easy exit rather than some symbolic sponsor."23 The FBI's initial
suspect was a private security guard Richard Jewell assigned to guard the AT & T
pavilion, the area of the blast. Jewell was described by the FBI as one "who has a
history of over-zealous policing in Habersham County."24 FBI investigators
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concluded that Jewell fit the profile of a lone bomber, who placed the 911 call.
According to Scruggs and Martz, "this profile generally includes a frustrated white
man who is a former police officer, member of the military or police "wanna be" who
seeks to become a hero."25 Jewell was later cleared of any role in the bombing but
his investigation led to disciplinary actions against FBI agents and a probe by the
Senate Judicial Subcommittee on terrorism into the release and publication of
Jewell's name by the media.26
It should be noted that problems in Olympic Games, has been linked to
private security guards in the past. For example, a private security guard who
attempted to trade his badge for an Olympic pin at the 1980 Winter Games in Lake
Placid, New York, was rejected because the pin owner already had a badge.27
Similarly, at the 1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles, one private security guard
assigned to check buses for bombs, was caught smoking marijuana on the job.
Another arrested for rape, one discovered with a concealed weapon in the athletes
village and several busted after burglarizing athletes' rooms. Others failed to report
for duty after receiving their uniforms and badges.28
In Atlanta during the Opening Ceremony, Roland Atkins, an unofficial
security guard was arrested with a knife and a loaded handgun as he forged his
way through security gates into the Olympic Stadium. "Atkins was charged with
criminal trespass, carrying a pistol without license and theft of service."29 The
aforementioned past Olympic incidents could explain why FBI investigators were
quick to name Richard Jewell as the park bombing prime suspect.
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On December 9, 1996, after four months of unsuccessful internal
investigation leading to the bombing of the Centennial Park, the FBI Director, Louis
Freeh solicited for public help. He offered a "$500,000"30 reward for information
leading to an arrest in the Olympic Park bombing. In July 1997, with the first
anniversary of the Olympic Park bombing looming, the FBI again turned to the
public for help by releasing a photo of a mystery man in shadow with a hooded
sweat shirt sitting on the bench where the bomb was placed about twenty minutes
before it went off.31 The federal investigators as a follow-up in November 1997
displayed several components similar to those used in the explosions. The
investigators repeated the theory that the incidents may have been carried out by
the same person or group.32 Among the key items displayed were:
1. Military style or backpack style olive green camera bags.
2. Steel plates of various thickness.
3. Flooring and masonry nails commonly used at construction sites.
4. No. 7 and No. 9 smokeless gunpowder.
5. Dynamite sticks and B batteries.
6. Alarm clocks 8 duct tape.
7. Twisted iron wire and 10 plastic storage containers.33
There were a series of explosions proceeding the July 27,1996 Olympic Park
bombing. For example, in January 1997, two bombs exploded outside an Atlanta
area women's clinic. Within the same year, another bomb detonated at an Atlanta
night club with mostly lesbian clientele. The third bombing occurred January 29,
34
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1998 in a Birmingham, Alabama women's clinic known to perform abortions/
Investigators have hypothesized that a serial bomber could be responsible
for all four attacks including the 1996 Park bombing. Eric Robert Rudolph was
named as a suspect in the Birmingham bombing on February 14, 1998. Steel
plates from the bomb that exploded in the Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park were
linked to Eric Robert Rudolph. FBI investigators also explained that nails used as
shrapnel in that attack matched nails found in Rudolph's rented storage shed in
North Carolina. Despite a massive search, federal agents have been unable to
locate Rudolph and the Centennial Park bombing remains unresolved.
The 911 Call and ERT Alert
The unanswered question is whether the reduced staffing which created a
shortfall in security personnel, played any part in the glitches to the 911 emergency
system that resulted in the failure to inform state law enforcement officials that a
threat had been called in about a bomb in Centennial Olympic Park?
The ACOG Security Chief, Bill Rathburn, in his defense of the charge by
critics explained; though "security guards, military personnel and law enforcement
officers on duty were stretched thin throughout the city and venues,"35 that the
shortfall did not reduce staffing to a dangerous level. An examination of the joint
communications network following the Centennial Park bombing reveals what may
be described as an information breakdown. There is a disagreement as to the exact
time the bomb threat was first received by the city's chaotic 911 emergency
telephone operation. The 911 system documents suggest that approximately ten
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minutes may have lapsed before Atlanta Police official took action.36
Atlanta Police Chief Beverly Harvard at first denied any delay in responding
to the bomb threat. She later acknowledged the "lag between the time a 911 call
warned officials of a bomb at Centennial Olympic Park and police response to it."37
The proper protocol as described earlier in this chapter, was that the bomb
threat should have been relayed directly from 911 to the Atlanta Police
Department's liaison in the Joint Command Center (JCC), City Hall East. The
Police Department in turn should have immediately transmitted that information to
the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command (SOLEC) liaison. The Bomb
Management Center (BMC) should have been third in line to be notified of the
potential of the deadly explosive. Contrary to the correct protocol, an Atlanta police
officer was dispatched to the pay phone where the 911 threat originated, while
another officer was sent to the park. The lapse in time due to improper notification
of appropriate Agency Command (ACC), was seen by State officials as "a
hindrance to the evacuation process."38
Munich and Atlanta Incidents Compared
"The Games Must Go On" and "The Games Will Go On"
The above statements were made by two International Olympic Committee
(IOC) officials in separate but similar circumstances within a twenty-four year
period. The former was delivered by Avery Brundage, the IOC president after a
twenty-four-hour postponement of the XXth Olympiad, following terrorist killing of
Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village, September 5,1972. The latter announcement
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was by Francois Carrard, the director general of the IOC after a homemade pipe
bomb exploded in Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park during the XXVIth Olympiad,
July 27, 1996. Those emphatic words "were an echo of the last time that violence
devastated, but did not halt, the Olympic Games."39
Terrorist Attack on Munich -1972
The International Olympic Committee (IOC), experienced its bloodiest
incident in Olympic history at Munich, West Germany. The Games were interrupted
on September 5th when the first Olympic terrorist incident brought death in an event
unprecedented in the history of the Games.
Members of Black September broke into the Israeli quarters at the Olympic
Compound in Munich, initially killing two Israeli athletes and taking nine hostages.
After tedious negotiations the incident was terminated in a Shootout with the
German police. Five of the Arab terrorists involved were subsequently shot dead in
a gun battle at Furstenfeldbruck Airfield, some twenty miles from Munich, while a
German police official was also killed by the terrorists. The total death toll in
Munich was seventeen; that is, eleven Israeli athletes, five Arab terrorists and a
German policeman. The three surviving terrorists, two of whom were wounded,
were released following the hijacking of a Lufthansa jet the following month.40
The Black September Organization is described as a radical left-wing, anti-
Zionist group and takes its name from the month in 1970 in which the Palestinian
guerrillas, formerly active in Jordan, were crushed by the Jordanian Army after a
bitter nine-day "civil war."41
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The Black September Organization has utilized the full spectrum of terrorist
tactics, which have included kidnapping, hostage taking, bombing, armed ambush,
hijacking, assassinations, and others. This is an organization that has extensive
international terrorist connections, as well as support from many foreign nations
including Libya and the former Soviet Union.42
Munich, the modern German city, with its friendly and hospitable people,
planned the Olympics, not as an exhibition of national might, as was the Games of
1936, but as living proof that the strong, aggressive tensions of our world could be
tamed and discharged in the Games. The Munich Games were planned and
conducted with low security profile to further the Olympic creed: "Sound Mind in a
Sound Body, that will promote friendship among nations."43 The Olympic Committee
decided to utilize a minimum number of uniform police and security personnel in
keeping with a low security profile.
Security and law enforcement command and control was maintained through
a centralized command post and communication center. A limited intelligence
center was established as part of the command post to review all material collected
on political as well as criminal subversives. The law enforcement planners
conducted and reviewed a target assessment survey which included a review of all
critical areas; including but not limited to, places of high spectator concentration,
power plant locations, communication utility locations, VIP and others. In addition,
those country delegates and athletes who might, because of political background,
race or religion be identified as possible targets were reviewed. The Israeli
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contingent was so identified. Meetings were conducted to determine the need for
additional security precautions.
The two entrances leading to each Olympic Village compound was
surrounded by a six-foot high block wall fence with barbed wire at the top. Each
entrance was open from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. and patrolled on a random basis by
security personnel. After 11:00 p.m., these gates were located and patrolled by
uniformed law enforcement personnel on a regular schedule. Access was controlled
by a master personnel list between the 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. schedule. This
control was considered as weak at best. No identification system had been
established because it was felt by the Olympic Committee to be inconvenient to the
participants, journalists, and support personnel. For all of these reasons, security
was kept to a minimum.44
At 4:00 a.m. on September 5, 1972, the peace and tranquility of the XXth
Olympiad was shattered by an attack by the Black September terrorist group on the
Israeli Olympic athletes' apartment. This predawn attack was the beginning of the
24-hour reign of terror and death that brought shame on the German Republic and
began an era of Olympic terrorism. In mid-afternoon after competition had
continued as scheduled, the IOC decided to stop the Games and would not say
when, or even whether, they would resume. That announcement created some
uncertainty and a level of grief among the athletes.45
The four major actors in this short but complex incident during the
negotiation process were the eight members of the Black September terrorist group,
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the West German government, Israeli government, and heads of all Arab states and
governments. There were two different levels of representation of the German
government at the initial stage. One was the local government in Bavaria and the
other was the federal government in Bonn. However, from the terrorists' behavior it
is evident that the perpetrators intended to conduct negotiations at the federal level,
with the government in Bonn, rather than the local government of Bavaria.
The Israeli government was represented by its ambassador to Bonn,
Elyashiv Ben-Horin, who was communicating with Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba
Eban in Jerusalem. The German authorities attempted to use the Arab government
to mediate the release of the hostages but without success. For example, the
Egyptians refused to take part or to help resolve the incident. The German
authorities were entrusted with the handling of the situation by the Israeli
government. This included their contact with the terrorists and doing all that was
necessary to ensure the safety of the hostages.
The Black September key demand was the release of 200 Arab prisoners
held in Israeli jails. On the list also were the names of Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas
Baader, both leaders of a left-wing German terrorist group, and Kozo Okamoto, a
Japanese terrorist who had taken part in the Lod Airport massacre. In addition, the
group demanded a flight out of West Germany to an Arab nation. The authorities
were given three hours to meet all of their demands. During a brief meeting at the
police command post with police, diplomats, and other government authorities,
including the Bavarian Minister of State, officials were briefed by the head of the
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Munich Police. This official explained that he withheld any rescue attempts due to
the possibility of explosives being present.46
At 9:00 p.m. when a final decision was taken, the negotiation had lasted for
roughly fifteen hours. At that point a bus and two helicopters were provided by the
government to transfer the hostages and their captors to Furstenfeldbruck Airfield.
The crisis staff were to ambush the hostage takers at the airport, but the German
official misjudged the number of terrorist and their capabilities. There were too few
police marksmen at the airport. Police officers opened fire as terrorists jumped out
of the helicopters taking several of the hostages with them to the commercial jet.
The resulting fire from the terrorist lasted for more than fifteen minutes. A hand
grenade was detonated by members of the Black September killing the hostages
and some terrorists.
Finally, when the police firing ceased and the location was secured, the
ending result was traumatic: eleven Israeli athletes, one police officer, five Black
September terrorists were dead. Two police officers seriously wounded and three
members of the terrorist group captured.47
Terrorist Attack on Atlanta -1996
Security has evolved into a major production unto itself ever since the XXth
Olympiad Games in Munich in 1972. The security for the 1996 Games was said to
be "the tightest ever in history."48
Twenty-four years after the Munich massacre, the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) again, had relived their worst fear in Atlanta, Georgia. The July
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27 bombing of the Centennial Olympic Park, which killed two and left over 111
people injured, marked the second Olympic terrorist incident in modern Olympic
history.
It should be noted that ACOG was concerned about security as reflected in
correspondence and memos. It also reinforced the organization's political struggles,
its overriding concern not to "blow its budget and its zealous promotion of the
Games."49 An early document on security, called for ["zero assassinations and zero
terrorist attacks or bombings."]50 Security vulnerabilities such as bomb threats and
attempts to plant a bomb were listed. An assault on the Olympic image was
considered a greater threat. But despite the massive $3.1 million security budget,
with 30,000-strong security contingent51 who had rehearsed for threats up to and
including a nuclear attack using stolen reactor fuel, it did not stop a terrorist attack
on the XXVIth Olympiad.
On July 27, 1996 at 12:55 a.m., a security guard observed a suspicious
package near the communication tower. He alerted a law enforcement personnel;
an agent from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) examined the parcel and
called in a bomb-diagnosis team. At 1:06 a.m., David Johnson an FBI agent
reported that a white male with no 'discernible' accent calls 911 and warns of
impending explosion in Centennial Olympic Park within thirty minutes.52 The bomb
ordinance squad, which included FBI agents, ATF agents and military personnel
were joined by other officers to dispense the crowd. By 1:25 a.m., the crude pipe
bomb exploded resulting in the death of a Georgian woman, Alice Hawthorne, a
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Turkish TV Cameraman, Melih Uzunyol, and causing injuries to more than 111
people.53 It also marked the first terrorist attack at the Olympics since the 1972
Games in Munich.
The main key actors in the investigation of the bombing were: the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) at the federal level, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) at the state
level and the Atlanta Police Department, at the local level. Because the explosion
was labeled as a terrorist act, the FBI automatically served as the lead agent in the
investigation, with hundreds of other law enforcement officials under its direction.
In order to determine the source and those responsible for the bombing the
following were studied by forensic experts: tapes from surveillance cameras in and
around the park, the telephone from which the 911 call was made was traced;
checking for fingerprints and footprints, and the remains of the bomb fragments
were gathered from the scene. Others particles were removed from victims' bodies
and flown to the FBI crime laboratory in Washington, D.C. for analysis.
An FBI explosive experts described the crude device as a three two-inch-by-
ten-inch bomb made of screws and nails packed into a pipe and taped together.54
The use of a pipe bomb, augmented by screws and nails packed in plastic freezer
container, could be attributed to homegrown terrorist groups. It is estimated that
sixty percent of American bombings use black-powder or other homemade
explosives packed in plumbing pipe. A federal investigator described it as "the
American way of bombing."55
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The Centennial Park episode was a reminder of the arrests of two Georgia
militia members in April 1996,on charges of conspiracy and possession of
unregistered explosive devices. Although the two men were still in jail during the
bombing, Harry Brandon argued, that if there was a political agenda to the terrorist
attack, one logical place to look was the militia movement.56
Brandon and Roy described the militia movement as rifed with paranoid
fantasies about America's surrendering of its sovereignty to a New World Order.
Both concluded that "the movement perceives the Olympics as a showcase for the
New World Order."57
Presently as I write, no one has claimed responsibility for the Olympic Park
bombing, although investigators have named Eric Rudolph as a suspect to the
bombing. Rudolph has also been linked to the Christian Identity Movement,
according to Brian Levin.58
Munich versus Atlanta
Though all terrorist situations share common denominators, each case has a
twist of uniqueness and dynamics of its own. There is a progressive evolution not
only within each case of terrorist attacks but also from case to case. The learned
experience has been demonstrated in the incidents that occurred in Atlanta
Centennial Olympic Park. Lessons from Munich have been incorporated.
The Munich case occurred in a different continent, Europe. It was selected
to analyze the methods and strategies applied overtime. The current incident, the
Park bombing represents the most experienced continent in acts of terrorism,
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Western Europe. Both cases are compared because of the government policies
that were applied and the ultimate conclusion of those particular incidents. These
cases have captured a sample of policies and responses to acts of confrontational
terrorism.
In Munich 1972, it was Black September's awful masterpiece involving an
established international terrorist group. By comparison, Atlanta is described as
"amateur night" involving a domestic terrorist group. But Atlanta came in the
immediate aftermath of TWA Flight 800 and closed enough in history to Oklahoma
City. It also "leaves in Americans' minds a conviction, that their nation is somewhat
in the process of losing whatever may be left of its old immunity."59
Atlanta was the reverse of Munich. While the Athletes' Village was
vulnerable in Munich, 1972 Games, at the 1996 Games, the safest and most
secured place was the Olympic Village and venues.60
The security and law enforcement contingent in Munich consisted of a total
of 4,905 personnel: 2,000 police officers, 973 criminologists planners and support
personnel, a 347 man task force similar to a United States SWAT team, and 1,558
Olympic security personnel as well as other personnel.61 In Atlanta, over 30,000
law enforcement officers were deployed. In addition was 11,500 National Guard
and active-duty military personnel, including more than 500 Delta Force and SEAL -
Team Six commandos airmen from the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regimen and specially-trained US Army Rangers to serve as part of a backup force
for local police or the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team.62 In the midst of what amounted
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to "an armed camp," it was almost unimaginable that Atlanta would turn out to be
like Munich.
One would anticipate canceling the Munich Games due to what many
considered as "an unnecessary bloodbath on the tarmac."63 The public sentiment in
the United States was almost hysterical in demanding that the Munich Games must
be canceled. But in the midst of brutal human stress, ranging from denial to anger,
to grief and to resolve, the IOC president Avery Brundage announced that the
"Games must go on." To Israel, which had lost its sons, to call off the Olympics was
conceding to terrorists demands.
Unlike the 1972 attack in Munich, the 1996 Olympic Park bombing felt almost
routine. No one advocated for stopping the Atlanta Games. The IOC, ACOG, and
President Clinton never seriously considered canceling the Games. The IOC
director general, Francois Carrard had learned from the slow process in Munich
following the massacre. Carrard and other Olympic officials showed no hesitation
in affirming that the "Games will go on."64
Munich's situation - terrorism as theater is similar to that of Atlanta. One of
the primary purposes of modern terrorism is the exploitation of the media to reach a
broader audience. Criminal activities are generally linked to demands for media
coverage of the event. The hostage taking at the Munich Games demonstrated the
ability of terrorists to command media attention in a manner that instantaneously
conveyed their demands, publicized their objectives to a previously uninformed
public, and limited the policy options with which the West Germany government
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could respond. Similarly, the Atlanta Olympic security hypes were suddenly
overcome by the media's counter-shadow of the Park explosion of July 27, 1996.
Summary
In the 1996 Summer Games, Centennial Park was added to the Atlanta plan
by ACOG less than three years before Games opening ceremonies. The 21-acre
park was to serve as "one of the most visible legacies of the 1996 Summer
Games."65 The Park was (1) intended to make people lose their fear of coming to
downtown at night. (2) It was to represent the physical manifestation of the heart
and soul of the people of the Atlanta community and the history of how "ACOG
welcomed the world."66 (3) it was the spiritual heart of the festival, where thousands
of visitors could party without paying for tickets or pass through metal detectors.
Security at the Park was minimal as compared to the Olympic Village and
venues. On the security spectrum, the athletes' village was at the top end, and the
park on the low end, simply because of the type of facility it was designed to be... a
place for people to mingle freely. Rathbum, as a concern, suggested fencing the
park for crowd control, but Olympic organizers decided to forgo such security
measures as bag searches and metal detectors.67 Again, despite the authorities'
worst fears, unprecedented precautions and a massive security effort, a crude pipe
bomb exploded killing two, and injured more than 111 people.
Prior to the bomb explosion, there was mounting evidence that security
forces may have been overwhelmed with bomb threats. For example, during the
first full week of the Olympics, more than one hundred unattended bags and
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packages were destroyed by security personnel, though none contained bombs.68
Over a dozen of bomb threats were also reported after the Centennial Park blast
which resulted in the daily evacuations of malls and hotels.69
The purpose of the tactical deployment of the Emergency Response Team
(ERT) was to devise a strategy for ACOG security to coordinate with law
enforcement to deploy special trained and equipped tactical personnel to major
incidents or high risk situations related to the 1996 Olympic Games.
The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), commanded by a Special
Agent In-charge (SAC) was deployed to Atlanta to assist the Atlanta SAC during the
Olympic Games. Personnel from the SWAT Training Unit (STU) were assigned to
the Assessment Teams. The Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), consisting of a
seventy-two person Tactical Team, were staged at Dobbins Air Force Base within
the Army Reserve Center. This element maintained a command center on a 24-
hour a day basis and was available to respond to a potentially critical situation. The
HRT was commanded by an ASAC and was subordinate to the SAC, CIRG, and to
the Atlanta SAC, the on-scene commander. Since the bombing occurred within the
Olympic Ring at 1:25 a.m., the Tactical Team at the Navy Reserve Center within the
Olympic Village was dispatched by the FBIOC to the scene.
An investigation by state officials indicated a breakdown in the system
designed to relay information from the emergency dispatchers to the appropriate
law enforcement agency, for example, the Bomb Management Center (BMC). The
911 operators failed to alert the State Olympic Law Enforcement Command
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(SOLEC) of the threat.
The 1972 Munich Games security was totally inadequate for the location
and possible problems, which could have occurred. In addition, the police were
unprepared for the possibility of terrorist activity, even though they were aware of
the potential for disaster which existed in regards to the Isreali-Palestinian problem.
The idea that all nations entering the competition would not regard possible
political problems as appropriate within the period of the Games was not a
possibility. The thoughts were admirable but not realistic in that particular period of
time.
In the case of Atlanta, domestic terrorists' immediate objective may just as
well be revenge, to punish the United States for a perceived grievance, as in the
bombing of the federal building on Oklahoma City in April 29, 1995 and even the
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993. The perpetrators are
less interested in having their involvement advertised and are content to leave a
narrow group of national security officials to understand who has struck and why.
The crude pipe bombing in Atlanta, though not quite so chilling as the
images of the silhouetted gunmen of Munich in 1972, was not what Atlanta's proud
city fathers had anticipated during the glittering opening Ceremonies.
Finally, Atlanta Games will eventually be known in Olympic history, as the
first fatal terrorist attack directed at civilians and, therefore, at the Olympics
themselves, rather than the athletes of a particular country.
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CHAPTER VIM
CONCLUSIONS
The nature of this study is to examine a narrow aspect of a much larger topic.
Therefore, it does not answer all questions pertaining to the subject of Olympic
Security.
This study focuses on the XXVIth Olympiad security planning and
coordination strategies by multiple law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and
federal levels. Its objectives are to explore systematically how Atlanta's interagency
planning structure, called the Olympic Security Support Group (OSSG), was
involved in the development of the security blueprint, and understand the
compelling opportunity to focus their individual expertise at the developmental,
experimental and operational phases and achieve success through teamwork.
Unlike other studies on the subject of the Olympic Games which focused on
the nature of the phenomenon, its roots and trend over time, this researcher
concentrated on the International Olympic Committee and the host government's
reaction to what they perceived as a security threat to the Games. The study sought
to determine if a review of the 1972 XX Olympiad in Munich, West Germany could
reveal strengths and weaknesses in the security precautions taken at the Games,
and aid in recommending safety and security precautions for the 1996 Centennial
Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. The key security precaution was to avoid a
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terrorist attack or disruption of any kind during the Games.
This research is descriptive in nature and is based on the best available
empirical data among unclassified documents. Hence, it attempted to devise a form
of comparison for the host governments. The analysis is conducted on two levels—
aggregate and case studies from previous Games. The comparative case studies
were utilized for illustrative purposes. Therefore, the case studies as illustrative
tools, complement the aggregate data and fit into the holistic approach of this
research, thereby enhancing the conclusions.
Elaborate security measures have become obligatory in major special events
such as Olympic Games. One of the biggest challenges for Olympic host cities
from a security viewpoint, is to avoid the repetition of the first Olympic terrorist
incident during the 1972 Games in Munich.
This dissertation is subdivided into four groups: 1) to review other pertinent
literature as it relates to major special events management in general and terrorism
in particular. 2) to examine and evaluate selected US departments and agencies
with anti-terrorism responsibilities, 3) to analyze the three-phase-model of the 1996
Olympic security measures undertaken by more than forty local, state, and federal
law enforcement agencies responsible for the provision of a safe environment for
the 1996 Games and 4) to determine whether the US counterterrorist procedures
incorporated in the Olympic emergency response structure were adequate to meet
domestic terrorist threats. Finally, to make recommendations based on study
findings to determine if the groups projected as potential threats to the Centennial
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Olympic Games succeeded in carrying out the park bombing. If so, lessons learned
to prevent future Olympic terrorist actions will be discussed.
Definition Flaws
Over the past three decades, terrorism, be it domestic or international, has
been widely written about. A large portion of these writings has been in the form of
newspaper briefs or magazine articles describing some event or group. Other
portions of the literature documented in the form of scholarly research are based on
case studies. One can conclude that the majority of terrorism research is
descriptive in nature. Yet a most persistent myth in the study of terrorism stresses
the subjectivity that supposedly afflicts efforts to define the phenomenon. A single
definition of terrorism acceptable by all is still unknown and the arguments
regarding who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter are not yet resolved. The
lack of any consensus on a definition of terrorism or a topology of its significant
forms hardly bodes well for the explanation of its occurrence.
Some definitional flaws consist of the following: 1) failure to distinguish
between presumed terrorist activities and other forms of coercive action not
normally considered terrorist, 2) when terrorism, however characterized, is primarily
associated with one side or the other in a political struggle. Usually, terrorism is
often identified with revolutionary dissent given the nature of the dominant political
agenda. For example, if one side of a dispute succeeds in attaching the terrorist
label to its adversary, it has gained an important psychological advantage. In this
regard, definitions should focus on the act and recognize that the issue of actors
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and effects are areas for inquiry, not definitional attributes.
Counterterrorism Coordination
Examining the United States Counterterrorism programs, one can identify
over thirty agencies, departments, and offices involved in executing some form of
security services related to terrorism. However, there are three departments within
the government with jurisdictional authority over terrorist incidents: 1) the
Department of State (DOS), 2) The Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and 3) The Department of Transportation/Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The FBI serves as the lead agency responsible for
combating terrorism within the United States and abroad. The lead agency concept
operates on the principle that if an incident falls within one agency's jurisdiction,
that agency coordinates the United States' response toward the incident, other
agencies then provide support as required.
A number of terrorism task forces have been established to enhance
coordination and cooperation, as well as increased intelligence and information
sharing. Among those departments and agencies with counterterrorism
responsibilities for example is the Vice President's Task Force on Combating
Terrorism. It serves as a catalyst for the emergence of an active and effective
counterterrorism community. While the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, strengthened
the FBI's cooperative efforts with local and state law enforcement agencies.
Interagency policy coordination has been strengthened on the federal level
through cooperative working relationship among the following agencies: the Bureau
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of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
US Customs and US Secret Service (USSS). At the departmental level it includes:
the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of
State (DOS) and the Department of Transportation (DOT). These federal agencies
and departments, work effectively where mutual jurisdictional interests are involved.
The Policy coordinating Committee on Terrorism (PCCT) is responsible for the
development of overall policy of the United States regarding international terrorism.
This group is chaired by the Department of State. The US Counterterrorism
program operates on a consistent, aggressive, and proactive approach to the
problem of terrorism.
The United States' government counterterrorism initiatives have been guided
by the US President's Directives and Legislation. A Presidential Directive such as
the 1982 Ronald Reagan National Security Decision Directive fosters the FBI's
responsibility of investigating terrorism in the United States. While the 1995 Clinton
Presidential Decision Directives 39 further articulated and defined the roles of
members of the United States counterterrorism community.1 Similarly, the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 clearly stated that any hostage taken or physical
violence committed against a United States national abroad, during a terrorist act,
gives the FBI the authority to conduct an investigation with the cooperation of the
host country.2 The FBI's objective is two-fold: first, to identify and prevent terrorist
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acts before they occur; and second, to investigate, apprehend, convict and
incarcerate those terrorists should an act of terrorism occur.
The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) - the research and
development (R & D) subcommittee of the Policy Coordination Committee on
Terrorism (PCCT)3 serves as the only interagency coordinating group with a broad
perspective on the full range of technology development for fighting terrorism.4 The
broad agency participation is intended to maximize expertise and to assure that
unnecessary duplication does not occur.
The Three-Phase Model
The size of the 1996 Summer Olympic Games by comparison to past Games
was the largest in Olympic history. The vast size therefore required appropriate
security strategies in preparation for a range of contingencies. These contingencies
were required of the Atlanta Olympic security organizers in order to minimize risks
and threats during the Games. The Centennial Games were organized in three
phases; the Developmental, Experimental and Operational Phase. First, an
analysis of the Olympic Security revealed that a Public Safety Planning Structure
was necessary to facilitate the interagency planning process at the Developmental
Phase. It also showed that the establishment of the Olympic Security Support
Group (OSSG), composed of over forty agency members from local, state, and
federal levels to plan for the Games, was based on the Atlanta's version of the
Olympic Model. While interagency planners, namely; the OSSG, Olympic security
Planning Coordination Committee (OSPCC) and the Integrated Planning Group
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(IPG), continued with the planning process to provide guidance and standards for
the Games' safety. Significant responsibilities rested with individual agencies and
the nineteen subcommittees.
The Atlanta Police Department (APD) created a separate division to
coordinate and manage Olympic Security operations. APD participated at all level
of the OSSG, served as the chair of OSPCC and planners participated in all of the
subcommittees. The acquisition of resources was critical on several levels. At the
planning level, the Department of Defense Office of Special Events (OSE), was to
serve as the primary source of security materials and expertise by providing
communications equipment, computers, furniture, security fencing, specialized
security equipment, logistical support, and professional guidance. The Federal
Government was to serve as a major supplier of security resources including the
assignment of agents from a variety of federal law enforcement agencies to support
the local and state law enforcement mission. In addition to providing extensive
support in the areas of tactical response, bombs/EOD, intelligence and dignitary
protection. The final strategy at this level, was to use the Department of Defense
(DOD) military personnel consisting chiefly of military and security police to assist
the APD with Olympic-related traffic management duties. Therefore, effective
coordination and cooperation of the integration of the multi-agents from all levels of
the government including military personnel into Olympic security operations
required extensive planning at the Developmental Phase.
Second, training requirement received attention during the Experimental
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Phase. The OSSG Training Subcommittee produced the Master Training Calendar
which listed all scheduled public safety training courses at the agency and
interagency level of participating public safety agencies. At the agency level, the
APD's normal training cycle covered state-mandated, in-service training and
included the unique duties and responsibilities associated with Olympic security
operations. In addition to formal classes; seminars, home study materials, and roll
call videos, the Law Enforcement Handbook was utilized. At the interagency level,
outside training opportunities was provided by ATF, FBI and the United States
Secret Services for local law enforcement officers.
The two training packages designed at both the agency and interagency
levels were 1) training topics and 2) venue training exercises. Training topics
ranges from accreditation, bomb threats, diplomatic immunity to terrorist attacks,
while the venue training exercises included; Table Top, Field Test, Command Post
and seminars. These simulated exercises were to eliminate confusion about roles
and clarify the different areas of responsibility.
The important aspect of the Experimental Phase was to validate Olympic
Security plan. The Table Top, Command Post and field exercises involving the
different scenarios clearly showed how all aspects of Olympic security were to be
supported and provided for. The application of the Experimental Phase uncovered
shortcomings and deficiencies which are generally much easier to correct than
during the Operational Phase.
Third, Olympic Security roles at the Operational Phase, were of two-fold: 1)
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the government's law enforcement role and 2) the Atlanta Committees for the
Olympic Games' (ACOG) private security role. Government law enforcement
agencies provided a safe and secure environment for the Games while maintaining
a normal level of public safety services in their respective jurisdiction. These
agencies were responsible for traditional law enforcement duties including all arrest
situations, emergency responses, criminal investigations, bomb/EOD, tactical
responses, dignitary protection, air support, traffic control on public roadways and
general assistance to private security providers. ACOG Security personnel were
drawn from four primary sources; 1.) volunteers from out of state police
departments, 2.) volunteers from other professions with authoritative
responsibilities, 3.) security personnel from private security companies and 4.)
military personnel from the Department of Defense (DOD). During this phase, more
than twenty-five thousand American soldiers, private security guards, volunteers,
and police officers from the United States and foreign law enforcement agencies
screened visitors and vehicles, controlled crowds and checked bags for suspicious
contents. US special forces teams were on alert throughout the Olympics as was
four police SWAT teams, an FBI hostage-rescue team and several bomb-disposal
teams. The White House also made available a new Chemical and Biological
Incident Response Force (BIRF) to the Games.5
The primary role of ACOG private security personnel emphasized security
functions inside of Olympic venues and Olympic Family transportation. ACOG
Security personnel were responsible for access control, crowd management, and
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ACOG asset protection at Olympic venues. Additional responsibilities included:
magnetometer screening, contraband searches, accreditation badge checking, and
general enforcement of all house rules. APD concept of operations was to provide
centralized management over decentralized operations.
Coordination during the Olympic Games Operational Phase, was facilitated
by the collocation of law enforcement and security personnel at the Joint
Coordination Center (JCC) and law enforcement personnel at the ACOG security
command and central center. JCC served as a channel to ensure the timely flow of
vital information to over forty public safety agencies providing Olympic Security
services; it was not a command center. Live video feeds from automated Traffic
Management System (ATMS), Atlanta Olympic Broadcast Center (AOBC), the
APD's airship video cameras, close circuit cameras at the Olympic Village and
others were accessed by law enforcement agencies from their respective Agency
Command Center (ACC). This information from the JCC helped facilitate the highest
degree of coordination between participating law enforcement agencies.
To keep the 1996 Games safe, was a mix of active Reserve and National
Guards. Over 10,000 military personnel were assigned by Pentagon, but because
federal law prohibits military personnel engagement in law enforcement duties, the
state guards were responsible for coordinating the Games security mission through
the Olympic Joint Task Force (OJTF). To this effect, the Georgia National Guard
under the State control deployed over 4,500 of its troops from forty-seven states for
Olympic duties, and about 4,000 were involved in security-related positions.6
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Finally, it should be noted that the Developmental, Experimental, and
Operational Phases were better focused and more successful when agency roles
were defined and understood. Primary jurisdiction was generally the basis for an
agency assignment to function at venue sites. The cooperative efforts that were
emphasized from the very first day of the planning including the relationship
between public and private elements such as the OSSG and OSPCC with the
ACOG, played a pivotal role during the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games.
Olympic Games, by their very nature, according to the broad definition of
major special events, have come to require elaborate security measures. During
the Atlanta Games, prior to the Centennial Park bombing, threat assessment in
areas of vulnerability were analyzed by security planners.
A terrorist attack against a specific athlete or group of athletes was the
method used during the 1972 Munich Games. In Atlanta, an Olympic Intelligence
Center (OIC) under the FBI command, with experts from other agencies including
the CIA's Counter-terrorism Center was established to gather, coordinate, and
disseminate criminal extremism and terrorism intelligence threat information. As a
multi-agency center, the OIC coordinated the efforts of various local, state and
federal intelligence and law enforcement organizations by having representatives
from each agency work together in a centralized location and exchange information.
The FBI has successfully employed the newly developed "Domestic Threat
Warning System" (DTWS) to transmit threat warning messages that have been
thoroughly coordinated through the United States intelligence community.
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The FBI's ultimate goal was to provide the appropriate level of security at
an Olympic venues, based on the most current information available in the
prevention of terrorist and major criminal activities during the 1996 Summer Olympic
Games. However, assessing the terrorist threat to the United States have always
presented a challenge. Two terrorist groups; 1) indigenous homegrown groups that
currently operate in the United States and 2) the international groups with
operational capabilities in the United States were monitored. Indigenous groups
such as the Aryan Nation, a right-wing supremacist, has demonstrated
sophisticated tactical capabilities and has assassinated law enforcement personnel
in the conduct of their action. For example, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City bombing which resulted in over one hundred sixty-eight deaths7 is
classified as a right-wing attack on the government. This is considered the worst
terrorist incident on American soil. It further affirmed that the aim and motivation of
right-wing extremists span a broad spectrum of anti-federalist and seditious beliefs
and radical and religious hatred, masked by a transparent veneer of religious
precepts.
The July 27, 1996 Centennial Park bombing despite a massive $303 million
security operation, with more than 30,000 police officers, private security guards,
military personnel and special agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and other auxiliary agencies, has proven that terrorism is always one step ahead of
government responses and learning to survive. It could be argued that the
perceived emergency response structure incorporated at the Developmental Phase
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for the 1996Games by the Olympic Security Planners in theory was a sound effort.
Venue commanders were expected to identify all areas of their venue
operations plan and develop each area in their respective plans. Prior to
implementation of their venue operation plan, all outstanding issues were to be
resolved within the OSSG planning structure and their agency. This included; a),
defining the roles of support agencies with any secondary jurisdiction with the
support of MOU/MAA of required, and b). developing procedures for reporting all
Olympic-related public safety incidents to the ACC and JCC or JOC. For example,
minor incidents required no incident reports, but entry into a logbook; while
significant incidents, report through the proper channels was required.
The most up-to-date technological advances in the security industry and
state of the art equipment were utilized. It ranged from the latest in communication,
intrusion devices and video surveillance equipment at the tactical to omni
directional closed-circuit TV cameras, sometimes referred to as "speed-domes," at
the Olympic villages. The most advanced computer programs to provide the
necessary intelligence on any person or group planning disruptive or destructive
activities were employed by ITAG with the OIC.
The findings of the study recognized that there were administrative and
organizational flaws in the decision-making process. Various gaps were discovered
within the chain of command. For example, the relay of information between the
APD agency command center, the JCC, SOLEC, and BMC. Also, that security
forces may have been overwhelmed with bomb threats and reports of suspicious
373
packages. Furthermore, incidents reported to the Bomb Management Center (BMC)
were significantly higher than anticipated. Finally, shortage of manpower,
excessive working hours of security personnel, and fatigue may as well have
explained the poor coordination response to the bomb explosion at Centennial
Olympic Park.
Using the case study approach, the Black September terrorist incident of
1972 in Munich, West Germany was assessed in order to evaluate US
counterterrorism measures in the event of an attack, in terms of law enforcement
agencies' effectiveness and jurisdictional authority.
Atlanta, compared to Munich, indicated that each incident is unique. Tragic
as the actual number is, however, the bomb-shattering effect had little to do with
numbers. Like nearly every act of terrorism, placing the device was the ultimate
beat-the-system game by the bomber.
Study findings of the 1972 terrorist attack during the Munich Games and the
Centennial Park Bombing during the Atlanta Games, suggest that security
preparations will remain a massive undertaking for future host cities. Therefore,
developing a comprehensive Olympic Security plan will remain a complex and
coordinated task.
Tragic as the actual number is, however, the bomb-shattering effect had little to do
with numbers. Like nearly every act of terrorism, placing the device was the
ultimate beat-the-system game by the bomber.
In the final analysis, the Atlanta Games will go down in history and eventually
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be remembered as the first fatal terrorist attack directed at the civilian population
and, therefore, at the Olympics themselves rather than the athletes of a particular
country as was the case at the Munich Games. The best an Olympic host city can
hope for is that the few images with which it will forever be linked are of athletic
feats, not of the deaths and bomb threats.
Endnotes
'U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Terrorism in
the United States 1995." (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office
1997), 17.
2lbid.
3The PCCT is the successor committee to the Interagency Group on
Terrorism, referred to in Chapter III.
4Another group, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, has
help fund R & D in the Counterterrorism area, but focuses on technologies of
particular interest to the intelligence community.
5Douglas Pasternak and Jennifer Seter, "Let the Games Begin," U.S. News&
World Report (June 1996): 58-59.
6Rhonda Cook, "Duty turns tragic for 2 in Guard," The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution. 5 August 1996, sec. B, p. 1.
7Douglas Pasternak and Jennifer Seter, "Let the Games Begin," 60.
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APPENDIX B
LAW ENFORCEMENT'S ROLE VS. ACOG SECURITY'S ROLE
ROLE INSIDE OF A VENUE ROLE OUTSIDE OF A VENUE
Law Enforcement .
• All Arrest Situations
• Criminal Investigations •
• Crowd/Demonstration Control






• General Assistance to Private
Security when Requested
ACOG/Private Security
Perimeter and Interior access control
Magnetometer Screening
Contraband Searches
Checking out Accreditation Badges
Crowd Management
ACOG Asset Protection
Intrusion Deterrence and Detection
Traffic Control (Private Parking Lots)
Olympic Family Security
Enforcement of House Rules
Normal and Routine Public Safety Duties
and Responsibilities
Enhanced Patrols in Parks, Shopping and
Entertainment Areas
Enhanced Traffic Control
In-Transit Security (Safe Corridors,




• Badminton (Georgia State
University)
•• asagseaak
• Boxing (Georgia Tech) J
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